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Don't tell me that the rich don't know,
Sooner or later it all comes down to money.
-Bruce Springsteen
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ABSTRACT
The focus of this dissertation is campaign spending in congressional elections. I
examine the benefits that candidates receive from campaign expenditures. I think that
challengers receive greater benefits from spending than incumbents, but that the extent
of these benefits depends on the type of challenger. High-quality challengers are those
that have previous experience in an important elective office, while low-quality
challengers lack this experience.
Because o f this experience, high-quality challengers enjoy a higher level of
recognition among the electorate than low-quality challengers. 1 think that the benefits
that challengers receive from expenditures are inversely related to the level of
recognition that voters have o f these challengers, so that low-quality challengers should
receive greater benefits from spending than high-quality challengers. 1call this the
voter recognition theory.
The voter recognition theory applies equally well to elections for the House and
Senate. Incumbents from both chambers maintain high levels of recognition among the
electorate, so the difference in spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is
determined by the quality of challengers. The Senate is the more prestigious of the two
chambers. Consequently, 1think that Senate elections attract more high-quality
challengers than House elections. Low-quality challengers should receive much higher
benefits than incumbents, while high-quality challengers should receive benefits that
are roughly equal to incumbents. Thus, I think that the difference in spending benefits
between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections than in House
elections.
In order to test these assumptions, I collect data for House and Senate elections
from 1974 to 1994. Besides the main variables of interest-candidate spending and
challenger political quality-I examine other relevant variables, such as party
x
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identification, incumbent controversy, challenger celebrity, and state unemployment
level. My analysis of these variables includes descriptive statistics and multiple
regression.
Virtually all o f the results support my key assumptions. The difference in
spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections
because these elections have more high-quality challengers. Several interesting areas
are available for future research, and the voter recognition theory provides a valid
framework within which to conduct this research.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
If you close your eyes and try hard enough, you can imagine the nation's elected
officials standing shoulder-to-shoulder and singing this line in glorious unison in front
of the United States Capitol. The importance of money in elections, especially those
for national office, has become one of the undisputed truisms of American politics over
the past two decades. While political scientists often dispute the traditional wisdom
emanating from the vestibules of power, the case of campaign spending provides an
instance where the scholarly evidence seems to support the "real world" assumptions.
Numerous studies have shown that campaign expenditures have both a direct and an
indirect impact on the actual vote in legislative elections.
This impact is available to incumbents and challengers, to Democrats and
Republicans, and to candidates for the House o f Representatives and the Senate. The
inclusive nature of money's influence has caused all serious candidates to respond to its
siren call. Candidates who allow that call to go unheeded risk exposing themselves to
opponents who have not. Candidates feel an urgent need to maintain an approximate
parity with their opponents in order to sustain their own campaigns and present
themselves as viable candidates.
This environment of financial brinkmanship seems to mirror the international
security dilemma of an upwardly spiraling arms race (Sorauf, 1988). A huge
discrepancy in campaign war chests leads to a perceived instability in the contest
Candidates who are disadvantaged make a concerted effort to match their opponents'
level of spending in order to achieve balance in the contest. O f course, this aggressive
proliferation o f campaign funds will be viewed by the previously advantaged candidates
as a threat to their electoral security, so that they must also increase their funds. This

1
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pattern of escalation continues unabated. Unlike the international arena, however, the
domestic electoral system provides for a peaceful end-game known as an election.
With almost all candidates increasingly relying on huge inflows o f cash in order
to wage competitive campaigns, the overall cost of running for office has naturally
increased. The average cost per candidate for a House campaign in 1978 was $109,440,
while in 1998 that figure jumped to $472,468. The average cost per candidate for a
Senate campaign has rocketed from $951,405 in 1978 to $3.48 million in 1998. As
mentioned above, both parties have exhibited these increases. House Democrats went
from spending an average of $108,986 in 1978 to $426,974 in 1998; House
Republicans went from $109,995 in 1978 to $517,730 in 1998. In the upper chamber,
Democratic candidates spent an average o f $762,831 in 1978 and $3.30 million in
1998; Republicans went from $1.15 million in 1978 to $3.67 million in 1998 (Omstein,
Mann, and Malbin, 1996: 81 & 85). * The explosion of campaign costs and its related
consequences concern both scholars and politicians.
THE RISING COST OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS

Explanations
There are three plausible reasons why costs have increased over the past two
decades. The first, and simplest, explanation is that candidates have more people that
they must try to contact today than in the past, 'rhe population size of their geographic
constituencies (Fenno, 1979) has gotten larger.
This is especially apparent in the House o f Representatives. When Congress
passed legislation in 1911 fixing the number of seats in the House at 435, it guaranteed
that a burgeoning national population would translate into larger district populations,
since more seats could not be added to keep the representative-to-people ratio fairly
low. As a result, the mean population in congressional districts has steadily increased
through the years. In 1910, the mean population was 212,019; in 1950, it was 347,875;
2
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by 1980 it had increased to 520,794; as o f 2000, it stands at 626,875 people. This
increase in the size o f legislative constituencies necessarily places greater financial
burdens on House members and senators when they try to reach those constituents in a
campaign.
This leads to the second explanation for increased costs. A primary medium
that candidates use to reach vast numbers of people is television. Television advertising
has become a staple o f most congressional campaigns and virtually all senate
campaigns. A large number of observers, including politicians, point to this as a reason
for escalating campaign costs. Many candidates believe that getting their messages out
on the airwaves is the most efficient means o f communication with voters, particularly
in sizable districts of states where personal contact with a significant number of voters
is impossible (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984:120). Even when television ads might
not be very efficient, such as in districts in large metropolitan areas, many candidates
still perceive the need to resort to this tactic. The feeling that television advertising is
essential regardless of price is an important force in driving up costs (Jacobson, 1992:
83).
One must be careful, though, not to overstate the culpability of television for
this situation. While electronic media advertising is the single most expensive
expenditure in campaigns, it does not comprise anywhere near the percentage of total
campaign spending claimed by some observers. For instance, in 1990 House races only
19.5 percent of the total budget was allocated for television, while in 1990 Senate races
that figure was 32.6 percent (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). These figures clash sharply with
the conventional wisdom, supported by some research findings, that campaigns devote
well over half of their total expenditures to television advertising. A study published in September 1990 by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) set the level of spending on broadcast advertising at 39.5 percent for House races
3
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Table 1.1

Breakdown of Campaign Expenditures for 1990 House Races

Major Category

Incumbents

Challengers

Overhead

$108,049
(27.68)

$36,614
(27.48)

Fund Raising

$69,053
(17.69)

$11,732
(8.81)

Polling

$11,178
(2.86)

$3,615
(2.71)

Advertising*

$87,703
(22.47)

$41,581
(31.21)

Constituent Gifts/
Entertainment

$6,741
(1.73)

$21
(.02)

Donations to Parties
& Other Candidates

$26,492
(6.79)

$299
(.22)

Other Campaign
Activity

$66,929
(17.14)

$34,964
(26.24)

Unitemized Expenses

$14,243
(3.65)

$4,406
(3.31)

Total Expenditures

$390,387
(100.00)

$133,231
(100.00)

Note: Dollar figures are averages. Percentages are in parentheses. Totals are for the
entire two-year cycle.
* Advertising is further disaggregated into electronic media ($76,109-19.50%) and
other media such as radio and newspapers ($11,594—2.97%).
Source: Gold-Plated Politics by Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris (pgs. 14-15 & 18-19).
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Table 1.2

Breakdown of Campaign Expenditures for 1990 Senate Races

Major Categories

Incumbents

Challengers

Overhead

$964,194
(23.51)

$443,188
(26.28)

Fund Raising

$1,264,985
(30.84)

$327,064
(19.39)

Polling

$132,406
(3.23)

$36,387
(2.16)

Advertising*

$1,365,372
(33.29)

$702,682
(41.66)

Constituent Gifts/
Entertainment

$30,038
(-73)

$649
(.04)

Donations to Parties
& Other Candidates

$60,008
(1.46)

$2,847
(.17)

Other Campaign
Activity

$244,721
(5.97)

$152,888
(9.06)

Unitemized Expenses

$39,597
(.97)

$20,906
(1.24)

Total Expenditures

$4,101,338
(100.00)

$1,686,616
(100.00)

Note: Dollar figures are averages. Percentages are in parentheses. Totals are for the
entire six-year cycle.
* Advertising is further disaggregated into electronic media (51,336,206—32.58%) and
other media such as radio and newspapers ($29,166—.71%).
Source: Gold-Plated Politics by Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris (pgs. 16-17 & 20-21).

5
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and 53.5 percent for Senate races. The CRS is a respected branch of the Library o f
Congress that provides members of Congress and committees with information. The
skewed nature of the information in this report could be attributed to the methodology
employed. The findings were based on questionnaires filled out by major party
candidates in competitive races in the 1988 election.^
The information contained in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 is the result of an exhaustive
analysis of all 437,753 separate expenditures reported to the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) by 972 candidates who sought congressional office in 1990. Sara
Fritz and Dwight Morris, two reporters for the Los Angeles Times, placed each of these
expenditures into 1 of 220 different categories, using interviews with campaign officials
and consultants to clarify any ambiguities. The results show that the conventional
wisdom has been "wildly exaggerated" (Fritz and Morris, 1992: 125).
So while television is certainly one cause o f increased costs, it is by no means
the primary cause. This calls into question the logic of those who claim that a reduction
in television advertising rates will lead to a reduction in campaign spending, and thus a
lessening of the insatiable appetite for money. As Fritz and Morris (1992: 126) write,
Television discounts undoubtedly would help to lower campaign costs....But it
probably would not create the huge windfall anticipated by some proponents of
cut-rate media. Nor would it necessarily bring down overall campaign costs.
On the contrary, if broadcast costs were lowered, members of Congress would
probably invest the savings either in buying more television time or in building
a stronger, more elaborate permanent campaign organization.
That last phrase points to the third, and perhaps paramount, explanation for
increased costs. The candidate-centered nature of modem congressional campaigns has
contributed to the increased role of money. There have been numerous studies pointing
to the decline of parties and the rise of personal organizations as sources o f influence in

6
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campaigns (Abramowitz, 1980; Fiorina, 1981; Hinckley, 1980; McAdams and
Johannes, 1983; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Wattenberg, 1994). As Cain, Ferejohn,
and Fiorina (1987:10) note,
...the activities and characteristics of the candidates have increased in
significance in recent years....And they [incumbents] are better known and more
favorably evaluated because, among other factors, they bombard constituents
with missives containing a predominance of favorable material, maintain
extensive district office operations to service their constituencies, use modem
technology to target groups o f constituents with particular policy interests, and
vastly outspend their opponents.
While the above quote focuses on the activities of incumbents, challengers have
also learned how to cultivate supporters by focusing on their own personal
characteristics. Should they gain office, they are then more comfortable using the
aforementioned activities to keep these supporters. This personal constituency must be
nurtured, and politicians find that a green thumb is as important to ensuring a healthy
constituency as it is to ensuring a healthy garden. Since the traditional party apparatus
that could help link candidate to constituency through organizational structures—as well
as keep that constituency loyal through the use o f patronage-has partly eroded,
candidates are often left to their own devices in maintaining an electoral coalition. This
increases candidates' need for money.
This need for campaign funds to maintain a personal fiefdom has precipitated
the rise of another phenomenon: the permanent campaign. There are no longer clearly
delineated lines between campaign periods and governing periods. The candidatecentered organization requires that elected officials constantly pursue the financial
means with which to keep that organization viable; they have no one to rely on but
themselves. The incessant fund-raising combined with coalition-maintenance duties
places officials in constant campaign mode. In the House, this condition is even further
exacerbated by the paltry length o f time between elections. All o f the above leads to a
7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prevailing view that one must stay on the campaign trail in order to ensure reelection.
So if for no other reason, the sheer length of the permanent campaign will heighten
costs.
Consequences
The rising cost of congressional campaigns is not an abstract phenomenon, but
has concrete implications for those who practice the daily art of democracy. Public
officials, and those who assist them, must face the realities of a system in which money
has assumed a leading role. For quite a few, this reality is not very pleasant. The
money-dominated campaign has altered the way many officials view their roles. The
things that they must do to get elected, as well as the way that they must allocate their
time once in office concerns many officials.
Perhaps the single most frequently heard complaint among politicians is that
they must dedicate such a vast amount o f time to fundraising. Not only do many feel
that this is a degrading process, but also that it detracts from the more important
functions of policymaking and constituent service. In recent years, several highly
regarded members of Congress have pointed to this as one of the major drawbacks to
public office.
The phenomenon of rising costs also affects the way that citizens view the
relationships that occur in the corridors of power. It is no secret that, among American
political institutions, Congress routinely receives some of the lowest public approval
ratings. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995:6,38-39) write,
Historically, people have liked to dislike politicians, and especially members of
Congress....In the quarter-centuxy since [1971], support for Congress has always
been between 8 and 28 percent; support for the Court between 22 and 40
percent; and support for the presidency between 11 and 42 percent These
numbers suggest that support is far from static but also that it is largely locked
into a reasonably constrained low level for all institutions, particularly Congress.

8
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More recent numbers from a Gallup poll in September 1999 show support for Congress
at 37 percent. With these anemic numbers, Congress certainly wants to avoid the
emergence o f any issues that would serve to cast aspersions on the conduct of its duties.
But just such an issue has emerged in recent years.
That issue centers on the growing influence of special-interest groups in the
political system. These groups exert financial influence on candidates through the use
Table 1J
Year

The Growth of PAC Contributions to Congressional Candidates, 1974-94

Corporate

Labor

Trade/Health

Nonconnected

Other

Total*

1974

2.5**

6.3

2.3

—

1.4

37.6

1976

7.1

8.2

4.5

—

2.8

58.9

1978

9.5

9.9

11.2

2.5

1.0

77.5

1980

19.2

13.2

15.9

4.9

2.0

99.3

1982

27.5

20.3

21.9

10.7

3.2

128.4

1984

35.5

24.8

26.7

14.5

3.8

150.2

1986

46.2

29.9

32.9

18.8

4.9

179.4

1988

50.5

33.9

38.9

19.2

5.5

185.3

1990

53.5

33.6

42.5

14.3

6.5

169.6

1992

64.1

39.3

51.1

17.3

6.5

186.1

1994

64.1

40.6

50.1

17.3

6.6

178.8

* Adjusted for inflation, 1994=1.00.
** In millions o f dollars.
Source: The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 4th ed. by Gary Jacobson (pg. 56).

9
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Table 1.4 Sources of Campaign Contributions to House and Senate Candidates,
1974-94
Percentage o f Contributions from:
Individuals

Parties

PACs

Candidates*

Unknown

House
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994

73
59
61
67*
63*
51
52
49
48
50
54

4
8
5
4
6
3
2
2
I
I
1

17
23
25
29
31
39
39
43
44
39
37

67
76
69
70
78*
81*
68
69
68
70
68
61

14
6
4
6
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

12
11
15
13
21
18
20
25
26
24
25
17

6
9
9

__
—
—

—

—

—

—

6
7
6
7
10
8

—

0.4
1
12
8

8
6

—
—
—
—

—

Senate
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994

—
—

-----

—

—

—

11
6
6
5
6
22

—
—
—
—
—
—

* Includes candidates' contributions to their own campaigns.
Source: The Politics o f Congressional Elections, 4th ed. by Gary Jacobson (pg. 55).

10
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of associated political action committees. Political action committees (PACs) are a
main source of the influx o f money into modern congressional campaigns. The amount
of PAC contributions to congressional candidates has increased from $37.6 million in
1974 to a whopping $178.8 million in 1994. PAC contributions constituted about 37%
of House candidates' receipts and about 17% o f Senate candidates' receipts in the 1994
elections (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4).
Certainly PACs are not solely to blame. The campaign spending reforms o f the
mid-1970s allow huge contributions to be funneled through the two major parties in the
form o f "soft money." They also permit a practice known as "bundling," whereby an
individual skirts around the spending limits by bundling together numerous modest
contributions; in reality, individuals can gamer just as much influence through large
donations as they can in the days prior to contribution limits. PACs, though, seem to
attract much derision due to the fact that their sole stated purpose for existence is to
persuade lawmakers to vote a certain way on specific issues. This often leads to the
public perception that PACs cause conflicts between the national good and personal
gains.
A dramatic manifestation of this conflict is found in a quote by Rep. Glenn
Poshard, D-Ill.,
In 1988,1came to Washington, D.C. and I went from PAC to PAC to PAC.
At every stop, they asked me to fill out a questionnaire: "On House Bill X, will
you vote yes or no?" You not only have to pledge to support their position on
these bills, but you have to sign your name to them.
Now [after being elected] the bell rings in your office at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday
morning and now you understand how it [the bill] affects the nation. Your guts
start being torn apart because you signed a form a year ago during the campaign
saying you'd vote the other way. Now you understand the issue and it comes in
conflict with what you told them you would do a year ago. This is a rage inside
you.
You walk onto the floor and you know that if you vote their way, they will
announce it in their PAC newsletters, and next time you wont even have to beg
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for money, or you can do what in your heart you think is right That happened
to me three or four times in a row and I told my AA [administrative assistant], "I
cant do this anymore." I’m not going to take any PAC funds. I want to be free
to vote how I want to vote (Fritz and Morris, 1992:171-72).
Some candidates might perceive that a refusal to accept PAC contributions is
too risky, since it might make them more electorally vulnerable. Certainly for
incumbents, PAC funds are a potent way to ensure reelection. As Bennett (1996: 140)
writes, "...the deluge of PAC money allows incumbents to keep their seats by greatly
outspending their opponents (by a 2 to 1 margin in the Senate and a 3.5 to 1 margin in
the House in recent elections)." Ironically, the fact that all of this PAC information is
open and available for public scrutiny may also add to the negative perception of PACs.
Those "fat-cat" contributors who gain leverage through bundling, for example, are
usually not subjected to the same level of scrutiny by the media or public advocacy
groups.
So, many politicians believe that the escalating cost of campaigns forces them to
resort to a degrading ritual of attending endless fundraisers with their hats in hand. This
distracts them from the more noble pursuits of policy deliberation and constituent
service. And many citizens feel that the escalating cost of campaigns creates an
environment where special-interest groups exercise undue influence on their elected
officials. In the minds of many citizens, politicians have sold their collective soul to the
proverbial devil in order to secure electoral survival; in this instance, the devil takes the
form o f an expensively tailored K-Street lobbyist All of this negativity is the result of
the powerful impact that campaign spending has on elections. This powerful impact
causes candidates to try to raise and spend as much money as possible. But does the
scholarly evidence support this assertion?
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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM VERSUS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
There are numerous instances where beliefs held by professional politicos and
reported by journalists are contradicted by evidence unearthed by political scientists. It
seems that those embroiled in the daily maelstrom of political events may be denied the
perspective achieved by scholars working in a calmer, more objective atmosphere. It
also appears that the narrow and esoteric nature of much social science research might
prohibit a large percentage of the public from detecting and understanding that work.
In the absence of this countervailing force, the opinions o f the politicians hold sway;
thus, the emergence of a conventional wisdom.
The task o f political scientists in this situation should be to find a way of making
their research more accessible-which is not synonymous with "dumbed down"-so that
the public can weigh the two alternatives, and the erroneous conventional wisdom can
begin to be eroded. Assuming that the scientific methods employed are sound and the
research is thorough, the light of reason should shine through. Many might argue that
such debates are irrelevant because the outcome of the debates will not significantly
alter the political landscape. Some of the issues around which this type of
"conventional wisdom versus scientific evidence" conflict exists are important, and a
shift in recognition would certainly equal a shift in public dialogue.
Campaign spending is just such an issue. Determining the legitimacy of the
conventional wisdom-that spending affects elections-is important in terms of guiding
the continued construction of a research agenda. An understanding of the effects o f
campaign spending is also vital to an informed public dialogue on campaign finance
reform. This assumes that the conventional wisdom is supported by research, for if the
data demonstrate that spending does not have an impact, then the whole enterprise is
pure folly.

13
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The entire campaign house of cards is built upon a logic that crumbles if the last
sentence is true. If campaign expenditures do not have an effect on the vote, then there
is no reason for candidates to raise and spend such vast amounts of funds. And if
candidates need not raise and spend such vast amounts of funds, then modem
campaigns need not have such exorbitant costs. And if the above assumptions are true,
then the wrangling over campaign finance reform need not continue. The key to
lowering costs will simply be to inform candidates of the futility of relying on heavy
spending; implementing complex bureaucratic roadblocks will be unnecessary.
But if the data demonstrate that spending does have an impact, then further
sober reflection is required. Candidates would be behaving rationally, inasmuch as
there is a positive utility associated with the expenditure o f funds. In this circumstance,
lowering costs is not a matter of enlightening the ignorant, since the ignorant actually
know what they are talking about. Instead, restraints would need to be placed on the
political animals in the form of substantive reforms. The benefits derived from a
spending superiority eliminates the possibility o f candidates unilaterally disarming their
fundraising operation. So more impartial, objective minds will need to devise ways to
reform the system that is fair to all.
It is clear that the issue of campaign spending is an important one. Do
expenditures affect the vote? Do candidates benefit from outspending their opponents?
Do some candidates benefit more than others? Do constituency and chamber
differences affect which candidates benefit more from spending? All of these questions
and more prove pivotal in any discussion of this subject. Resolving these questions is
crucial to properly directing the discourse on this subject It is the goal o f this
dissertation to contribute to the ongoing process of resolving these questions.
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OVERVIEW
The central focus of this dissertation is campaign spending in congressional
elections. Specifically, I examine the effect of candidate expenditures on the vote.
This is a topic that has been explored often in previous studies, but the combination of
conflicting results and as yet untraveled terrain invites further exploration. I hope to
add to this research agenda by bringing a fresh perspective to some previous findings,
and by examining areas that have heretofore been relatively ignored.
Previous Findings: The Majority
The one key conclusion that is reached in virtually all o f the studies in this area
is that challengers receive greater marginal benefits from campaign expenditures than
incumbents. Simply put, challengers get a bigger bang for their buck. The reason for
this is fairly straightforward. The most important thing that campaign money buys for
candidates is visibility and recognition. Whether it be via television ads, radio ads,
newspaper ads, billboards, yard signs, bumper stickers, fliers, brochures, telephone
calls, or town hall meetings—candidates are primarily concerned with getting known.
Candidates who are unknown to the electorate are losing candidates. The risk of
loss prompts candidates to be proactive in their drive toward visibility among voters. It
is not enough to sit back and hope that news reports and word-of-mouth will provide
adequate publicity to attract voters. In order to gain attention, candidates must take the
initiative and spend money. In Seussian terms, if you do not have the green, you will
not be seen.
Now, while it is certainly true that all candidates seek recognition, it is equally
true that one set o f candidates start out with an advantage in this regard. On the whole,
incumbents are better known than challengers. This initial incumbent advantage makes
attaining awareness among voters even more o f an imperative for challengers. Since
15
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the various weapons used by entrenched incumbents are not available to challengers,
other means are necessary for achieving this imperative. Money is crucial in allowing
challengers to even the playing field.
It now becomes clear why challengers receive greater marginal benefits. They
have more ground to cover in a campaign, and hence their spending buys more.
$10,000 spent by a challenger languishing in obscurity is going to yield far more in the
way of building voter recognition than $10,000 spent by an incumbent who has already
saturated the district with his name and image in previous elections. All candidates
eventually fall prey to the law of diminishing returns. There is only so much
recognition that candidates can achieve, and at higher levels the campaign dollar is
going to yield less and less. The initial disparity in voter awareness between
incumbents and challengers means that incumbents succumb to diminishing returns
sooner.
Again, this conclusion about greater challenger spending effects is found
throughout the literature. There are disagreements over how much incumbent and
challenger spending effects differ, but there is little disagreement over the fact that a
difference exists. There are disagreements over the exact process by which challengers
receive these benefits, but these debates over causal processes do not nullify the
underlying assumption. Almost all scholars are in agreement about this finding-almost
all.
Previous Findings: The Minority
Perhaps the specter o f a whole subset o f political scientists marching in lock
step to the same beat was more than some could bear. So in an act of academic
contrariness, one lone voice dared to dissent, and in the discipline's most prominent
journal no less. In a 1998 article published in the American Political Science Review,
16
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Alan Gerber examines the expenditures o f Senate candidates, and what impact those
expenditures had on each election outcome. He finds that incumbent and challenger
spending effects are roughly equal, and if anything, incumbents receive greater marginal
benefits. He uses his results to directly attack the opposite conclusions reached in
earlier studies, and the logic behind those conclusions.
In fact, Gerber’s results may actually strengthen the underlying logic concerning
candidate visibility. If so, both his results and the opposite results presented in other
articles can both exist and be explained by this single voter recognition theory. The
reason for this is the different electoral environments within which Senate and House
candidates operate.
The Voter Recognition Theory
The Senate is the more prestigious of the two chambers. Thus, Senate elections
tend to be more competitive than House elections. One of the main determinative
factors for a competitive election is the quality of the challenger. Simply, Senate
challengers tend to be of a higher quality than House challengers. One of the main
attributes of high-quality challengers is that they have an established reputation among
the electorate; this reputation may come from having previously held another important
elective office, from being a celebrity figure, etc. Thus, Senate challengers tend to be
more well-known than House challengers by the electorate.
If the above statements are true, then it stands to reason that there should be less
of a disparity in candidate recognition/voter awareness among incumbents and
challengers in Senate elections than among incumbents and challengers in House
elections. And since this disparity helps create differential spending effects, Senate
challengers should not receive as big a bang for their buck relative to Senate
incumbents as do House challengers relative to House incumbents. The same logic
applies to the different environments that exist in elections for the two chambers.
17
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CONCLUSION
The following pages contain a more detailed and comprehensive explication of
the ideas presented in this overview. Chapter Two contains a review of the relevant
literature. In Chapter Three, I present the theory which guides this study. In Chapter
Four, I explain the data and methods used to test the theory. In Chapter Five, I provide
a descriptive analysis of the data. In Chapters Six and Seven, I present in-depth analysis
of regression results for Senate and House elections respectively. In Chapter Eight, I
summarize all o f the key results and describe how they support the theory.
ENDNOTES
1) The figures for 1998 were calculated from data obtained from an FEC report. I
used the same method of calculation as the cited authors. These figures do not
control for inflation.
2) Relying on one election year to draw conclusions about a more general trend is
certainly not an optimal approach, but as in much social science research, optimality
must give way to practicality. The herculean task o f analyzing and categorizing all of
the separate expenditure reports makes it virtually impossible for me to add any
additional years. I am not a full-time journalist with die vast resources o f the Los
Angeles Times at my disposal. Even under those conditions, it took the authors two
years and cost the Times considerable expense to compile the database from which
these figures are drawn. Hopefully, this project will continue and more years will
become available for study. For the time being, I grant any misgivings while
standing firmly beside my conclusions.
3) There are several reasons why candidate questionnaires may not be the best source
o f information about the allocation of campaign funds. First, there is the problem of
respondent recollection. Many o f the questionnaires are not filled out until many
months after the actual campaign, so that relevant documents are not available to
refresh some candidates' memories. This may have the effect o f clouding those
candidates' recollections. Second, some candidates never know the precise allocation
of funds to begin with. They rely on campaign managers and other top organiza
tional staff to deal with the specifics of the distribution of money. This lack of
knowledge may be one of the factors behind candidates' overestimation o f how much
money is spent on television. Third, candidates, especially incumbents, have a vested
interest in fostering a perception of television as the root cause o f excessive
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campaign costs. This shifts blame away from themselves and toward the media. It
is much easier to point a finger at someone else than to enact self-imposed reforms.
Thus, answers to the questionnaire may be biased.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on campaign spending can be divided into two categories. The
first category o f studies deals only tangentially with expenditures in actual campaigns.
These studies are more concerned with the effects o f money as it relates to activities
that occur before and after the campaign cycle. Prominent areas of research in this
category include works that explore the access and influence that PACs purchase with
their campaign contributions (post-election), as well as works that attempt to determine
the degree to which incumbents can deter quality challengers by amassing large
campaign war chests (pre-election).
The second category of studies focuses directly on the money spent in actual
campaigns. These studies serve as the foundation upon which this particular study
rests. Prominent areas o f research in this category include the differential effects of
spending for incumbents and challengers, the relevance of different resource allocation
patterns, the importance of the timing of expenditures, the specific ways that spending
impacts voters, the differential effects of spending for House and Senate races, and the
determination o f the best methodology to employ in studying this subject
THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
Since the literature on the influence o f PACs is not directly relevant to the topic
under consideration in this dissertation, I will only provide a cursory review. The main
finding from these studies is that special-interest groups do not control politicians.
Campaign contributions, which are closely related to expenditures, do not necessarily
cause politicians to become "puppets on a string" controlled by those who wield vast
amounts of money. Even assuming that PACs are driven by the nefarious motive of
wielding absolute influence over a congressman, the academic literature provides no
clear evidence that those motives ever come to fruition. Usually, campaign
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contributions gain interest groups access to politicians that they might not otherwise
have. At most, they may persuade a congressman to look favorably upon legislation as
it winds its way through the labyrinth of Congress. There is absolutely no reliable
evidence to support the contention that PACs are able to buy votes directly through
contributions (Hall, 1989; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Krasno, Green, and Cowden, 1994;
Mayhew, 1974; Welch, 1982).
THE ROLE OF CAMPAIGN WAR CHESTS
The last decade has seen the emergence o f a category of literature that focuses
on the role that war chests play in campaigns. The main assumption behind these
studies is that high-quality challengers are disinclined to enter races involving wellfinanced incumbents. In the face of an overwhelming spending disadvantage, smart
challengers bide their time and wait for more opportune circumstances in which to run.
In this way, the ability o f a candidate to raise large sums o f money can have a
substantial impact on an election. Since a main component of this dissertation involves
the quality-level of challengers, the conclusions reached about war chests are of some
importance.
The fundraising ability is in and of itself a weapon that can dissuade other
candidates from entering a race, or can nullify an emerging threat once a campaign is in
full swing. This latter scenario is studied by Krasno, Green, and Cowden (1994). They
recognize that a campaign is a dynamic event, and that the usual total expenditures
variable cannot fully capture the process. Even if a researcher does break down
expenditures according to the time in the campaign that they occurred, this might
present an erroneous picture. Expenditures at one point in the campaign might cover
things that occur at another point in the campaign; for example, pre-paying for
commercials to air at a later date.
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Krasno et al. (1994) argue that fundraising receipts are a more reliable
instrument for determining the ebb and flow of a campaign. They break down these
receipts according to the eight periods reported by the Federal Election Commission
(FEC). As expected, incumbents raise more money than challengers over the entire
campaign period, though the gap narrows in the final period; there is a 20 to 1
advantage in the first period and a 1.9 to 1 advantage in the eighth period. The amount
of funds collected rose steadily over the length o f the campaign for both candidates, but
the incumbent always had the advantage.
For challengers, the amount o f receipts collected in one period affects the
amount they collect in the following period. They must raise a lot o f money early and
then spend that money effectively in order to gamer support and additional money in
the future. In a sense, success breeds success. Incumbents are not so dependent on past
fundraising levels to fuel future efforts, and can turn it on late in the campaign. This
ties into the rest o f the literature that assumes that incumbents can adjust their
fundraising and spending levels in accordance with the perceived electoral threat; a
characteristic not shared by challengers.
Box-Steffensmeier (1996) also looks at the different stages of a campaign, but
she is concerned with the idea that a war chest can deter challenger entrance into a race.
She defines a war chest as the actual amount of cash on hand, since looking at receipts
and expenditures creates the problem o f untangling reactive and preemptive strategies.
Cash on hand is defined by the FEC to include petty cash, funds held in checking and
savings accounts, traveler's checks, certificates o f deposit, treasury bills, and other
investments valued at cost (Federal Election Commission, 1988). She utilizes the
relatively new method o f duration analysis (Yamaguchi, 1991; Bartels and Brady, 1993)
to detect distinct patterns over time.
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She finds that, at any point in time, war chests for incumbents who faced a
challenger did not differ significantly from those of incumbents who did not;
measuring a war chest in January 1999 will not predict whether an incumbent faces a
challenger in November 2000. She contends that when a challenger enters a race is as
important as i f a. challenger enters a race, and her dependent variable reflects this
emphasis on the dynamic aspects o f a campaign. Her results show that both the size of
the war chest and the incumbent’s margin o f victory in the previous election are
significant determinants of challenger entry.
The effect o f a larger war chest on challenger entry, however, is nonlinear. BoxSteffensmeier writes, "...if the increase is S 100,000, the hazard rate [of a quality
challenger's entry] decreases 26%; if the increase is $200,000, the hazard rate decreases
by 45%. So this $100,000 differential increase results in a decrease of 19%. In
contrast, a $100,000 differential increase between $900,000 and $1,000,000 results in a
decrease of only 1.8%. Thus, there are diminishing returns" (1996: 365-66).
THE EFFECTS OF MONEY DURING CAMPAIGNS
This literature is more voluminous. With the introduction of election laws that
required campaign organizations to keep and submit detailed records of receipts and
expenditures, researchers were able to utilize a vast reservoir of data in an effort to
understand the meaning behind and repercussions of the increased spending in
congressional campaigns. The emergence o f reliable data sources coupled with the
newfound interest in candidate spending naturally led to an explosion in this research
agenda.
I focus here on that research deemed most important to the development of
knowledge in this area. I do this not only in the interest o f brevity, but also because
limiting review to certain key works will help to establish a clear link between the
studies o f the past and this current study. As mentioned earlier, these studies provide
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the motivation for my current research. The conclusions drawn by other scholars
provide illumination in some instances and provide targets for constructive criticism in
other instances. Hopefully, any understanding o f my study will only be heightened by
placing it in a proper context.
An Initial Exploration o f Campaign Spending
The article that remains one of the seminal works in this area was written by
Gary Jacobson in 1978. Up until that time, the literature on campaign spending was
sparse, and the general assumption was that spending had the same consequences for
incumbents and challengers. Jacobson challenges that assumption by showing that, in
fact, challenger spending yields higher marginal benefits than incumbent spending. The
explanation for this counter-intuitive finding lies in the behavior of incumbents.
Incumbency yields many inherent advantages, such as franking privileges and
access to government agencies capable o f aiding constituents. These advantages lead to
very high reelection rates among incumbents, and they often win without facing any
strong opposition. So normally, incumbents are not forced to spend large amounts of
money in order to win elections. Challengers, on the other hand, have none of these
advantages and must rely almost solely on campaign spending to be competitive in an
election. The more challengers can spend, the better their chances of winning.
Incumbents recognize this and adjust their level o f fundraising and spending according
to the perceived electoral threat of the challenger. If they face a strong challenger in a
close election, they will dramatically increase their spending.
Spending is important to the extent that it provides a candidate with the
opportunity to communicate with voters through television, radio, town meetings,
pamphlets, etc. Spending increases voter awareness of the candidate. Since
incumbents are already fairly well-known and challengers are usually obscure (Mann
and Wolfinger, 1990), challengers will have more to gain from spending; they get a
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bigger bang for their buck. Even when incumbents increase expenditures to meet the
threat, they cannot counter-balance the gains made by challengers. This leads to the
finding that the more incumbents spend, the worse they do. In terms of the regression
model, the effect of incumbent expenditures is often statistically insignificant and
sometimes even negatively related to the incumbent vote share.
Jacobson finds that the two most important variables for explaining incumbent
vote shares are challenger spending and the strength o f the challenger’s party in the
district. He finds that for every $10,000 that challengers spend, they gain
approximately 1% o f the vote. One of the flaws with his analysis is that he models the
relationship between challenger spending and challenger share of the total vote as being
linear, when it clearly is not. Candidates cannot gain more than 100% of the vote, so at
some point they will begin to experience diminished marginal returns on each dollar
spent, especially at the high end of the scale. Jacobson writes that a semilog modeling
o f this relationship underestimates the challenger vote at higher spending levels, leading
to incorrect predictions of defeat His decision to treat the relationship as linear,
though, is probably not the correct solution.
The Endogeneity Problem
One o f the main issues addressed by Jacobson, and an issue that plays a
prominent role in most of the future research on the topic, is the endogeneity problem.
The most important aspect of the endogeneity problem is that the independent variable
is highly correlated with the error term. This often occurs in equations where two or
more variables have a reciprocal effect on one another, and when a model is not fully
specified (Kennedy, 1992). The basic campaign spending model matches this
description. The two main independent variables are linked in a reciprocal relationship.
Incumbent spending is directly influenced by challenger spending. This relationship
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creates the problem of multicollinearity within the model, which often affects
significance tests.
Also, the relationship between independent and dependent variables is
reciprocal in nature. The hypothesized relationship is that spending affects the vote, but
the vote can also influence the level of spending. For instance, assume that an
incumbent becomes aware o f something that causes him or her to think that the vote
will be close. He or she will begin to spend more money in order to counter-act this
perceived threat. We are unaware o f whatever it is that the incumbent is relying upon,
since it is not explicitly included in our model, but it is captured by the error term. As
this unobserved phenomenon increases in importance and as incumbent spending
increases along with it, the incumbent expenditure variable and the previously random
error term become highly correlated.' The usual result is the underestimation of the
effects of incumbent spending and the overestimation of the effects o f challenger
spending. Jacobson's solution to this problem is to use two-stage least squares (2SLS)
in order to purge the endogeneity from the spending variables.
Second-Generation Studies
Green and Krasno (1988) disagree with Jacobson's methodological decisions
and seek to build on his work in their study. They challenge Jacobson's findings on
three fronts. First, they posit that not all challengers will necessarily derive the same
benefits from campaign spending. There is a vast difference between those who have
never held elective office and are inexperienced in organizing a campaign, and those
who have waged successful campaigns in the past. In order to capture this they
construct a challenger political quality (CPQ) variable that is based on the attractiveness
and skill o f the candidate.
The second area o f departure from the previous study involves the issue of
spending linearity discussed above. They recognize that the gains enjoyed by
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challengers through increased expenditures must taper off at some point, and they use
logarithmic functions in order to capture these diminishing returns. Finally, they assert
that the problem o f spending being correlated with the error term can be corrected by
creating an instrumental variable, rather than relying on the actual expenditures as a
direct measure. This instrumental variable is the amount of money spent by the
incumbent in the prior election. They argue that the other independent variables
capture the reactive nature of incumbent expenditures, which allows this variable to
pinpoint an incumbent's propensity to spend, regardless of his or her vulnerability in the
current election.
The results o f their study show that CPQ has a direct effect on the vote, plus a
positive effect when interacted with challenger expenditures. This means that highquality challengers get a larger effect from spending, especially at higher levels; at
these high levels, a challenger’s personal characteristics become more important than
long-term political forces. They find that there are diminishing returns, and that
incumbent spending does have a direct effect on the vote total, though it is not as strong
as challenger spending. Incumbent spending can even counter-balance most of the
effects of challenger spending if the challenger spends a small amount. For instance, if
a challenger spends less than $10,000, then an incumbent can reduce the share of the
challenger's vote by 5.3% for every $100,000 that he or she spends.
In a rebuttal article, Jacobson (1990) refutes the findings by Green and Krasno.
He claims that their instrumental variable is highly correlated with several other
independent variables, which skews the results. He correctly points out that Green and
Krasno only assume a nonlinear relationship for challenger spending and the vote, while
continuing to treat the effect of incumbent spending as linear. There is no sound
theoretical reason for drawing this distinction, and doing so could artificially inflate the
importance o f incumbent spending. In order to correct for this mistake, he conducts
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natural log transformations on both variables (making $5,000 the lowest amount that a
candidate could spend) and reaches the same substantive conclusions that he reached in
his original article. Challenger expenditures have twice the effect o f incumbent
expenditures at all levels o f spending.
He adds a new twist to the research by utilizing an ABC/Washington Post panel
survey to decipher exactly how spending affects voters. He shows that increased
challenger spending will increase the likelihood that a voter who was originally
opposed to the challenger will become supportive of him or her, particularly if the voter
is of the same party. Likewise, challenger spending prevents supporters from defecting
to the incumbent's camp, particularly among partisan rivals. These results come after
holding partisan identification and national political forces constant Incumbent
spending has no effect on changes in vote intention.
Jacobson does note the continued difficulty o f trying to untangle the effects o f
variables on both the vote total and candidate expenditures. Ansolabehere and Gerber
(1994) suggest that this task is made more difficult by the misspecification o f the key
explanatory variables. They contend that using total expenditures as a measure of the
challenger and incumbent spending variables is unreliable. A distinction should be
made between total expenditures and campaign-related expenditures. As noted earlier,
the primary importance o f money is to provide candidates with communicative access
to the electorate; this is what we mean when we say that spending increases voter
awareness. So the spending that goes toward other things-overhead, donations,
unitemized expenses-is not necessarily what political scientists should want to study.
That kind of spending certainly helps to maintain a campaign, but it does not
necessarily translate as directly into votes.
Ansolabehere and Gerber use a 1990 data set that decomposes spending into
different categories. They then estimate regression equations using the traditional
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measure for expenditures and their more stringent measure. They find that challengers
spend S3 out of every $5 on direct voter contact, while incumbents spend $2 out of
every $5. This illustrates how the traditional measure can bias the coefficients for
spending toward zero, especially for incumbents. The model using the more stringent
criteria also produces much stronger coefficients, though the curious result of
incumbent spending actually being negatively correlated still holds.
Abramowitz (1991) does not find that incumbent spending is negatively related
to vote shares, but he does find that it has no significant effect on the vote. This is
made all the more odd due to the increased incumbency advantage in the mid-1980s
and 1990s. Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, incumbents are being reelected at higher
rates and with larger margins of victory. He looks at the 1984-86 elections, and
includes variables such as seniority, political scandal, and the rate of defection on party
votes for incumbents. Many of these contextual variables turn out to be significant
explanations for the vote, but challenger expenditure is still the strongest.
On the endogeneity front, he argues that the problem is not so much the
reciprocal relationship between spending and the vote, since the actual final vote total
cannot affect campaign spending. Thus, instrumental variables need not be constructed.
Rather, it is the expectations of the vote by political elites that influence spending. So
Abramowitz includes a variable culled from CQ reports on the races as a measure of
elite expectations, but finds that the coefficient for this variable is not significant. From
this he concludes that the model must already account for these expectations, and is
therefore not severely biased.
Part o f the problem with this variable is that it relies too heavily on timing. The
reports filed by CQ are based on hundreds of interviews with political experts from
around the country. Based on these interviews, CQ rates the competitiveness of a race
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based on a seven-point scale ranging from "safe Democratic" to "safe Republican."
These interviews are conducted between February and September of the election year.
Arguably, the resulting reports might be flawed because interviews took place before
crucial events occurred in the campaigns or well after elite actions worked their magic
on the campaigns. In other words, elite expectations could affect the flow o f campaign
contributions and expenditures, but simply not be detected by these reports.
When comparing the results from the model for 1984-86 to results for 1974-76,
he discovers that the effect o f challenger spending is not as strong as it once was. When
you combine this with the fact that challengers are not spending as much money as they
once did and with the escalating costs of campaigns, then the reason for the increased
incumbency advantage becomes clearer. Incumbents are aided by other factors that
more than offset their impotence in terms of campaign spending.
Kenny and McBumett (1994) dismiss the claim of an incumbent's
ineffectiveness in spending and agree with the earlier conclusion drawn by Green and
Krasno. This innovative study directly tackles the endogeneity problem that hampered
Jacobson and others, while also providing fresh insight into which voters are most
affected by campaign spending. Its main distinction lies in the fact that it takes an
individual-level approach to the issue, rather than the common aggregate approach.
They derive the individual-level data from the 1984 ANES data set Recognizing that
"money and electoral outcomes are closely intertwined" (1994: 700), they construct a
multiple equation model to account for this.
Compared to the single equation model, the results conform to our common
sense expectations. Both incumbent expenditures and challenger expenditures affect
the vote, though the latte.* is the stronger of the two. Therefore, incumbents do derive
direct, positive benefits from increased spending, even if these benefits are not as large
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as those reaped by challengers. The authors also find that the voters most likely to be
influenced by campaign communications are those that have weak partisan attachments,
low educational levels, and little interest in the campaign.
Goidel and Gross (1994) also use a system o f equations in modeling spending
effects, and come up with conclusions that are similar to those of Kenny and
McBumett. Though they are operating at the aggregate level, they share Kenny and
McBumett's view that a system of equations is necessary in order to account for the
endogenous nature of the expenditure variables; this, in turn, helps vanquish the
endogeneity problem. Goidel and Gross (1994:135-36) note,
Unlike two-stage least squares, which proceeds on an equation-by-equation
basis, three-stage least squares estimates the entire system simultaneously.
Moreover, three-stage least squares incorporates the correlation between the
residual terms o f the individual regression equations into the estimation process.
Consequently, estimation with three-stage least squares is asymptotically more
efficient than estimation with two-stage least squares (Greene, 1990). The
greater the correlation between these error terms, the greater the gain in
efficiency over two-stage estimation. Given the subject matter at hand, one
might suspect that the error terms of the separate regression equations would be
highly correlated. Consequently, the gain in efficiency may be substantial.
Like Green and Krasno, they include a CPQ variable in their model. Their
conclusions are similar to those of Kenny and McBumett, in that they find that
incumbent spending does have a direct, positive impact on the total vote, though not as
much o f an impact as challenger spending. They provide an additional bit of
information by showing that the benefits of incumbent spending are also differential.
"First-term incumbents receive a much larger marginal return on their expenditures than
do multi-term incumbents. In fact, the marginal return on spending by first-term
incumbents rivals the marginal return on spending by challengers” (Goidel and Gross,
1994:125).
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This makes sense when one considers that freshly minted incumbents have not
had time to do the things-casework and bringing home the pork-that help to establish a
personal constituency. Established members, however, have done the things necessary
to become entrenched in a district, so that spending is less beneficial to them. This is
consistent with my main theoretical argument, since established members should have
higher visibility among constituents than their first-term counterparts.
For CPQ, they find that quality challengers are successful at fundraising; for
every additional point on their quality scale, a challenger gains over $60,000 in
additional expenditures. The greater ease with which quality challengers can raise
funds combined with the greater benefits that quality challengers receive at higher
levels o f spending (the Green and Krasno finding discussed above) provide ample
evidence of why incumbents have reason to fear challenges from high-quality
candidates.
A Dissenting View
The most recent article to explore this subject reaches conclusions that sharply
differ from previous findings. Gerber’s (1998) study also distinguishes itself by being
one of the few to take a look at the effects of spending in Senate races, instead of the
usual focus on House races. Rather than use a system o f equations approach to tackle
the endogeneity problem, he opts for the methodology used earlier by Green and
Krasno. Gerber suggests that a 2SLS model is sufficient, as long as one corrects for the
blunder that plagued the earlier study; namely, one must treat both incumbent and
challenger spending as endogenous variables. Beyond this, he claims that the major
innovation of his study is the use o f a new set o f instrumental variables that permits
more consistent model estimation.
These instrumental variables should influence campaign spending without
directly affecting the election itself; Gerber selects challenger wealth level, state voting
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age population, and lagged spending. The lagged spending variable is an extension o f
the lone instrumental variable employed by Green and Krasno. Since House races are
every two years, Green and Krasno look at the amount spent by actual incumbents in
their last races. The staggered nature of Senate races causes Gerber to look at the
amount spent in the last race, whether or not it involves the same incumbent He notes,
"...the previous race and the current race rarely involve the same incumbent or
challenger. The variable is therefore free from the criticism that might be applied to
lagged spending by the same candidate, namely, that specific candidate attributes are
correlated with both the regression error and past fundraising levels" (Gerber, 1998:
405).
When estimating a standard OLS regression model, Gerber generates the same
results as other studies; both incumbent and challenger spending is important, but
challenger spending is almost twice as effective. It is when he estimates the 2SLS
model using the instrumental variables that his findings veer dramatically from previous
findings. He concludes,
...the traditional view of incumbent campaign spending does not hold up when
OLS regressions are reestimated using an instrumental variables approach. In
fact, after taking the endogeneity of spending into account, the marginal effects
o f incumbent and challenger spending are statistically equivalent [And the
overall effect o f campaign spending is to boost the share o f the incumbent vote
by 6.28%]. This result is very robust to changes in the set of instruments. The
assumptions underlying the 2SLS estimation hold up very well; standard
statistical tests confirm the endogeneity o f candidate spending levels and the
exogeneity o f the instruments (Gerber, 1998:409).
CONCLUSION
With this review o f the literature, we are now in a position to revisit the question
posed earlier. Does campaign spending have an impact on electoral outcomes? The
answer is mixed. The conventional wisdom that says special interest groups control
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politicians is not supported; the conventional wisdom that says money is important to
campaigns is supported; and the jury is still out concerning the conventional wisdom
that says incumbents can buy elections because of their spending advantage.
Large contributions are not enough to lure candidates into the pockets of fat-cat
contributors. Contributions can, however, help incumbents dissuade potential quality
challengers through the accumulation o f large war chests. And when challengers do
enter the race, there is overwhelming evidence to support the claim that actual
expenditures do have an effect on the vote. There are virtually no political scientists
working in this area who claim that spending in campaigns is irrelevant The only real
points of contention remaining are whether these positive effects are shared equally by
both candidates and how these effects come about in the first place.
In this study, I concentrate on the impact that candidate expenditures have on
congressional elections, though I also seek to expand the literature by including
elements from studies on candidate quality and voter information. It will also be one of
the first to take a comparative approach by examining the effects o f campaign spending
for both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Let us now take a more detailed
look at the core theoretical arguments underpinning this dissertation, as well as the
research design that is meant to fortify these theoretical positions.
ENDNOTES
1) Since receipts and expenditures are opposite sides of the same coin, a similar logic
applies to the behavior o f contributors. If contributors expect that the election will
be close, then they are more apt to give more money to the candidates, who will in
turn have higher expenditures.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE THEORY
The recent work of Alan Gerber (1998) serves as the catalyst for this
dissertation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this work is interesting for three
reasons. First, whereas the vast majority o f studies on campaign spending focus on the
House, Gerber examines the effects of spending in Senate elections. Second, Gerber
finds a way to reliably use the tried-and-true technique of 2SLS by creating three
instrumental variables, so that both incumbent and challenger spending can be treated
as endogenous. Third, his conclusion that incumbent and challenger spending effects
are roughly equal challenges the view held by most scholars.
This dissertation is a replication and extension o f Gerber's work. It is a
replication in that I try to mirror his operationalization and generate similar results for
Senate elections. * However, 1offer an alternative explanation that is at odds with his
main theoretical explanation for why Senate incumbents and challengers receive equal
marginal benefits from their respective expenditures. It is an extension of that article in
that I apply roughly the same operationalization and methodology to House elections.
The theoretical lens used for viewing Senate races offers an equally focused picture of
races in the House.
A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
Now I would like to turn to a discussion of the differences of opinion that I have
with Gerber concerning the theoretical explanations for his findings. For any social
science research to gain relevance, there must be a sound theoretical underpinning to
the data and methodological machinations. Without a reasonable and enlightening
theory, research findings are nothing more than a series o f disjointed potentialities.
And when a new study comes along that presents findings that are at odds with the
usual fare of a research agenda, it behooves the author to offer an alternative
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explanation for why these findings should be accepted. In this instance, it is Gerber
who must offer a reasonable explanation to accompany his conclusions. Alas, such an
explanation is not forthcoming.
The Information Explanation
As noted earlier, most research in the area o f campaign spending finds that
challengers receive greater benefits from expenditures than incumbents. The traditional
explanation for this, originally given by Jacobson, is that spending is mainly used on
communication which increases candidate visibility among the electorate. Since
incumbents are better known than challengers, they naturally have less to gain by
spending on communication. It is not as if spending is of no use to them, but simply
that they will not achieve the dramatic increase in voter recognition that well-funded
challengers achieve.
Gerber's finding that Senate challengers and incumbents receive the same
benefits from spending not only challenges the usual empirical findings, but also has
theoretical implications. Gerber asserts that the old explanation no longer holds-even
in the case of House elections. He writes,
The level of voter familiarity with Senate incumbents is similar to that for
House incumbents, while Senate challengers are in many cases better known
than the typical House challenger but often not as well known as the Senate
incumbent (Westlye, 1991). Thus, the informational advantage for incumbents
is smaller in Senate elections, but they appear to enjoy a definite edge. This
would lead to a prediction that estimates of spending effects in Senate elections
might show a smaller relative advantage for challenger spending over incumbent
spending than that observed in House elections, but not no advantage at all
(Gerber, 1998:410).
Clearly, he thinks that the rough equality o f spending benefits among both types
o f candidates in the Senate calls the old theory into question. There is a problem with
this line o f thinking. While Gerber is probably correct in speculating that the smaller
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informational advantages for Senate incumbents over their challengers would not result
in equal spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers, it is quite possible that
the differences in results for Senate and House elections could at least partly be
attributed to the differences in informational advantages for House and Senate
incumbents.
When examining the informational advantages of House and Senate incumbents
from 1980 to 1994, one finds that House incumbents have an average recognition
advantage of about 40% (i.e. 92% to 52%), while Senate incumbents have a recognition
advantage of only 19% (i.e. 97% to 78%) (Jacobson, 1997:96). It is also telling that
Senate challengers are 26% more recognized than House challengers. This places at
least some limitations on how much electoral benefit that Senate challengers can obtain
with higher levels o f spending, and hence may result in at least some equalization of
incumbent and challenger spending effects in Senate elections. Overall, it is not
implausible that the reduced informational advantage o f Senate incumbents over their
challengers can account for a substantial amount of equalization o f spending effects for
Senate incumbents and challengers vis-a-vis the House.
Take an instance where a high-quality challenger decides to enter a Senate race.
Let us assume that this challenger has high name recognition within the state. Let us
assume that, in fact, the electorate is as familiar with this challenger as they are with the
incumbent In this instance, one would expect to find that both candidates receive
essentially equal marginal benefits from their campaign expenditures. Thus, the
empirical findings would contradict the traditional findings while still fitting into the
traditional theory.
O f course, not every race is going to exhibit this type of equality. But there will
be more Senate races approximating this situation than House races. Approximation is
a key word A challenger need not achieve total equality with an incumbent, in terms of
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voter familiarity, in order for the data analysis to show roughly equal benefits from
campaign spending. The challenger need only be fairly close to the incumbent for these
results to surface.
House races typically do not attract the kind o f quality challengers that Senate
races do. The severe partisan make-up of many districts renders one o f the parties
basically impotent Often, this leads to a situation where incumbents face no
challengers at all. There have been numerous instances o f uncontested races for the
House in the past two decades, something that is extremely rare in races for the Senate
(Campbell, 1996). On those occasions when the disadvantaged party does field
challengers, they often provide little more than token opposition. Needless to say, these
challengers do not top the list of most recognized personalities in their communities.
And even in competitive districts, challengers often find it hard to get their message
across due to a relative lack of coverage by the media (Clarke and Evans, 1983).
These same dynamics are not at work in races for the Senate. Since a Senate
seat is more valuable than a seat in the House, one would expect that more highly
qualified challengers will be attracted to Senate races. The benefits of the seat help to
alleviate the associated costs that sometimes prove to be a deterrent against candidate
entry into a race (Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979). In cases where a sitting incumbent is
perceived to be vulnerable, strategic considerations cause the most formidable
challengers of all to emerge (Jacobson and Kemell, 1981).
A high-quality challenger is likely to be far more familiar to voters than an
obscure challenger. Putting these things together, one arrives at a simple conclusion:
the average Senate contest will exhibit a smaller gap between incumbents and
challengers in terms o f candidate quality and voter familiarity than the average House
contest If the spending benefits that accrue to challengers are based on the initial lack
o f familiarity, then when that lack of familiarity dissipates, so should the relative
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spending benefits. Simply stated, my theory is that the difference in voter information
about Senate incumbents and challengers is smaller than the difference in voter
information about House incumbents and challengers, and that this smaller difference
in voter information about the two candidates creates an environment where Senate
incumbents and challengers derive fairly equal benefits from their campaign spending.
In some cases, the effects may be equal.
I believe that this explanation of Gerber's results is more reasonable than the
ones offered by Gerber himself. Though he mounts a vigorous argument for why
Jacobson's traditional theory o f campaign spending effects should be rejected, he is far
more tepid in advancing theories that would serve to replace it. Initially, he said that
Senate incumbents know how to spend their money more effectively than House
incumbents. This was the argument he forwarded in an earlier draft o f his article.
Since this explanation is not explicitly presented in the published article, one can only
assume that even he may be having second thoughts about its validity. In the
voluminous amount of research conducted on the effects of incumbent advantages,
nowhere is it stated that senators are more expert than their House colleagues in
wielding these advantages (Cover and Brumberg, 1982; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977;
Johannes and McAdams, 1981; Mayhew, 1974; Payne, 1980; Stein and Bickers, 1994).
The Incumbent Efficiency Explanation
He does not seem willing to abandon this thread of logic entirely, but rather
shifts ground to an explanation that has more "at first glance" appeal. Instead of
comparing the spending efficiency of Senate incumbents to House incumbents, Gerber
settles on a comparison o f incumbents to challengers. He writes,
In theory, incumbent spending may be more effective than challenger spending.
Incumbents typically have advantages in organization and expertise that make
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their expenditures more efficient and therefore more effective dollar for dollar
than those o f challengers. If this is an important consideration, then the
marginal effect o f spending by the incumbent may be greater than the marginal
effect of challenger spending (Gerber, 1998: 402).
Upon closer inspection, this explanation also reveals a couple of flaws. First,
Gerber’s own results do not allow him to proffer this claim. His central finding is that
Senate incumbent and challenger spending is roughly equal, but in order for the above
explanation to hold, they would have to be unequal. Senate incumbents should receive
higher marginal returns on their expenditures than challengers if they have greater
organizational expertise and efficiency. He is falling into the same trap that he accuses
those proponents of the traditional theory of having fallen into. His earlier quote states
that the rough equality of expenditure coefficients in the face o f unequal informational
advantages is illogical, but by the same token, equal coefficients in the face of unequal
organizational advantages are also illogical.
Second, even if Gerber's results supported the contention that Senate incumbents
have organizational advantages over their challengers, this contention still does not
account for the consistent results achieved by scholars studying House elections. The
fact remains that House incumbents derive few er benefits from campaign expenditures
than House challengers. Surely, House incumbents have organizational and expertise
advantages similar to those of their colleagues in the Senate. If so, why is it that
spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers in Senate elections are roughly
equal, while spending coefficients for challengers in House elections are greater than
those for incumbents?
Although this alternative theory comes up short, the traditional theory forwarded
by Jacobson and supported in this dissertation hits the mark. Again, the different
pattern o f spending effects between the two sets of candidates is the result of
dissimilarities between the challengers. Mainly due to the prestige of the office, Senate
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contests attract challengers who have credentials that are superior to those o f House
challengers. Among those credentials is a higher level of public recognition. This
higher visibility brings Senate challengers into closer proximity to Senate incumbents;
thus, both receive a similar bang for the buck. The relative lack of visibility among
House challengers gives them more room to operate and, consequently, a greater return
on their expenditures.
The Negative Advertising Theory
Another explanation that serves as an alternative to Jacobson's focuses on the
various ways that campaign funds can be employed. Gerber writes, "...campaigning not
only informs the voters about oneself but also brings to light damning information about
one's opponent. When the voters do not know much about the challenger, this gives the
incumbent a great opportunity to use money to 'define' the challenger" (1998:402).
This explanation is also logically flawed. Contrary to Gerber's assertion, incumbents
usually do not bring damning information to light about their challengers until their
challengers become serious, viable candidates. There is little reason to expect
electorally secure incumbents with large campaign chests to spend money destroying
their opponents if there is little chance that those opponents will win (Ansolabehere,
Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino, 1994).
The old political axiom that any press is good press certainly applies to obscure
challengers. If an incumbent is facing a little-known challenger and is virtually assured
reelection, what possible rationale would lead that incumbent to risk waking a sleeping
lion by dramatically increasing the visibility of that challenger, even if it occurs through
the release of negative information. For if the voters ultimately disregard the negative
attacks, then the incumbent is faced with a visible candidate who has been at least
partially inoculated against future negative attacks. The separation o f Bill Clinton from
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the pack o f other Democratic hopefuls in early 1992, due in large measure to the
Gennifer Flowers stoiy, is a case in point.
The Incumbent Behavior Explanation
Gerber's final attempt at a reasoned explanation for his results is the weakest of
all. He appears to wash his hands of theorizing altogether and merely exclaims that
since politicians believe incumbent spending has an effect, then it must be true. He
writes, "A final reason for skepticism [toward Jacobson's theory] is that the actual
behavior o f incumbents, who are political professionals, appears to contradict the
premise that incumbent campaign spending has little effect If incumbents are sensible,
then it is hard to explain their substantial fundraising efforts" (Gerber, 1998:402).
Obviously, this assertion, too, is riddled with problems. First, one must
recognize the distinction between fundraising in order to amass a substantial war chest
and actually spending those funds during a campaign. It makes perfect sense for
incumbents to raise large sums of money, because doing so helps to ensure that they
will not face quality challengers (Box-Steffensmeier, 1996). Incumbents may be raising
this money with the expectation that they will need to spend only a fraction of it during
the actual campaign.
Second, even if incumbents are convinced that they receive vast benefits from
campaign spending, they may be mistaken. Political scientists simply cannot accept the
perceptions o f politicians as fact. Rather, we should examine the underlying factual
basis for any claims made by others-"professionals" or not If we relied solely on the
beliefs o f politicians, then we would accept their absolute conviction that they must
mirror the views o f their constituency when voting on bills or risk severe electoral
consequences in the next election. In truth, numerous studies have found a dearth of
knowledge among the electorate when it comes to the issue positions taken by
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congressmen. Most voters are doing well if they can recount even one of the detailed
policy stances of their congressmen, much less punish them for straying on a particular
roll-call vote (Hinckley, 1976; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Smith, 1989; Wright, 1989).
CONCLUSION
It now becomes clear that Gerber’s study contains interesting findings in need of
an equally interesting theory. His empirical results, if valid, offer a sharp contrast to
virtually all of the other studies in the field o f campaign spending. But he offers no
compelling reason for why these results should cast Jacobson's general theory in doubt.
The results of his study may negate the specific hypothesis that incumbent spending is
relatively unimportant in Senate elections, while confirming the general theory which
states that the level o f candidate recognition among the electorate determines the
effectiveness of campaign expenditures.
It is my goal in this dissertation to bridge the gap between theory and data. By
analyzing both House and Senate elections, I can explore how different electoral
environments affect campaign spending. Also, I can compare the relevance of factors
such as challenger political quality, candidate visibility, and campaign-specific events.
I can do all o f this within the context of an overarching theory that serves to guide my
exploration of these matters.
ENDNOTES
1) His study goes through the year 1992. Since my study goes through the year 1994,
this will not be an exact replication. However, the addition o f one election cycle
should not dramatically alter the basic results.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DATA AND METHODS
The following pages provide detailed information on the data and methods used
for this study. The study encompasses all House and Senate elections occurring from
1974 to 1994. * This creates a data set containing approximately five thousand cases.
These cases are used in a model that contains variables proven to be related to the vote
in previous research. Besides the main explanatory variables of interest-candidate
expenditures and challenger political quality-the model encompasses economic factors,
partisan and ideological influences, and situations that prove to be isolated quirks
affecting specific elections. It also contains a set of instrumental variables. The
dependent variable in the equation is the incumbent’s percentage o f the two-party vote.
INCUMBENT AND CHALLENGER SPENDING
Since candidate spending lies at the heart of any study focusing on campaign
finance, it is imperative that this variable be measured and modeled correctly. Much of
the debate over the true effects o f spending centers on the elusiveness of this variable.
Over twenty years of research by top scholars has not produced an accepted approach
for constructing the spending variable or exploring the relationship between candidate
spending and the vote. This is problematic when one considers that alternative methods
o f measurement and modeling produce drastically different results.
An initial point o f contention centers on the type of regression equation that
should be used to estimate the effects o f spending. The traditional method used for
regressing a dependent variable on a set o f independent variables is ordinary least
squares (OLS). However, due to the nonrecursive nature o f the relationship between
spending and votes (see my discussion o f the endogeneity problem in Chapter 2), OLS
is not the optimal method for modeling this relationship. There have been studies that
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employ OLS (Jacobson, 1978 & 1985; Abramowitz, 1988), but newer research calls the
results of those studies into question (Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 1988; Kenny
and McBurnett, 1994).
Since the spending variables in the model are endogenous and OLS produces
biased estimates, a different statistical technique is required. In general, there are two
paths that one can take. Some scholars prefer using a system of equations to estimate
the effects o f spending (Goidel and Gross, 1994). As Kenny and McBumett write,
... the single-equation model produces insignificant incumbent expenditure
effects because it suffers from the same simultaneity problems o f many
aggregate models. Estimating a system o f equations accounts for the
endogeneity of expenditures and should produce the intuitively sensible result
that spending improves electoral prospects for incumbents as well as
challengers, although probably not to the same degree (1994: 701).
Other scholars rely on two-stage least squares (2SLS) as their estimation
technique (Gerber, 1998; Green and Krasno, 1988). 2SLS purges a model of any "white
noise" caused by the covariance of independent variables with the error term. The
procedure involves estimating a predicted value (reduced form) for the endogenous
regressors. These predicted values are then used in the second-stage regression as
replacements for the original independent variables. The key to any of these multi
equation models is finding instrumental variables onto which the endogenous variables
can be regressed. The paramount requirement for an instrumental variable is that it
affect the endogenous explanatory variable without directly affecting the dependent
variable.
In the case o f campaign spending, an instrumental variable should influence
candidate expenditures without influencing the vote. Jacobson (1990) notes the peril in
trying to discover such a variable:
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Any observable variable known to influence the vote should also affect
campaign contributions, and it is difficult to come up with any observable
variable that would systematically affect contributions (especially to
challengers) without also independently affecting the vote. Certainly conditions
known to influence contributions would affect the expected vote, which would
in turn affect contributions, and so on. If all of the available exogenous
variables influence both spending and votes, reciprocal effects can never be
untangled using these techniques (341-42).
Gerber (1998) claims that his most important contribution to the literature is
putting forth instrumental variables that stand up to that paramount requirement, and, in
so doing, provide us with the most accurate and dependable means for gleaning the true
effects o f candidate spending on the vote. This dissertation follows Gerber’s lead by
employing these variables (see Instrumental Variables section) and estimating their
effects in a 2SLS model.
Another point o f contention concerns what form the relationship between
spending and votes should take: linear or logarithmic. In his seminal article, Jacobson
(1978) finds that both forms support his central conclusion of greater challenger
spending effects, but that other differences are apparent. He writes,
The functional relationship between spending and votes is assumed to be
linear. This has the advantage of simplicity but the drawback that it fails to
allow for the diminishing returns that must apply to campaign spending; no
candidate can get more than 100 percent o f the vote, no matter how much is
spent. An attractive alternative is the semilog form in which spending is entered
as the natural logarithm of actual expenditures (Welch, 1976); it permits
diminishing returns but does not allow them to become negative as would, for
instance, a quadratic model (Silberman and Yochum, 1977).
But the semilog model has the defect o f seriously underestimating the
challenger's vote at higher levels of spending; that is, it provides estimates
which exaggerate the extent to which returns diminish as spending
increases....The linear equation exaggerates the expected vote o f challengers at
higher levels o f spending, but inspection o f the residuals [the difference between
the actual vote and the predicted vote] indicates that this is not a significant
problem until the challenger's spending exceeds $160,000, which occurs in less
than 2 percent o f the cases in either election year, at this level of spending the
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equations are less likely to overpredict the number o f winning challengers than
they are to overstate the size of the challenger’s victory (Jacobson, 1978:471).
A simple additive relationship between expenditures and votes is, ultimately,
untenable. Virtually everyone agrees that there are definite diminishing returns at
higher levels o f spending, and since challengers tend to spend less than incumbents,
simple linear models will overestimate challenger spending and underestimate
incumbent spending. Even Jacobson (1990), in more recent research, abandons the use
o f linear functions for spending. The question becomes how to properly account for
this diminution.
Abramowitz (1991) confronts this dilemma by including a variable that is the
square o f a candidate's spending. This "spending-squared” variable is significant in the
model, but does not provide for the type o f nuance that one would hope for when
constructing a spending model. It is the equivalent of a sledgehammer when a scalpel
is preferable. For instance, this type of operationalization can tell us how diminished
the returns are when a candidate goes from $200,000 to $400,000, but provides us with
no information about the rate o f descent between these two figures.
Perhaps the best technique for capturing diminishing returns at all levels of
spending is to calculate the logarithm of expenditures (Gerber, 1998; Jacobson, 1990).
This functional form conforms to the sensible expectation that spending has positive
benefits at all levels, but that the marginal returns decrease at higher levels. This
decreased marginal utility is to be expected for two reasons.
First, the most basic and critical campaign tasks (e.g. opening campaign offices,
acquiring equipment, hiring staff) are taken care of with early expenditures, so that later
expenditures should not have as dramatic an effect Second, the main value of
campaign funds is that they increase candidate visibility. If candidates are spending
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high levels o f money, then they have probably already achieved a significant degree of
visibility; any further spending is rendered less valuable.
In this study, the two expenditure variables represent total campaign spending
and are measured in real 1974 dollars.^ Because the log of zero is undefined, every
candidate is given a minimum expenditure of $5,000 before transforming the data to a
logarithmic function (Jacobson, 1990: 338). This minimum dollar amount also prevents
the log transformation from sending the value of very low expenditures to negative
infinity.
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
The first instrumental variable is based on a measure o f challenger wealth.
Obviously, wealthy challengers have more money to spend on their campaigns than
those without such resources. This variable is created by reading through the
summaries o f House and Senate races presented in the bi-annual election preview issue
of the Congressional Quarterly. The variable is coded 0 (not wealthy) if the
challenger's occupation is listed as a lawyer, teacher, airline pilot, businessperson, or as
someone who works in the public sector or military. It is coded 1 (wealthy) if the
challenger is described as a business owner, president or top executive of a corporation,
banker, real estate developer, doctor, law firm partner, or as someone who is "wealthy,"
"a millionaire," or "an heir."
The second instrumental variable is based on the size o f a state's population.
This variable has been the focus of an ongoing debate among some in the academic
community. Remember, state population size can only be used as an instrumental
variable if it does not affect the vote; some scholars assert that it does just that By
examining Senate elections from 1946 to 1980, Hibbing and Brandes (1983) find that
each additional congressional district in a state costs incumbents .17 percent of the
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two-party vote. This would translate into a senator from California receiving around
nine percentage points less than a senator from Montana.
There are two reasonable explanations for this finding. First, senators from
large states are unable to have the amount o f personal contact with their constituents
that senators from small states enjoy. This kind of personal interaction is a superb way
to cultivate a positive image among the electorate. Since senators representing large
populations have greater difficulty meeting with a significant number of their
constituents, their position among these possible voters is less secure (Hibbing and
Brandes, 1983).
A similar logic applies to the handling of casework. Senators are often judged
on their ability to effectively handle casework and other types of district service. Each
senator has a finite amount of time and resources to devote to these tasks. As the
population grows, the proportion of that population that a senator can attend to shrinks.
Because constituency service often translates into votes, senators understandably want
to solve as large a proportion of voters' problems as possible (Cain, Ferejohn, and
Fiorina, 1984; Johannes, 1984; McAdams and Johannes, 1988; Parker, 1980; Serra,
1994; Yianakis, 1981). Senators from large states are often unable to "pay assiduous
attention to the needs o f [their] constituents" (Jewell and Patterson, 1977:91).
The second explanation has received scant attention within this literature. This
explanation centers on the increased political, economic, and cultural diversity that
usually accompanies population growth. Senators from small states, as well as
representatives, have an easier time satisfying the interests of their constituents because
those constituents tend to be more homogenous. Simple solutions become harder to
come by when there is a multitude of competing interests vying for a piece of the
proverbial pie. An exploration o f state heterogeneity, as opposed to sheer population
size, as a cause of decreased incumbent vote share is a possible area for future research.
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A pair of more recent studies have cast serious doubt on the assertion that
"Senators from heavily populated states do substantially worse on election day than
Senators from lightly populated states" (Hibbing and Brandes, 1983: 811). Westlye
(1991) examines Senate elections from 1968 to 1984. He uses three separate criteria to
judge the electoral success o f senators: average margin of victory, number o f elections
won by more than 20 percentage points, and number of elections where the incumbent
lost reelection. For all three categories, he finds that there is a weak relationship
between population size and the vote, and that this relationship is primarily due to very
large states. He writes,
There appears to be no significant difference in the margin of victory of Senate
elections whether a senator represents 550,000 constituents or 5.5 million. It is
only in the very largest states-where constituents number more than 10
million-that a senator's average margin of victory is significantly lower than in
smaller states. It is only in these few very heavily populated states, as well, that
notably fewer elections are of the "safe" variety and that the chances of winning
reelection are significantly reduced....the threshold above which "assiduous
attention to constituents' needs" fails to pay off would appear to be so high that
only senators in the largest states are affected. For most states, and therefore for
most Senate elections, state size is not a sufficient explanation for electoral
results (Westlye, 1991:157).
Krasno (1994) divides Senate elections into three different periods: 1946 to
1960,1962 to 1978, and 1980 to 1992. He finds that Senate seats located in small
states have become safer during the last two periods, with 40 percent of incumbents
losing reelection bids in the first period compared to 11 percent and 8 percent in the
latter two. He also finds that seats located in the three largest states-Califomia, Texas,
and New York-have become safer during the latest period. Since 1980, only two
incumbent senators have lost races in these states: appointee John Seymour (R-CA) and
scandal-ridden A1D'Amato (R-NY).
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Overall, Krasno reaches conclusions that are very similar to Westlye's. Remove
the largest states from the equation and virtually no relationship between the two
variables remains. He writes,
Restricting the analysis to states with fewer than twenty-six House districts...
substantially reduces the effect of state population (to .05 percentage points). If
representing more people does cost senators votes, this phenomenon is felt
almost entirely in a handful of the most populous states. In addition, state size
alone is a poor predictor of the vote. The number of congressional districts in a
state accounts for very little of the variation in incumbent senators' share of the
vote(R-squared=.010) (Krasno, 1994:45).
So, the size of a state's population does not appear to influence the vote. It
should, however, influence campaign expenditures. Since senators can raise money
independent of their states' population, those from small states should raise and spend
more funds per capita than those from large states (Magleby, 1989). Individual
contributors do not necessarily tie their contribution levels to the size of the state that a
candidate is from, and research shows that PAC contributions do not increase with the
population size of a senator’s state (Snyder 1989,1990).^ A final reason to suspect that
per capita spending varies inversely with population size is that the legal limits on
contributions set by the FEC are fixed sums, instead of being scaled to a state's
population.
The state population variable is coded as the number of residents in each state as
determined by the census. Census data are also used in determining the population size
for each House district. Obviously, House districts do not display the degree of
variation in population that is seen among the states.'* However, there is enough
variance, especially in terms of a longitudinal perspective, to offer a suitable analysis.
CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY
In addition to candidate expenditures, the other key independent variable is
challenger political quality (CPQ). As mentioned earlier, CPQ is important because it
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serves as a proxy for candidate visibility in my aggregate model. The assumption is that
challengers with a greater degree o f prominence are more recognizable to the general
public than challengers who exist in relative obscurity. This prominence can be derived
from holding high office or from distinguished personal characteristics. As with
candidate spending, the importance of CPQ to the model makes it crucial that an
appropriate measurement is utilized.
The scholarly literature is rife with various ways to measure challenger political
quality. Jacobson (1978) and Jacobson and Kemell (1983) introduce the concept of
CPQ. They assert that challengers who had previously held elective office were more
successful in congressional elections than those that had no previous experience. To
capture this difference, they use a simple dummy variable, coded 1 for candidates who
previously held elective office. While many scholars have adopted this measure, others
have sought more nuanced measures of CPQ.
Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) develop a three-point quality scale based
upon previous experience. They also create a composite of this scale and challenger
spending. In a study o f Senate elections, Squire (1989) also relies on more than just
previous experience in creating a measure. He interacts a seven-point quality scale with
the percentage of a state's population represented by the officeholder, which results in a
staggering 600-point scale. Krasno and Green (1988) provide the most comprehensive
measure of CPQ by combining past experience with a wide array of other
qualifications. Gerber (1998) eschews the creation o f a scale in favor of using five
separate dummy variables representing five separate levels o f office. Since one of the
aims o f this dissertation is to adhere to Gerber's methodology, I employ his approach in
measuring CPQ.^
Any of the measures of CPQ that move beyond a dichotomous variable operate
under the assumption that some elective offices are more valuable than others. There is
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ample research on the pattern o f political careers to suggest that a definite hierarchy of
elective offices exists (Black, 1972; Matthews, 1984; Mezey, 1970; Rohde, 1979;
Schlesinger, 1966). For example, most people would agree that the position of
governor is more valuable than that o f small town mayor, or that the position of U.S.
Representative carries more weight than state legislator. By placing the separate offices
into a hierarchy, one can better establish whether a candidate who held a particular
office should or should not be considered high-quality.
Once a researcher recognizes that different offices vary in terms of their
intrinsic value, then the question becomes how to correctly capture the appropriate
position of each office in that hierarchy. Until recently, there was no empirical
justification for placing one office over another. For instance, some measures placed
governors over U.S. Representatives even though there was no empirical evidence to
suggest that governors garner a higher percentage o f the vote when running for the
Senate. Lublin's (1994) study was the first to empirically analyze this issue.
Lublin writes that "only after determining the relative impact of having held any
particular office on the vote for the challenger can one rank offices, and thus challenger
quality, on a hierarchical scale" (1994:230). To determine the relative value of prior
office experience on the vote, he regresses the vote for senatorial incumbents on a set of
dummy variables measuring the office held by the challenger, as well as standard
political and economic control variables. He finds that challengers who served as U.S.
Representatives receive "a greater boost at the polls than former governors and other
statewide officials" (Lublin, 1994: 238). He also finds that statewide offices provide a
higher value, in terms o f votes, than local offices and state legislative posts.
The insight gained from Lublin's study is applied to the measure of CPQ used in
this dissertation. Specifically, Lublin's results help guide my judgment in ranking the
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prestige of offices. For Senate elections, prestigious offices include governor, former
senator, U.S. Representative, other statewide official, and mayor of a major city. For
House elections, prestigious offices include former U.S. Representative, statewide
official, state senator, and mayor or commissioner of any city.
CHALLENGER CELEBRITY
Krasno and Green's scale assigns an additional point to challengers who have
attained celebrity status. As my equation indicates, celebrity is also used as a separate
dummy variable. Including this variable when specifying the model is important
because it highlights the fact that some challengers have special attributes quite apart
from any previous political experience. For example, had Warren Beatty or Donald
Trump actually run for president in 2000 (God forbid!!), they would certainly have had
an advantage over some obscure third-party candidate, even though neither man has
ever held elective office.
I follow the guidelines laid out by Abramowitz (1988) for deciding whether to
code a challenger as a celebrity. Based on the aforementioned election preview
summaries in the Congressional Quarterly, a challenger is considered a celebrity "if he
[or she] was a prominent public figure because of his [or her] activities before seeking
elected office" (Abramowitz, 1988:401). Some examples of celebrity challengers
include Oliver North (White House operative), Fred Thompson (actor), and Jack
Lousma (astronaut).
STATE/DISTRICT PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY
Any study focusing on factors that influence elections should control for
partisanship and ideology. Over the years, extensive analysis of these two factors has
revealed their impact on election results (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes,
1960; Kelly and Mirer, 1974; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Markus and Converse,
1979; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1979; Niemi and Weisberg, 1993; Page, 1978; Page
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and Jones, 1979). The problem, though, is finding a reliable means for measuring them.
For over thirty years, political scientists have wrestled with the problematic task of
finding dependable substitutes.
A substitute is necessary because of the tenuousness of relying on information
gleaned from primary sources. Using state registration information to determine
partisanship is not helpful because many states do not require citizens to declare a
partisan affiliation. Even when a state does require a declaration of partisanship, that
information, as it pertains to individual districts within the state, is not maintained at a
central location. If obtaining information on partisanship presents such a daunting task,
then locating hard data on ideology is the research equivalent of finding the Holy
Grail—and Indiana Jones is not a member of the APSA.
The next best alternative is to get the needed information via a survey. The
difficulty with this option is administering a survey to enough people to accurately
gauge the attitudes and predispositions o f the actual electorate. For example, Miller
and Stokes (1963) relied on actual survey data gathered in the 1958 American National
Election Study, but that survey provided an average district sample size o f only 13
respondents. This paltry sample size at the district level calls into question the validity
o f that study's findings (Erikson, 1978; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984).
To be able to rely on public opinion to determine partisanship and ideology, one would
need to conduct a survey that includes far more respondents than the typical national
survey does, but a lack of time and money eliminate this route as an option.
Instead, researchers have come to rely on presidential election returns (Carson
and Oppenheimer, 1984; Fleisher, 1993; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; LeoGrande and
Brenner, 1993; Schwarz and Fenmore, 1977). These scholars assert that presidential
election returns are an adequate proxy because they cover both the state and district
level, represent actual constituency behavior, and consistently occur every four years,
55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which allows for time-series analysis. While most studies use returns as a substitute for
ideology, they have also been used as a substitute for partisanship. An article by
LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) spotlights some troubling drawbacks to using this as a
proxy for either electoral factor.
There are two assumptions that must hold in order for presidential election
returns to be a valid proxy: "(a) that short-term factors determining the vote have a
fairly uniform effect across subnational constituencies and (b) that constituency
ideology [or partisanship] is the only significant long-term factor affecting the vote"
(LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997:6). Using Pearson correlations, the authors find that the
average correlation between presidential elections at both the state and district level is
approximately .50; far below the frequently used benchmark of .80. This shows that
short-term forces have differing impacts on specific states or districts from election to
election, which makes it hard to gauge any long-term predispositions.
LeoGrande and Jeydel test the second assumption by conducting principal
components analysis. They find that there are, in fact, two significant dimensions that
account for the vote. These dimensions translate into the long-term factors of ideology
(60.3 percent o f the variance) and partisanship (21.8 percent of the variance). Their
results are similar to those o f Macdonald and Rabinowitz (1987) ^ With both factors
maintaining a significant influence on the electorate's voting decisions, presidential
election returns should not be used as a proxy for either one of them. This proxy cannot
be justified because researchers cannot reliably discern which specific long-term factor
they are tapping into.
The variables that I use to measure state/district partisanship and ideology avoid
some o f the pitfalls discussed above. First, there are two distinct variables, which
eliminates any ambiguity about what is being measured. Second, the variables are
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culled from surveys that have been pooled together over time to provide a reliable
number o f respondents. Finally, the surveys were conducted over a long enough period
to allay any concerns about the results being temporal quirks.
Both variables are drawn from the work o f Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993).
Their study establishes the partisan and ideological temperament o f a state based on
CBS-New York Times surveys conducted between 1974 and 1988. These pooled
surveys enable Erikson et al. to produce measures calculated from two self-placement
questions. They test these measures by correlating them with several state polls and
find correlations around the .80 range. They appear to have arrived at a reasonable
estimation of a state's general partisan and ideological placement. Erikson et al. (1993)
write,
In the CBS/NYT surveys, respondents' partisanship is measured by their
answers to the question, "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” Ideology is assessed by
asking the questions: "How would you describe your views on most political
matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or
conservative?" These questions are similar to the standard American
National Election Study questions on partisan and ideological identification.
[Tables B. I and B.2] present the results of our state aggregations for the 48
contiguous states plus the District o f Columbia. (No estimates are available
for Alaska and Hawaii.) Shown are the percentages for each self-identified
partisan and ideological category, as well as the number o f usable respondents
on which they are based. State positions on the two trichotomized measures are
summarized as mean positions. These means are calculated by assigning a score
o f -100 to each Republican or conservative, a score o f 0 to each Independent
and moderate, and a score o f +100 to each Democrat or liberal and then
calculating the mean in the standard way. Measured in this metric, the mean has
an easy interpretation as the relative percentage point difference between the
Democrats and Republicans or between liberals and conservatives (14 & 17).
Because Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the original analysis, I
create a measure for these states. Erikson et al. note that states of the Pacific Rim are
liberal, while Northwestem-Mountain states tend to be conservative. Since the past
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electoral history of the two states and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
scores o f their senators show Hawaii to be Democratic-liberal and Alaska to be
Republican-conservative, I compute the mean partisan and ideological score of similar
states and use this as a substitute. California, Oregon, and Washington are used for
Hawaii, while Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming are used for Alaska.
Because the Erikson et al. data only gauge partisanship and ideology at the state
level, I use a variation on their measure for the district level. Garand and Ardoin (1999)
have developed a statistical procedure for using the state-level scores computed by
Erikson et al. to simulate district-level scores. Basically, state-level data is used to
estimate the relationship that state partisanship and ideology have to various
demographic and political variables. Once the parameters of this state model are
estimated, then analogous data from U.S. House districts are substituted into the model
to yield predicted levels o f partisanship and ideology for House districts. These
simulated scores can be interpreted in the exact same way. ' This provides me with a
fair degree of confidence as 1 expand my study to include House races, since the
simulated scores exhibit the same strengths as the original data from which they are
estimated.
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Since economic conditions affect elections, a variable measuring the level of a
state's unemployment in the election year is used. This variable is also interacted with a
dichotomous variable measuring whether the incumbent is in the same party as the
president. A high level o f unemployment should benefit all challengers, especially
those that are not in the party of the sitting president.
There are no readily available statistics on unemployment in individual districts.
Although districts will vary within a state, the literature on sociotropic voting suggests
that perhaps voters will be more concerned with the macro-conditions o f the state;
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thus, even if their own community may be thriving, they may still cast a ballot based on
the overall condition of the state (Lewis-Beck, 1988). However, this type of economic
voting has not been clearly established. Rather than include these economic variables
based on such a tenuous amount of information, it is prudent to exclude them from the
House model.
INCUMBENT-CENTERED VARIABLES
The model specifies three variables that account for campaign-specific
situations that affect election outcomes. Part o f the allure o f politics is the energy and
excitement generated when vivid personalities clash in the swirling cauldron of a
campaign. A fiercely contested campaign often takes on the dimensions of both a
championship fight and a suspense novel. Incumbents are content to sail to reelection
without any such drama, but know that a perceived personal transgression can invite
strong competition. Such negative incidents are often unique to specific campaigns and
can alter these campaigns in differing ways.
However, negative perceptions of incumbents do produce one fairly uniform
result: incumbents fare worse than they normally would. This manifests itself in lower
victory margins or outright defeat. In such situations, high-quality challengers sense
that there is blood in the water and move in for the kill. Even if incumbents do survive,
they are often left in a weakened state. The goal for incumbents is to avoid being
placed in that situation to begin with. In the language o f my model, this means
avoiding scandal and controversy.
An incumbent scandal involves "allegations in the media o f illegal activities,"
while an incumbent controversy involves "incidents that were reported by the media
and raised questions about the incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence"
(Abramowitz, 1988:400). Another condition that can negatively impact an incumbent's
chances for reelection is poor health. If voters perceive that an incumbent does not
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possess the vigor and stamina necessary to adequately perform in office, they may
decide to replace him or her with someone who does. All three variables are
dichotomous and are constructed from information found in the Congressional
Quarterly.
PARTY
A dummy variable is included for party for each year in order to account for
national partisan tides that influence local elections. There are certain election years
where the public mood is firmly in favor of one of the two parties, and this will either
positively or negatively affect incumbents depending on their party affiliation. For
instance, Republicans were running for cover in 1974 and running toward the spotlight
in 1994. A strong national partisan swing does not nullify other factors, but does serve
to accentuate them.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
As mentioned in an earlier section, the fact that both spending variables are
correlated with the error term makes it undesirable to apply the usual estimation
procedure o f ordinary least-squares (OLS). Rather, a procedure must be employed that
accounts for this endogeneity problem and produces reliable results. King (1989) notes,
...the identification of this model of reciprocal causation leans heavily on the
theoretical specification of [the different variables]. If substantive theory
provides insufficient guidance to make these specifications, parameter estimates
with maximum relative likelihoods are not unique. In the history of statistics, a
large number o f estimators have been proposed for this model and its close
relatives. Most were proposed due to easier computational efficiency or as
incremental improvements over the prior state of the literature. A mutually
nonexclusive list includes two stage least squares (also known as 2SLS), three
stage least squares (3SLS), generalized least squares (GLS), indirect least
squares (US), AT-class estimators, double K-class estimators, AT-matrix-class
estimators, limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), instrumental
variables estimators (IV), and nonlinear versions o f each (200).
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This study employs an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The instrumental
variables must be correlated with the two spending variables and be uncorrelated with
the error tenn, and by extension, with the vote total. Challenger wealth and
state/district population fulfill these two requirements. These instrumental variables,
along with the other exogenous variables in the model, are used in two stages.
FIRST STAGE: The endogenous regressors are treated as dependent variables
and are each regressed onto the instrumental variables, plus
the other exogenous regressors. This reduced form produces
a predicted value for incumbent/challenger spending, known
as an instrumental variable estimator.
Incumbent Spending =Governor, Senator, U.S. Representative, Major, Minor,
Celebrity, Controversy, Scandal, Health, State District
Partisanship, Ideological Distance, Unemployment,
Unemployment*Party, State District Population, Challenger
Wealth, Error Term.
Challenger Spending =Governor, Senator, U.S. Representative, Major, Minor,
Celebrity, Controversy, Scandal, Health, State District
Partisanship, Ideological Distance, Unemployment,
Unemployment*Party, State District Population, Challenger
Wealth, Error Term.
SECOND STAGE: The predicted value is then inserted into the next equation.
Purged o f the endogenous variables, this equation should
produce accurate, consistent coefficients. This process of
estimation allows for greater veracity in gauging the
effects of candidate spending on the vote.
Incumbent Vote % =Incumbent Spending, Challenger*Spending, Governor, Senator,
U.S. Representative, Major, Minor, Celebrity Challenger,
Incumbent Controversy, Incumbent Scandal, Incumbent Health,
State District Partisanship, Ideological Distance, State
Unemployment Level, State Unemployment Level*Incumbent in
Governing Party, Party, Error Term.
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CONCLUSION
The attention focused on the Clinton administration's fundraising activities, and
political figures such as John McCain and Bill Bradley reveal that the issue o f campaign
finance is very much on the national agenda. The majority o f citizens may not
explicitly point to campaign finance as a pressing issue, but surely their expressed
concern over the perceived disconnect between the government and the governed is, in
part, derived from this issue. Such a political environment makes this study relevant
and, hopefully, beneficial.
Some view the current trends in campaign spending as troubling and call for
reforms, while others view these trends as benign and prefer the status quo. This study
is not intended to reinforce any particular argument or to offer support to either side in
the campaign finance debate. Rather, it is intended as an exploration o f the role that
money has played in congressional elections over the past two decades. Having a
clearer understanding o f money's role will help inform the current debate, and an
informed debate is infinitely better than one mired in ignorance. Trying desperately to
avoid sounding like Kenneth Starr, I merely want an impartial, objective examination of
the facts.
O f course, my findings may tend to lend credence to one side over the other.
Once the basic facts have been established, the path upon which future legislation
should travel may appear clearer. An analysis of the results may cause me to favor
certain types o f reform and to offer my recommendations in another study. If any, or
all, of these things turn out to be true, then so be i t After all, one of the four roles of
research is prescription. The key is that one's prescription be based on sound logic, and
this requires an appreciation of relevant facts. So, this study is more concerned with the
other three roles of research: observation, explanation, and prediction.
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ENDNOTES
1) Open seat elections and elections with missing variables are excluded from the data
set.
2) The sources used for this information are the bi-annual editions o f The Almanac o f
American Politics, as well as reports issued by the FEC.
3) In fact, individuals or interest groups who wish to maximize the impact o f their
contributions might prefer donating money to senators from small states. Since the
cost of campaigning is usually lower in small states (Brown, 1992), a contribution
can increase spending per voter more dramatically in small states than in large ones.
For instance, a $3,000 contribution will go farther in Maine than in California, and by
extension, the senator on the receiving end may be more grateful; financial donors
get more bang for the buck. This is not to say that senators from small states raise
more money than those from large states, but only that senators from small states
are ahead o f the curve when one factors in state population size. Dianne Feinstein
may raise more actual dollars than Olympia Snowe, but Snowe more than holds her
own when it comes to per capita fundraising, because she need only raise one-fiftieth
of what Feinstein does.
4) See the Supreme Court decision in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) which forwarded
the "one person, one vote" doctrine and eliminated malapportioned districts.
3) Gerber divides candidates into five categories based on previous political experience:
governor, U.S. Representative, major state or local official, minor public official, and
no previous elected office. I include a sixth-senator-to capture those few instances
where former senators sought to recapture that office.
6) Macdonald and Rabinowitz find a bit more parity between the two dimensions, but
also conclude that the importance of ideology has been rising since the mid-1960s.
7) Erikson et al. and Ardoin and Garand measure these variabtes in the Democratic and
liberal direction. 1am concerned with whether a district's partisanship and ideology
are consonant with its incumbent’s partisanship and ideology. So I recode these two
variables in a way that allows me to gauge this relationship. If the incumbent is a
Democrat, then I multiply by 1. If the incumbent is a Republican, then I multiply by
-1. By performing this function, I ensure that all o f the numbers are measured in the
incumbent's direction.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
There are essentially two ways to determine the outcome of any election:
examine the percentage o f the vote captured by each candidate involved in the race, or
simply look at who won and lost. O f course, the latter standard is the one that really
matters. The saying that "close only counts in horseshoes and hand-grenades" is
certainly applicable to U.S. elections. It does not matter if a candidate garners 49.9% or
.01% o f the vote, in both cases he or she walks away with nothing. * Victory brings
acclaim and opportunity, while defeat brings a pat on the back and a "better luck next
time."
While hardball practitioners of politics may only care about winning and losing,
academicians who study politics have additional concerns. The dichotomous nature of
the won-lost standard makes its utility somewhat limited in a study of elections.
Though dichotomous variables are often useful-and sometimes the only measures
available-for modeling political behavior, they are also blunt instruments. One way to
assuage this bluntness is to construct continuous variables, which allow for a more
nuanced approach.
This is why vote percentages are valuable. By looking at the percentage o f the
vote that a candidate receives, one has more latitude in estimating the impact of
particular factors on election outcomes. For instance, assume that there are two
challengers who are identical in every way, except that one has previously held elective
office and the other has not Also, assume that previous experience in elective office
translates into five percentage points, above and beyond what a candidate would receive
otherwise. Finally, assume that these extra five percentage points are not enough to
surmount the lead held by the incumbent so that both challengers are defeated.
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An analysis relying on the dichotomous measure would show the results for both
challengers to be the same: they lost. An analysis relying on vote percentages would
highlight the fact that the challenger with previous electoral experience performed
better. He or she may have lost, but that loss was by a smaller margin, and that smaller
margin can be accounted for. This is useful information. The scholarly community
now knows that challengers with previous electoral experience wage campaigns that are
more potent and have a greater likelihood of success.
In examining my results for House and Senate elections, I employ both of the
above standards. In this chapter, I look at some relevant descriptive statistics, many of
which are centered around the number o f challengers who were victorious. The next
two chapters contain various regression results. All o f the regression equations have the
incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote as their dependent variable.
CHALLENGER POLITICAL QUALITY
Challenger political quality (CPQ) stands alongside candidate expenditures as
the variables of most interest. Its importance derives from the fact that it serves as a
proxy for a candidate's visibility among voters. O f course, the ideal would be to have
survey data that directly measured the voters' awareness of candidates for all of the
elections encompassed in this dissertation. That kind of data set does not exist and
would take a lot of time and money to create. So, CPQ is called upon to serve as a
substitute, and it is a reliable one.
At the core of any CPQ measure is whether or not a challenger has prior
political experience in elective office. All of the approaches to measuring CPQ
discussed earlier (see Chapter 4) have one common thread: previous elective office.
Some researchers suggest that this information alone is a sufficient gauge of candidate
quality (Jacobson, 1978), while others contend that additional information needs to be
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added in an effort to elaborate on the various aspects of candidate quality (Green and
Krasno, 1988; Squire, 1989). Why is previous elective office so critical to CPQ?
Perhaps more than anything else, prior political experience is the best indicator
for how a candidate will perform in a campaign. A challenger who has previously held
elective office has a proven record of successfully running a campaign.^ One of the
hallmarks of a successful campaign is connecting with a significant proportion of the
electorate. Also, past electoral success indicates that a candidate is at least somewhat
proficient at organizing, fundraising, advertising, and other activities required for
victory.
In most instances, a challenger with previous experience in elective office
should run a better campaign than a challenger with no such experience. Furthermore,
a vigorous campaign should attract more attention from the electorate than an anemic
one. Therefore, challengers who have held elective office should be better able to
attract the attention of voters; they should have a higher degree o f visibility. This is the
logic behind using CPQ as a proxy for a candidate's visibility among voters. It is a
sound logic and CPQ is a sound concept. Now let us turn to an examination of the
actual data.
Based on my general theory of expenditure effects, there are several specific
hypotheses that one would expect to demonstrate in regard to CPQ. First, higher quality
challengers for both the House and Senate should spend more money in campaigns, on
average, than their lower quality counterparts. Second, higher quality challengers for
both chambers should win a greater proportion of the races that they enter relative to
lower quality challengers. Third, campaigns for the Senate should attract a greater
proportion of high-quality challengers than campaigns for the House.
In Table 5 .1 ,1 present average expenditures for incumbents and challengers for
the twenty years under review, as well as a breakdown by decade. In Tables 5.2 and
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S.3,1 present average expenditures by challengers grouped into six categories based on
previously held office. The main thing to be determined from these tables is whether or
not high-quality challengers do indeed spend more than low-quality challengers. Table
S. 1 is mentioned because it is also useful to see how high- and low-quality challengers
compare to the overall average for challengers.
Table 5.1
Years

Average Expenditures by House and Senate Candidates, 1974-94.
N

Incumbents

Challengers

1974-1994

$292,204

$123,893 (.25)

3163

1974-1978

$158,400

$100,956 (.32)

881

1980-1988

$311,103

$135,277 (.24)

1434

1990-1994

$399,257

$128,471 (.20)

848

1974-1994

$2,453,085

$1,316,491 (.30)

280

1974-1978

$1,493,668

$ 872,825 (.36)

64

1980-1988

$2,448,327

$1,273,844 (.29)

136

1990-1994

$3,228,708

$1,743,926 (.26)

80

House

Senate

Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars. Figures in parentheses represent
challenger spending as a proportion of total spending.

Regarding the six categories, even though each office is treated as a separate
entity, rather than being arranged along some scale, there should be little argument over
the fact that some of these offices are more prestigious than others. I propose that the
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Table S.2

Average Expenditures by House Challengers-Previous Elective Office,
1974-94
N

Previous Office

Expenditures

Governor

$74,734

2

Senator

$146,516

I

U.S. Representative

$325,160

44

Major

$232,600

173

Minor

$187,569

470

No Elective Experience

$101,343

2860

Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
Table 5.3

Average Expenditures by Senate Challengers-Previous Elective Office,
1974-94

Previous Office

Expenditures

N

Governor

$2,427,509

13

Senator

$2,039,803

2

U.S. Representaive

$2,235,425

49

Major

$1,836,088

34

Minor

$617,484

70

No Elective

$1,021,198*

111

*This figure is misleading due to the exorbitant sum o f money spent by Oliver North in
his 1994 bid for the Senate. Excluding North's $13,905,106, the average figure is
$904,071. All figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
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six categories be viewed as representing three levels o f prestige. The top echelon of
offices are governor, senator, and U.S. Representative. The intermediate level covers
major statewide elected officials other than governor, as well as mayors o f important
cities. The lowest level covers those elected to minor offices, along with those who
have never been elected to office.
Certainly a governorship is qualitatively far superior to any other statewide
office; to a certain degree, governors can be thought of as the presidents of their
individual states. While they do not have the awesome powers of the presidency and do
not really have to deal with foreign policy, they are chief-executives and chieflegislators in their states. This may be one o f the reasons why governors have been
more successful than congressmen in getting elected to the highest office in the land.
Meanwhile, senators and representatives are federal officeholders who share the cachet
of being only one of 535 legislators to serve their country in Washington D.C..
Major statewide and local offices do confer a certain degree o f status on those
who occupy them, but in most instances, they do not have the luster of the top echelon. ^
However, those who hold these offices should be viewed as higher quality candidates
than those found on the lowest level. Having been a county commissioner or a member
of a small town school board simply does not compare to having been a U.S.
Representative or a state attorney general. Taking these distinctions into account, let us
proceed with an analysis of the data.
Looking at races for the House, the numbers perfectly match expectations.
Because the number o f former governors and senators who ran in House races is too
small to be of much probative value, it is sensible to set these two categories aside.
Once this is done, the other four categories line up as predicted. Former U.S.
Representatives have the highest average expenditures at approximately $325,000,
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followed by major officeholders at approximately $233,000. Minor public officials
spent an average of $189,000, with those holding no elective office bringing up the rear
with around $101,000.
Likewise, spending figures for Senate races pretty much unfold as expected.
Those in the top echelon o f offices spent an average of over $2 million in their
campaigns. Governors spent the most, followed by representatives and senators. Major
officeholders were next in line at approximately $1.8 million. Challengers from the
two low-quality categories failed to clear one million dollars in spending, with minor
officeholders coming in at $617,000, and those with no prior office spending an average
of$904,000.4
For House and Senate campaigns, high-quality challengers do, in fact, spend
more money than low-quality challengers. High-quality challengers for both chambers
also have expenditures that exceed the overall average for challengers, while those
challengers from the two low-quality categories have expenditures that are below the
average for all challengers, with the exception of minor officeholders campaigning for
the House. The first hypothesis passes muster.
While it is instructive to look at the amount o f money spent by candidates, it is
also beneficial to view these expenditures as a proportion of total spending. It is
especially important to view challenger spending within this context What might seem
like an impressive sum o f money may actually be a pittance when compared to the
incumbent's output We know that the average amount spent by House challengers is
roughly $124,000, but how does this amount stack up against what incumbents are
spending? Determining the proportion spent by challengers in a campaign gives us an
understanding o f how competitive challengers are from a financial standpoint
In Table 5.1, the numbers in parentheses show challenger spending as a
proportion of total spending. The proportion of money spent by challengers in House
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campaigns has steadily dwindled over the years. In the 1970s, challengers accounted
for 32% of total spending in a campaign. In the following decade, that percentage fell
to a quarter o f all expenditures. By the 1990s, challengers accounted for a mere 20% of
total spending.
While the proportion of spending accounted for by Senate challengers is greater,
across the board, than that accounted for by House challengers, the numbers are still
anemic. From a high of 36% in the 1970s, the trend has been downward. In the 1990s,
their expenditures were only 26% of the total spent It is plain to see why incumbents
continue to return to office with the slightest of ease. The overall numbers for House
and Senate challengers point out their financial disadvantage in stark detail.
In Tables 5.4 and 5 .5,1place the total number of challengers for the House and
Senate into the six CPQ categories, along with the number of those who were
victorious. The findings conform to expectations. Beginning with House races, once
governors and senators are excluded due to the small number of observations, the other
categories basically fall into place. O f the 44 former representatives who sought
another trip to the House, 25% of them were successful. O f the 173 who held a major
office, 14% were successful. The minor office category does not match expectations in
that these challengers were as successful at winning office as their major office
counterparts.
Upon further consideration, however, this result is not too surprising. House
districts are relatively small, so it is possible that someone holding a minor office might
have a decent shot at winning. However, the odds of victory become much smaller
when one competes for statewide office. Those minor candidates who are able to sneak
through in a House race face a much bigger problem when trying to win a Senate seat
This is borne out in results shown in Table 5.5. Finally, those challengers with no
elective experience lag well behind with only a 4% success rate.
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Table 5.4

Winning Challengers in House Elections-Previous Elective Office,
1974-94

Previous Office

Total Challengers

Winning Challengers

%

Governor

2

0

0

Senator

1

0

0

44

11

25

Major

173

25

14

Minor

470

67

14

2860

120

4

U.S. Representative

No Elective

Table 5.5

Winning Challengers in Senate Elections-Previous Elective Office,
1974-94

Previous Office

Governor

Total Challengers

Winning Challengers

%

13

5

38

2

I

50

U.S. Representative

49

16

32

Major

34

8

23

Minor

70

6

8

111

14

13

Senator

No Elective

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In races for the Senate, things also pretty much hold to expectations.
Discounting the senate category (there are only two entries), the other top echelon
offices yield a higher proportion of victories than the lower offices. O f the 13
challengers in the governor category, 38% were successful. 32% of the 49
representatives were successful. Dropping to the next level, of the 34 who held a major
office, 23% achieved victory. This is much higher than the 8% of minor officeholders,
out o f 70, who won. The only glitch in the results for Senate races is that o f the 111
with no elective office, 13% were successful-a higher percentage than for minor
officeholders.
So, looking at races for both chambers one finds that, with only one exception,
challengers at higher levels won a greater proportion of the races that they entered
Table 5.6

Challengers for House and Senate Campatgns-Previous Elective Office,
1974-94

Senate
N=280

House
N=3163
Governor

2 (.10)

Governor

Senator

1 (.00)

Senator

U.S. Rep.

44(1.2)

13 (4.6)
2 (.70)

U.S. Rep.

49(17.4)

Major

173 (4.8)

Major

34(12.4)

Minor

470(13.1)

Minor

70 (24.8)

No Elective

2860 (80.0)

No Elective

111 (39.7)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
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compared to challengers at lower levels. And when looking at the six categories of
offices separately, there are only two instances when higher quality challengers did not
have a greater proportion of victory than lower quality challengers. The second
hypothesis comes through nicely.
The final area to be explored concerning CPQ is whether or not there are a
greater proportion of high-quality challengers running for the Senate compared to those
running for the House. Referring to Table S.6, the results show that this is the case.
Out of the 3,000-plus House campaigns analyzed in this dissertation, there were only
two former governors and one former senator who competed in them. This produces a
percentage so minuscule as to be irrelevant Barely 1% of challengers for the House
had served in that institution previously, while only 5% had held a major statewide or
local office. Minor officeholders accounted for a little over one-tenth of the pool of
challengers. The overwhelming percentage o f challengers (80%) for the House had no
previous experience in office.
As for Senate races, there were only two former senators accounted for in the
280 contests under examination in this study. But the percentages are comparatively
higher for the positions o f governor (approximately 5%), representative (17%), major
officeholder (12%), and minor officeholders (25%). Naturally, this dispersion means
that there are far fewer challengers (40%) in Senate contests who have never held
office. These numbers conclusively demonstrate that Senate challengers are of a higher
quality than House challengers, as predicted by the third hypothesis.
CHALLENGER EXPENDITURES
Before moving on to some o f the other variables in my model, I want to
explicitly address an issue concerning challenger expenditures. Many people argue that
because money is so important in campaigns, it can often be the determining factor in
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election outcomes. Those candidates who outspend their opponents will win more
times than n o t And if challengers are more dependent on spending than incumbents,
then outspending an opponent is especially critical for them. Is this true?
Table S. 7 casts some light on this question. O f the 222 challengers who
defeated incumbents in elections for the House, 85 (38%) of them outspent the
incumbent. O f the 50 challengers who defeated incumbents in elections for the Senate,
18 (36%) of them outspent the incumbent. This would seem to indicate that it is not
necessary to outgun an incumbent in order to achieve victory.
Table 5.7

Victories in Relation to Spending by House and Senate Challengers,
1974-94

House
222 challengers defeated incumbents~85 (38%) of these outspent incumbents
349 challengers outspent incumbents-85 (24%) of these were victorious
2814 challengers did not outspend incumbents-137 (5%) of these were victorious
Senate
50 challengers defeated incumbents-18 (36%) of these outspent incumbents
38 challengers outspent incumbents-18 (47%) of these were victorious
242 challengers did not outspend incumbents-32 (13%) of these were victorious

Viewing this question from a slightly different angle, o f the 349 House
challengers who outspent incumbents, 85 (24%) of them won the election. But of the
2814 challengers who spent less than incumbents, only 137 (5%) of them were
victorious. In Senate elections, 38 challengers outspent incumbents and 18 (47%) of
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them were successful. But o f the 242 challengers who spent less than incumbents, only
32 (13%) of them won the election. These figures paint a more complete portrait of
what I think is the true relationship between expenditures and victory.
Money is more important to challengers than to incumbents. Incumbents have
an array of resources at their disposal in seeking reelection, while challengers must
often rely more heavily on campaign expenditures to establish themselves and create
momentum in a campaign. Just because money is more crucial to the success of a
challenger's efforts does not necessarily mean that it is the ultimate arbiter of victory
and defeat There are, o f course, other factors involved in elections, hence the use of
multivariate as opposed to bivariate equations; I will explore some of these other
factors shortly.
The key point to remember about challenger spending is this: financial parity is
usually a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. Spewing forth money like
a human teller machine is not enough to ensure victory, and thank goodness that it is
not Citizens should expect more from candidates, especially relatively unknown
challengers, than a fat wallet On the other hand, challengers who are unable to be
financially competitive with incumbents have almost no chance of winning. For poor
challengers, Capitol Hill is not a career destination, but a vacation destination. In the
final analysis, challengers should recognize that a spending advantage provides a better
chance for victory, not a guarantee of one.
INCUMBENT CONTROVERSY AND SCANDAL
Contrary to public opinion, which is often shaped by the media, all politicians
are not unethical and crooked. By and large, politicians are conscientious about their
jobs and try to perform their duties as public servants admirably. But as in any
profession, there are occasions when some people fall short of the mark. Unlike other
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professions, the punishment doled out for such transgressions is decided by the public
via a ballot, rather than by a supervisor via a pink slip.
Following the lead of Abramowitz (1988), I classify political wrongdoing into
two categories: controversies and scandals. A controversy is when incidents call an
incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence into question. A scandal is when an
incumbent is alleged to have been involved in illegal activities. In Tables C.l and C.2,1
list the campaigns where one of these two were present.^
I hypothesize that challengers should win a greater proportion of elections
involving incumbent controversies or scandals compared to their overall rate of victory.
Furthermore, I would expect that the proportion would be greater for elections
involving scandals as opposed to those involving controversies, since the wrongdoing
involved in scandals is usually of a more serious nature. These incidents do not occur
in a vacuum, so that potential challengers are aware that there is blood in the water. In
an effort to capitalize on an already favorable situation, the eventual challengers should
spend more money than usual in the campaigns, and should be aided in this cause by
contributors who also see a real opportunity for change. Thus, I also hypothesize that
average challenger expenditures will be higher in elections involving incumbent
controversies or scandals compared to overall average challenger expenditures.
Furthermore, I would expect that challenger spending would be higher in elections
involving scandals as opposed to those involving controversies, for the reason cited
above.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate that both hypotheses are borne o u t In House
elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers won 26% of the time; in House
elections involving incumbent scandal, that figure jumps to 48%. Both of these are
higher than the overall percentage (6%) of victory for challengers in House elections.
In Senate elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers won 28% of the time;
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Table 5.8

Victories by Challengers in Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy
or Scandal, 1974-94

House
3460 elections without incumbent controversy or scandal-challengers won 191 (6%)
86 elections involved incumbent controversy—challengers won 22 (26%)
31 elections involved incumbent scandal-challengers won IS (48%)
Senate
248 elections without incumbent controversy or scandal-challengers won 40 (16%)
25 elections involved incumbent controversy-challengers won 7 (28%)
7 elections involved incumbent scandal-challengers won 3 (43%)

Table 5.9

Average Expenditures in Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy or
Scandal, 1974-94

House
Neither:
Incumbent-$275,335
Controversy: Incumbent-$462,202
Scandal:
Incumbent-$287,037

Challenger-$ 120,369
Challenger-S206,147
Challenger-$221,227

Senate
Neither:
lncumbent-S2,376,635
Controversy: Incumbent-$3,293,767
Scandal:
Incumbent-$2,159,190

Challenger-$ 1,236,111
Challenger-$2,117,820
Challenger-$ 1,302,382

Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars.
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in Senate elections involving incumbent scandal, that figure increases to 43%. Both of
these are higher than the overall percentage (16%) of victory for challengers in Senate
elections.
In House elections involving incumbent controversy, challengers spent an
average of approximately $206,000; in House elections involving incumbent scandal,
challengers spent approximately $221,000. Both of these are higher than the overall
challenger average of $124,000. In Senate elections involving incumbent controversy,
challengers spent an average of approximately $2,100,000; in Senate elections
involving incumbent scandal, challengers spent roughly $1,300,000. The overall
challenger average is $1,300,000. So, only the final subset of elections provides a
glitch in terms of my expectations.
As a sidenote, incumbent spending in these types of elections exhibits a curious
pattern. Remember that the general theory of candidate spending guiding this
dissertation assumes that incumbents adjust their level of spending to match the
perceived level of threat. If they anticipate a tough race from a qualified opponent with
ample financial resources, then they respond with a torrent of cash. Surely, incumbents
who are embroiled in a controversy or scandal realize that this could prompt that kind
o f scenario. They may have behaved foolishly, but they are not fools. This would lead
one to expect that incumbents would also raise their level of expenditures in elections
involving controversies and scandals, in an effort to lessen the potential negative
electoral repercussions stemming from such incidents.
The evidence partially confirms this expectation. For both chambers,
incumbents involved in controversies do increase their level of spending above what
they spend in a normal campaign. In both cases, their expenditures actually exceed
those of challengers. Incumbents involved in scandals, however, do not raise spending
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levels and are outspent, on average, by challengers. So, when they are in the most
trouble and should anticipate the stormiest weather, they do not respond as expected Is
there any possible explanation for this?
I think the most feasible explanation involves the initial stage of the campaign
spending process. Before candidates can spend money, they have to collect it Donors,
too, are strategic thinkers when it comes to electoral politics (Jacobson and Kemell,
1981). If they think that a candidate has little chance of winning, then they are not
going to waste their valuable resources on that candidate.
Even though incumbents enjoy a very cozy relationship with big-time donors,
this relationship is not impervious to outside events. The question becomes how severe
does a negative event have to be before the flow o f cash dries up. A small controversy
may not be enough to interrupt the symbiosis o f donors and incumbents, but a major
scandal probably will be. The reason that incumbents who are on the ropes do not
dramatically increase spending is because they cannot; they do not have adequate
funding. Again, this is only an educated guess that is meant to highlight yet another
interesting area to be explored.
CHALLENGER CELEBRITY
There are occasions when incumbents must face challengers who are well
known to a significant portion of the electorate based on factors not directly related to
political life. Whether they be entertainers, athletes, scions o f famous families, or some
other breed of celebrity-these challengers bring something extra to the table. To the
extent that celebrity challengers emerge with a higher awareness among voters than
ordinary challengers, they should have an easier time overcoming the varied obstacles
that face anyone trying to unseat an incumbent For this reason, I hypothesize that
celebrity challengers should win a greater proportion of the elections that they enter
compared to the overall rate of victory for challengers.
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Table S.10

Victories by Celebrity Challengers in House and Senate Campaigns,
1974-94

House
S3 elections involved celebrity challengers-challengers won 10 (19%) of these
Senate
10 elections involved celebrity challengers-challengers won 4 (40%) of these

Table 5.11

Expenditures by Candidates in Campaigns with Celebrity Challengers,
1974-94

House
Incumbent-$425,283

Challenger-$277,324

Senate
Incumbent-$3,418,404

Challenger-$3,467,423

In Tables S. 10 and 5.11,1 list information on the results and expenditures in
elections involving celebrity challengers. All of the forwarded hypotheses are borne
out. Celebrity challengers in House races win 19% of the time; this is hardly a
staggering percentage, but it is more than the overall 6% rate o f victory. Races for the
upper chamber involving a celebrity challenger result in incumbent defeat 40% of the
time, which is higher than the usual 16%. Celebrity challengers for the House spend
two times more than the overall expenditure average, while that figure for Senate
challengers is almost three times more. In fact, the average Senate celebrity challenger
actually outspends the rival incumbent by nearly $50,000. Though both House and
Senate incumbents do, as predicted, increase spending in order to meet the threat
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Publicity is not the only thing that celebrity attracts, it also attracts money.
There is a reason why the late Sonny Bono was the most sought after congressman for
Republican fundraising events. Not even staid "main Streeters" can resist the allure o f a
little Hollywood dazzle. Since being a celebrity should aid challengers in attracting
campaign funds, I expect celebrity challengers to have higher expenditures, on average,
than other challengers. The publicity accompanying a celebrity challenger will give the
incumbent plenty o f time to gear up his or her own finance machinery, so that
incumbent spending should increase as well.
CHALLENGER WEALTH
The final variable to be explored in this chapter is challenger wealth. As noted
earlier, a vast amount o f wealth does not automatically translate into political success.
It should, however, translate into an enhanced ability to spend. Challengers who
maintain a degree of personal wealth have deeper financial reservoirs to draw from. If
necessary, they can simply write a check or secure a big loan in order to remain
competitive in terms of spending. While there is no reason to believe that wealthy
challengers should win more often than others, there is ample reason to suspect that
wealthy challengers should spend more than others.
In Table 5.10,1 show that, indeed, wealthy challengers do have higher average
expenditures. Wealthy challengers for the House spend $201,000 compared to the
overall average o f $124,000, while wealthy challengers for the Senate spend $1.98
million compared to the overall average of $1.31 million. Incumbents' spending against
wealthy challengers hovers close to their overall spending average. This makes sense
when one considers that incumbents may not view wealthy challengers with as much
alarm as they do high-quality opponents, personal scandals, and celebrities.
Just because a challenger has substantial wealth does not mean that he or she is
willing to use i t Many wealthy challengers who are also relatively unqualified for the
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Table 5.12

Average Expenditures in Campaigns Involving Wealthy Challengers,
1974-94

House
Incumbent-$323,869

Challenger-$201,229

Senate
Incumbent-$2,448,395

Challenger-$ 1,985,947

Note: Figures are in real 1982-1984 dollars. Refer back to Table 5.1 for average
expenditures in all campaigns.

office which they are seeking may realize the quixotic nature of their endeavor and
refrain from squandering a small fortune (aka. the "I am not going to be another Steve
Forbes" philosophy). Others, in a fit of near delusion, may throw caution to the wind
and spend like there is no tomorrow (aka. the "look how much coverage Ross Perot got"
philosophy). It is almost impossible for incumbents to know in advance which route
wealthy challengers will take, so they tend to be reactive. More than likely, they will
wait until they detect a spending surge from the other camp before increasing their own
spending. And if that surge comes in the latter stages of the campaign, poll numbers
may indicate that they have no reason to fear it anyway.
High-quality opponents, personal scandals, and celebrities are all things that
incumbents are aware of fairly early in the election season. Unlike challenger spending
levels, these things are predictable, so that incumbents can be proactive. A high-quality
challenger with experience as a governor is not going to suddenly lose that credential; a
scandal is not going to suddenly disappear, a celebrity cannot choose to suddenly
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become an obscure figure for the campaign. When everything is said and done, it may
turn out that the incumbent was not in that much trouble after all, but that is a chance
that most incumbents are unwilling to take.
CONCLUSION
This initial, descriptive look at the data provides a favorable view o f the main
theoretical ideas guiding this dissertation. Focusing on the percentage of victories by
and the average expenditures of challengers who fit into certain categories allows one
to get a feel for the topic under review. Though simple and straightforward, these
descriptive techniques are valuable and insightful.
However, in order for this study to be complete, multiple regression is required.
Multiple regression is the best technique for uncovering the true relationship between a
candidate's awareness among voters, a candidate's expenditures, and a candidate's vote
total. It also serves as a more vigorous test of the hypothesized relationships between
other variables and the vote. I now turn to an analysis of my multiple regression results.
ENDNOTES
1) This is the case because o f the winner-take-all system that governs U.S. elections.
2) Unless that challenger assumed his or her previous office via an appointment.
3) Mayors o f world-renowned cities, such as New York and San Francisco, can be
placed in that top echelon. However, they are the exceptions that prove the rule.
4) Oliver North's exorbitant campaign spending in the 1994 Virginia contest skews
these results.
5) The coding procedure is as follows: I culled through relevant issues o f CQ and
coded each election as I deemed appropriate. Those cases that were not absolutely
clear-cut were given to three of my colleagues. After their independent assessments,
I correlated these cases. The correlation rate was .84. In those instances where
there was disagreement, I used the classification that received the most votes. I offer
my thanks to Jamie Pasley, Scott Crichlow, and Karrie Huggins for their assistance.
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CHAPTER SIX:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SENATE ELECTIONS
Congressional elections are dynamic events. Ambitious candidates, powerful
parties, inquisitive voters, strategic interest groups, and complex public policy issues
blend together into a unique electoral stew. It should come as no surprise, then, that the
results o f these elections are determined by a wide array of factors. Money, the
economy, partisanship, candidate attributes, and campaign-specific occurrences all
impact the final decisions rendered in voting booths across the land.
In order to better understand the dynamic processes that drive congressional
elections, one must be able to delineate the nature and extent of the impact that relevant
factors have on the vote. For instance, the importance of money in elections truly
becomes apparent only after other potential factors have been considered. If campaign
spending is not made to stand beside other variables, then one cannot know for sure
whether these other variables are providing an influence that is being erroneously
attributed to spending. Likewise, the meaningfulness of these other variables is best
determined by relating them to each other.
For social scientists, multiple regression is a valuable analytical tool. It allows
researchers to do precisely the kinds of things discussed above. By controlling for other
variables, one can pinpoint the significance o f the variable of interest In my case, 1can
get at the importance of money and challenger quality by controlling for such things as
state/district partisanship, state unemployment, and an incumbent's health. I can also
determine whether any o f these variables interact in relevant ways, such as the effect
that money has on the vote at different levels of CPQ. The following sections contain
the results of my regression analysis for Senate elections.
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OLS RESULTS
In terms of campaign spending, ordinary least squares is not the most efficient
type of regression to perform, but it is the workhorse o f political science and deserves at
least a glance in this study. Other researchers (Abramowitz, 1991; Jacobson, 1978)
have performed OLS on campaign spending data, but most ultimately turn to other
forms o f regression in an attempt to solve the endogeneity problem. Though the
endogenous nature of the spending variable probably skews the OLS estimates, it is
instructive to include an OLS model in order to see if my results conform to earlier OLS
estimations. In a sense, OLS allows us to get our feet wet before swimming into the
depths o f instrumental variables and 2SLS.
In Tables 6.1 and 6.2,1 present two OLS equations for the Senate. Table 6.1
contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only
independent variables. ^ Both coefficients are highly significant and in the expected
Table 6.1

OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote

Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

3.279

.329

6.03***

Challenger Spending

-5.392

-.796

-14.90***

Party

2.387

.127

2.80***

R-Squared=.46
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01
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direction. Since this study is concerned with the relative impact that each variable has
on the vote, I am also interested in comparing the strength o f the two variables within
the equation.
A natural inclination might be to look at the unstandardized coefficients in order
to gauge the relative strength o f variables, but this would be incorrect. The approach
adopted by virtually all researchers is to look at the standardized (beta) coefficients.
Anthony Walsh writes, "This value tells you how much a one standard deviation change
in the independent variable will affect the dependent variable, also in standard
deviation units, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the equation. This is
an important statistic to reveal in any report because, unlike the unstandardized slope, it
is a measure of the relative importance of the independent variables in the equation
(1999: 282).
The results displayed in Table 6.1 are as expected. While both spending
coefficients are significant, the beta for challenger spending (-.796) is more than double
the beta for incumbent spending (.329). When candidate spending is isolated within an
equation, challengers do indeed get a bigger bang for their buck. However, such an
equation does not tell the whole story. As the R-squared indicates, the spending
variables alone explain less than half of the variance. Therefore, a more complete
model is required.
In Table 6 .2 ,1 present results from the full model, which lifts the R-squared to
.54. The results from this equation are in harmony with the generally accepted view
within the scholarly community; both challenger and incumbent spending have a
significant effect on the vote, though the effect of challenger spending is greater.
Notice that the beta for challenger spending (-.575) greatly exceeds the beta for
incumbent spending (.222). So even when candidate spending is placed alongside other
essential variables, the relative strength of challenger spending comes through.
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Table 6.2

OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending—Senate

T

Incumbent Spending

2.096

.222

3.77***

Challenger Spending

-3.790

-575

-9.16***

Governor

-2.453

Senator

-3.795

U S. Rep

-4.121

Major

-2.252

-1 59*

Minor

-468

-.023

-.45

Celebrity

-5.449

- Ill

-2.38***

Controversy

-2.574

-083

-1.88**

Scandal

-4.411

-.080

-1.75**

Health

-7.907

-.121

-2.75***

Unemployment

090

.020

Unemploy*Party

-518

- 199

-3.86***
3.28***

I
o

IS l

B

Independent Variables

1
oC/l

b

1
o00

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote

- 178

Party I.D.

.134

.183

Ideological Distance

050

.024

Party

-1.771

-099

-1.15
-.83
-3 37***

.43

.53
-1.68**

R-Squared=54
N=260

Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<01

88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The coefficients for eleven of the thirteen remaining variables are in the
expected direction. The two variables-state unemployment level and incumbent
ideological distance-that are in the wrong direction have coefficients that are
insignificant. Plus, when state unemployment level is interacted with a dummy variable
coded one if the incumbent is in the same party as the president, it becomes highly
significant. This more refined variable shows that, in distributing justice, voters tend to
be fair and save their retribution for those politicians belonging to the party in power
(Hibbing and Alford, 1981; Stein, 1990).- While the coefficient tapping into ideology
is insignificant, its party identification counterpart is not. This supports the belief
among some scholars that party is still a central factor in deciding elections, and that it
serves as a more accessible guide to the average voter than does ideology (Aldrich,
1995; Petrocik 1987 and 1989; Sundquist, 1983).
In order to gauge CPQ, 1constructed five separate dummy variables, each coded
one if a challenger had previously held a particular elective office and zero if he or she
had not held that office. Those challengers who held higher offices (senator, governor,
representative, and major statewide office/mayor of important city) are assumed to be
of a higher quality compared to those who held only minor offices or had no previous
electoral experience at all. While I do not employ an additive scale, there is
undoubtedly a hierarchy of offices. Only two o f these coefficients reach significance:
U.S. Representative and major office.
1am not surprised that being challenged by a former senator does not
significantly decrease the vote percentage of the incumbent. In most cases, these are
people who were rejected by voters in the prior election and are trying to mount a
comeback. The office of senator is a prestigious one, but some of the luster wears off
after suffering a recent electoral defeat Also, these rematches are difficult for
challengers because incumbents have had six years to wield all of the advantages that
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come with holding office. This results in the challenger having to combat the oft-noted
"sophomore surge" (Gelman and King, 1990; Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991). If the
former senator/current challenger could not achieve victory as an incumbent, then it is
unlikely that he or she will do so while standing on the opposite side o f the fenced
I am a bit surprised that a challenge waged by someone with a gubernatorial
pedigree is not significant The assumption is that a governor's statewide coalition
translates effectively in a run for that other prestigious statewide office: senator.
Perhaps the explanation for this insignificance lies in the perceived role for each office.
Senators are thought of as distant legislators, while governors are viewed as the
executives who actively manage the state. The voters may not see governors in the role
of senator, a governor's duties do not translate effectively to the Senate. This line of
thinking is in the same vein as the argument that senators are not elected president
because their legislative role is not consonant with those duties performed by the chiefexecutive (Bartels, 1985; Kenney and Rice, 1988).
Those challengers who held the office of U.S. Representative did have a
significant influence on the vote. This is consistent with the finding that U.S.
Representative is the most valuable office to hold, in terms of election to the Senate
(Lublin, 1994). Representatives have advantages that the other top officeholders do not.
Unlike former senators, representatives are usually still in office when they decide to
run for a senate seat Their candidacies are not viewed as attempts to return to the
status quo-or in the case o f governors, as lateral moves-but as logical moves up the
political ladder. They have usually achieved a string o f House victories and can bring
that momentum, along with their own incumbency advantages, into the election. And
since they have spent at least part of their careers on Capitol Hill, they avoid the
perceptual pitfalls faced by governors.^ A move from the lower chamber to the upper
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chamber is functionally consistent, just as a move from the city hall of a metropolis to
the governor’s mansion would be. They are prepared legislators and a run for the
Senate is the logical next step.
The variable for major statewide officials and mayors of important cities has a
coefficient that reaches significance at th e . 10 level. To a certain degree, these
officeholders are in the same boat as representatives when it comes to mounting a
challenge for the senate. They are politicians seeking upward mobility in their careers,
and they have a fairly solid constituency-base from which to run. However, these
offices are not as prestigious as the previously mentioned three, which means that these
candidates do not benefit as fully from established reputations. They have to work
harder to get the attention o f the press and have a somewhat harder time convincing the
public that they have the right stuff to flourish as senators.
As one might anticipate, challengers with experience only in minor offices do
not, solely on the basis of that qualification, pose much of a problem for incumbents.
The effect of this variable on the vote is insignificant, though in the right direction.
Perhaps minor officeholders should attempt to attain a certain degree of celebrity. The
variable for celebrity status does have an independent effect on the vote.
It appears that the political world is no more immune from the allure of
celebrity than the rest o f society. Merely having a recognizable name and face-no
matter if unaccompanied by political experience and know how-is enough to threaten
the comfortable existence o f incumbents. Candidates are elected by an expression of
the public's will, so it stands to reason that those challengers already basking in the
glow o f the public eye are more advantaged than run-of-the-mill challengers.
The three remaining variables in my model demonstrate that certain
circumstances can arise in a campaign that significantly threaten an incumbent's
electoral security. These circumstances center around the activities and health of
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incumbents. Incumbents who find themselves embroiled in controversies or scandals
will suffer at the polls. Incumbents who exhibit poor health are also vulnerable, both
physically and electorally. This trio o f variables shows that the vaunted incumbency
advantage is not indestructible. If voters begin to question an incumbent's ability to
carry out the duties o f his or her office, regardless o f whether this doubt is self-inflicted
or caused by forces beyond the incumbent's control, then there is a real chance that the
incumbent will be replaced.
2SLS RESULTS
Because o f the non-recursive nature o f the campaign spending model, it is
appropriate to use an estimation technique that purges the model of troublesome
endogenous variables. Two-stage least squares is the technique employed in this study.
The model is exactly the same under 2SLS, except that a predicted value is substituted
for actual candidate expenditures. This predicted value is derived from regressing the
spending variable onto an instrumental variable (i.e. a reduced form equation). The
technique is valid so long as the instrumental variable is correlated with the endogenous
variable, but not with the error term. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the
instruments used in my 2SLS equations are state population and challenger wealth.
In Tables 6.3 and 6.4,1 present two 2SLS equations for Senate elections. Table
6.3 contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only
independent variables. As with OLS, both variables are highly significant and in the
expected direction. The R-squared is a bit lower than that for the OLS counterpart to
this equation, coming in at .42.
An initial examination of the unstandardized coefficients reveals that incumbent
spending is a stronger performer than challenger spending This is a perfect illustration
o f why it is a mistake to use unstandardized coefficients when comparing variables. A
closer look at the equation shows that the t-value for challenger spending is larger,
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Table 6 J

2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote

Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

7.442

.748

5.79***

Challenger Spending

-6.944

-1.026

-11.93***

Party

3.801

.202

3.74***

R-Squared=.42
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***.01

which means that challenger spending is actually more significant. A t-value is
calculated by dividing the unstandardized coefficient by the standard error. So even
though challenger spending has a smaller unstandardized coefficient in this equation, it
also has a much smaller standard error, which is the reason why it performs better than
incumbent spending. Basically, the effect of challenger spending is more homogenous,
while the effect o f incumbent spending is more variant.
This is borne out by a comparison of the standardized coefficients for the two
spending variables. The beta for challenger spending (-1.026) is more robust than the
beta for incumbent spending (.748). Again, the use of standardized (beta) coefficients
in determining the relative importance of variables in an equation is the more reliable
course o f action for researchers. In this instance, the beta coefficients provide clear
proof that Jacobson's (1978) original contention is as applicable in Senate races as it is
in House races. Challengers do receive higher marginal returns on their expenditures.
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Table 6.4

2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
b

B

Incumbent Spending

5.142

.546

3.59***

Challenger Spending

-5.125

-778

-7.lt***

Governor

-1.789

-.040

-.79

Senator

-.584

'©
©
l_ /t

I

T

Independent Variables

-.11

U.S. Rep

-3 698

- 159

-2.83***

Major

-1.970

-072

-1.31*

Minor

-265

-.013

-.24

Celebrity

-4.662

-095

-1.91**

Controversy

-2.462

-080

-1.70**

Scandal

-3.552

-.064

-1.31*

Health

-6.5 U

-.100

-2.09**

Unemployment

.305

Unemploy* Party

-554

-.213

109

148

Party I.D.

070

1.28*
-3.87***
2 44***

Ideological Distance

-043

-.021

-.40

Party

-.591

-033

-.48

R-Squared=51
N=260

Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<01
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In Table 6 .4 ,1 present the results from the full model. Both of the spending
variables are significant at the .01 level. Again, challenger spending has a stronger
effect on the vote. This finding is consistent with the findings of other scholars
applying 2SLS to campaign spending (Green and Krasno, 1988). It casts some doubt on
Gerber's assertion that incumbent spending is paramount in Senate elections. Certainly
the difference between the two spending coefficients is smaller in this equation than in
the equations previously discussed, but challenger spending (-.778) still clearly
outperforms incumbent spending (.546).
It is worth mentioning again that this result is perfectly attuned to my central
theory. If the favorable differential in spending effects for challengers is the result of
challengers having low recognition among the electorate and thus being able to garner
more benefits from spending on communications, then it stands to reason that
challengers garnering higher amounts of recognition from the public would benefit less
from spending. As I detailed in the previous chapter, challengers for the Senate have a
higher profile than challengers for the House; thus, the difference in the effects of
spending between incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate campaigns than in
House campaigns.
U.S. Representative and major statewide official/mayor of important city are the
only CPQ coefficients to reach significance; none of the others even come close,
though they are all in the expected direction. The explanation for this result is identical
to the one offered in my discussion of the full OLS model. As for the other variables in
the equation, only ideological distance has a coefficient that fails to reach significance;
the other seven variables are all significant and in the expected direction.
Curiously, incumbent controversy (-.080) is more significant than incumbent
scandal (-.064). This creates the counter-intuitive finding that being accused of a
violation of law is less damaging to an incumbent’s ability to attract votes than being
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considered a bit shady or irrational. One would expect the opposite to be true. Having
their honesty and judgment questioned is often considered par for the course for
politicians, but as a group, they tend not to lean toward felonious behavior. For this
reason, scandals would have more of an impact. Voters are more likely to focus on
these behavioral aberrations and punish the wrongdoer via the ballot
One possible explanation for the finding is that some controversies may be
viewed by the public as worse than some scandals. For instance, a public display of
drunkenness is deemed as more reprehensible than a violation of campaign finance law.
Marital infidelity may be less acceptable than the casual use of marijuana. Maybe
incumbents faced with a scandal are more diligent in their campaigning and more
liberal with the use o f campaign funds, thus counter-acting any potential negative
effects. Since they think that a scandal can seriously threaten their incumbency, they
are prepared to deal with it in advance of the campaign. Controversies are not
considered as threatening, so incumbents are not as vigilant. This lack of vigilance
translates into lost votes. In any event, the scandal variable is insignificant Further
scholarly exploration of campaigns involving candidate misconduct will hopefully shed
more light on this interesting topic.
The interaction term between state unemployment level and the incumbent's
status in the governing party is one of the strongest variables in the model. This is clear
proof that economic factors do influence the outcome o f elections. Many studies have
found that presidents are held accountable for the state o f the economy (Erikson, 1989;
Hibbs Jr., 1987) and my findings suggest that senators, too, are held accountable if their
party affiliation matches that o f the president This type o f collective accountability
should provide ample motivation for presidents and senators to bridge any institutional
gaps in an effort to attain party solidarity. In a sense, they all sink or swim together.
This situation is an example o f the continuing importance of parties.

%
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This importance is additionally manifested in Table 6.4 by the performance o f
the partisan identification variable. When an incumbent runs in a state that has a high
number of citizens identifying with his or her party, then he or she will perform better at
the polls. This holds true for Democrats and Republicans. Obviously, it is easier to win
an election when the electorate is predisposed to vote for you. Incumbents running in
states with a fairly even distribution of party identifiers or with a higher number of
opposing identifiers have a tougher trek, since they do not have the luxury o f preaching
to the choir.
Finally, the variable measuring an incumbent’s ideological distance from the
electorate is insignificant. In this equation, however, it is in the right direction. Taken
together, these variables perform relatively well. 1 would like a higher R-squared, but
further refinement of the model should strengthen its explanatory power.
The overall strength o f the model is only one consideration in this study. The
key question that I seek to answer is whether a challenger's level of political quality
determines the effectiveness of his or her spending. Do high-quality challengers receive
lower marginal benefits from their expenditures? The very strong performance of the
two spending variables in my model should allow me to answer this question with a fair
degree of accuracy. It is to this task that I now turn.
Partitioned Samples
When seeking to demonstrate that a particular variable creates variation in the
performance of another variable, researchers will often utilize an interaction term.
Specifically, they code the variable that is hypothesized to cause the effect as a dummy
variable, and then multiply it with the variable that is supposed to be affected. In this
study, CPQ would be transformed into a variable coded one for high-quality challengers
and zero for those that are not. Candidate spending would then be multiplied by this
variable. This method is employed when the researcher thinks that only one variable in
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the overall model is affected. None o f the remaining variables should be directly
affected by the dummy variable.
The use of an interaction term is not suitable for this study. Instead, I choose to
divide the entire sample into two groups based on the political quality of challengers.
Rather than using CPQ to create a dummy variable, I use it to guide my division o f the
sample. One group contains only high-quality challengers, and the other group contains
only low-quality challengers (minor office and no elective office). This method o f
analysis is appropriate when the researcher thinks that all o f the variables in the model
are affected. That is the case here.
I think that CPQ alters the dynamics o f an entire campaign, of which candidate
spending is one element, albeit an important one. Senate contests are waged over an
entire state, and therefore require a lot of diligence in order to be successful. It is not
enough for a candidate to run an ad on two or three television stations in order to reach
likely voters. This might work in smaller House districts, but the geography of a Senate
race dictates that candidates disburse their messages through various media outlets and
across vast populations.
It is also not enough for a candidate to stand in front of a local grocery store or
shopping mall and greet voters as they arrive. Instead, the candidate must be willing to
devote an inordinate amount of time traveling across the state and focusing on often
distinct groups of voters. Obviously, this combination o f retail and personal politics
requires an efficient organization and substantial campaign funds. Entrenched
incumbents have both of these, but what about challengers?
This is where the distinction between high-quality and low-quality challengers is
clearest High-quality challengers have experience running successful campaigns;
sometimes even statewide campaigns. This means that they begin the Senate race with
a relatively high amount of recognition among voters. Low-quality challengers do not
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have this kind o f experience. While they may have met with past electoral success,
winning a seat on the local school board or in the state House hardly prepares one for
mounting a challenge for a U.S. Senate seat. Those challengers with no previous
electoral experience face an even bleaker scenario.
What does this mean in terms o f challenger expenditures? Results from past
research point out that the primary function o f campaign expenditures is to
communicate with the electorate. An effective utilization o f funds will result in a
greater awareness of the candidate by the public. Such spending will be most beneficial
to those candidates who are not well-known by the public.
For example, imagine that two candidates each spend $10,000 to run an ad
during a popular prime time program. This program is watched by 100,000 people in
the state, and these people also happen to be conscientious citizens who regularly vote.
Before the ad airs, Candidate A is already known by 90,000 of these voters and
Candidate B by 20,000 of them. No one gets up to go to the refrigerator or to use the
bathroom during the commercial, so all 100,000 voters see the ad. Candidate A has just
reached 10,000 new voters, or one voter per one dollar spent Candidate B has just
reached 80,000 new voters, or eight voters per one dollar spent.
So, even though each candidate spent the same amount of money on the same
thing, one candidate got a higher return on that expenditure. And the explanation for
that higher return is that the candidate was not as well-known to the public as his or her
opponent. Like Candidate A in the above example, incumbents tend to be well-known
among voters. This means that the extent of the spending differential in a campaign
will be determined by the challenger. Since high-quality challengers are also fairly
well-known, the marginal benefits that they receive from spending will be similar to
those received by incumbents. Since low-quality challengers are not as well-known, the
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marginal benefits that they receive from spending will be much greater than those
received by incumbents.
My major contention is that the difference in the benefits received from
campaign expenditures will be greater in elections involving low-quality challengers
than in elections involving high-quality challengers. However, there is more to the
stoiy. It is simply illogical to think that the ever-fluctuating atmosphere of a campaign
will remain unaltered, except for spending, when a prominent challenger enters that
atmosphere. High-quality challengers are in a position to take advantage of other
elements in a campaign that low-quality challengers are not.
For instance, high-quality challengers should be better able to capitalize on
incumbent controversies and scandals. High-quality challengers are usually relatively
well-funded and have experience waging victorious campaigns. This means that they
are prepared to take advantage o f any mistakes made by their opponents. Becoming
embroiled in a personal imbroglio is the type of mistake that incumbents try to avoid
like the plague. Should an incumbent become involved in a controversy or scandal,
however, then high-quality challengers are more likely to make them pay.
High-quality challengers should also be better able to capitalize on poor
economic conditions in order to achieve victory. If a state is suffering through
economic malaise, then much of the blame is placed at the feet o f those incumbents
perceived to be responsible for directing economic policy. Governors are the most
obvious targets, but senators, particularly those in the president's party, may also
become focal points for the electorate's wrath.^ Challengers skilled in the art of
campaigning can leverage this negative perception toward incumbents to their own
benefit. Challengers without much electoral experience or skill are not likely to be as
opportunistic.
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In addition, high-quality challengers may be better able to sway voters without
strong partisan affiliations. These independents tend to rely on other cues in deciding
how to cast a vote. Many of these cues are candidate-centered, such as political
advertisements and personality-driven interviews. Since high-quality challengers are
relatively prominent, then they can make good use of these cues. Furthermore, highquality challengers have a better chance of blunting the impact of party identification
among party identifiers. Party identification is a strong factor in any election, but in
elections where both candidates are well-known to voters, it may play less of a role.
So, it is not that challenger political quality interacts only with spending in an
interesting way, but that it affects all o f the variables in my model. The most efficient
way o f capturing this is to separate the two types of campaigns-those with high-quality
challengers and those with low-quality challengers-and run equations for both. This
allows me to gauge the effect o f spending in these two different electoral environments.
High-Quality Challengers In Table 6.5,1 display the results of my analysis for
elections involving high-quality challengers. The coefficient for challenger spending is
significant. As stated many times throughout my work, challengers rely heavily on
campaign funds to present themselves to the public. Even if a challenger has
superlative qualifications, a steady flow of cash serves to enhance the benefits that
those qualifications are already providing. It is rare that a challenger can achieve
victory absent formidable amounts of spending. It is a safe assumption that without
money, challengers-even high-quality challengers-do not stand much o f a chance. But
if they do acquire campaign funds, they are virtually guaranteed benefits from these
funds. The level of significance for challenger spending in every equation in this
dissertation serves to reinforce this contention.
The most important aspect of this equation is how challenger and incumbent
spending compare to each other. For while challenger spending is significant,
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Table 6.5

2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-Senate Campaigns
with High-Quality Challengers

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

3.423

.407

1.30*

Challenger Spending

-2.693

-.408

-1.71**

Celebrity

-8.075

-.121

-1.47*

Controversy

-4.539

-.213

-2.54***

Scandal

-5.477

-.140

-1.67**

Health

-5.529

-.082

-1.07

Unemployment

.834

.285

3.24***

Unemploy*Party

-.948

-.490

-4.35***

Party I.D.

.172

.295

3.19***

Ideological Distance

-.115

-.071

Party

-3.738

-.271

-.70
-2.21**

R-Squared=.52
N=92
Note: *<10 **<05 ***<01

incumbent spending occupies an equally important place in the equation. The beta for
the former is -.408, while the beta for the latter is .407; almost perfect parity in this
regard. This is a markedly different relationship than the one seen in the other
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equations for the Senate. In the other equations, both variables are significant, but
challenger spending is always the stronger performer.
The whole reason for bifurcating the data set is to get at this very relationship,
and the relationship conforms to expectations. By isolating this subset of elections, one
can get a clearer view o f what occurs when an incumbent encounters an experienced,
skilled, and well-financed opponent. What occurs is that both candidates get locked
into a sort of spending stalemate. The primary factor that normally allows challengers
to have a spending advantage is of little consequence in these elections.
Specifically, high-quality challengers are denied the huge gains that their lowquality counterparts receive from expenditures on communications, because they start
out with a fairly high amount of recognition among the public. Thus, while they still
get positive benefits from their expenditures, they also reach the point of diminishing
returns much sooner. This brings the benefits that they receive from spending into line
with the benefits that incumbents receive. Incumbents are used to receiving little from
the dollars that they spend, the difference in these elections is that their high-quality
challengers are now in the same boat.
What are the consequences of this for the final election result? One might think
that challengers who are denied the advantage derived from differential spending
effects have two chances: slim and none, with slim having just left town. In fact, just
the opposite is true. The reason that they are not getting huge returns on every
campaign dollar spent is because they have advantages that most challengers do not
enjoy. While these advantages may not be as numerous as those that accrue to
incumbents, they are sufficient to wage an effective campaign.
Given the choice o f having previously held an important elective office and
being known by the electorate versus being inexperienced and obscure, only those
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challengers prone to tilting at windmills would choose the latter. High-quality
challengers may not get the benefits from spending that other challengers get, but this is
offset by the fact that their experience and visibility place them on a fairly level playing
field with incumbents. This is not to say that incumbents are underdogs, because even
in the more competitive arena of Senate elections, incumbents win a majority of the
time, but it is to say that high-quality challengers have a better chance of winning than
low-quality challengers. Deriving higher marginal returns from campaign spending
does not do one any good when you do not have much to spend in the first place, which
is the position that most low-quality challengers find themselves in.
The remaining results basically conform to expectations. High-quality
challengers take advantage of incumbent controversies and scandals, as well as taking
advantage of incumbents who are in the governing party during poor economic times.
They are not able to overcome the influence o f party identification on the electorate.
Incumbents from states with populations that mirror their own partisanship are in a
more favorable position than incumbents who must run against the tide o f partisanship.
This partisan loyalty is especially important to an incumbent in a competitive election.
Low-Quality Challengers In Table 6 .6 ,1 display the results of my analysis for
elections involving low-quality challengers. The coefficient for challenger spending is
significant Though low-quality challengers often have difficulty acquiring campaign
funds, whatever funds they can acquire are very beneficial in helping them to achieve a
higher vote total. This points out the Catch-22 that low-quality challengers face in
congressional elections. They are unable to raise large sums o f money because of a
dismal level o f recognition among contributors, but the surest way of increasing that
recognition is to raise—and spend-large sums o f money. The problem is not the
efficiency with which funds are expended, but rather the inability to acquire those funds
in the first place.
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Table 6.6 2SLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending—Senate Campaigns
with Low-Quality Challengers

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

5.115

.581

3.09***

Challenger Spending

-5.495

-.845

-6.56***

Celebrity

-5.762

-.141

-1.99**

Controversy

-1.776

-.054

-.83

Scandal

-2.343

-.041

-.60

Health

-5.610

-.098

-1.45*

Unemployment

.049

.010

.14

Unemploy*Party

-.449

-.168

-2.24**

Party LD.

.071

.097

1.20

Ideological Distance

.032

.016

.22

Party

.622

.035

.37

R-Squared=44
N=168
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01

In this equation, as opposed to the one for high-quality challengers, the
coefficient for incumbent spending is significant at the more stringent .01 level.
However, incumbent spending does not come close to achieving parity with challenger
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spending. The beta for challenger spending (-.845) is larger than that for incumbent
spending (.581). Once again, the relationship between the spending variables is as
predicted. In elections with low-quality challengers, the difference in the coefficients
should be greater than in elections with high-quality challengers.
Low-quality challengers do not enjoy the advantages that were described in the
previous section, which means that they have a huge amount of ground to cover in order
generate recognition among the public. They rely heavily on campaign funds in order
to accomplish this goal. Since each dollar spent translates into increased familiarity
among voters, the marginal returns are quite high. Incumbents capitalize to the extent
that they can from expenditures, but as with the other group of elections, the
relationship between the spending variables really depends on the characteristics o f the
challengers. The lack o f recognition for low-quality challengers and the abundance of
recognition for incumbents manifests itself through a greater disparity between the two
spending coefficients.
Among the other variables in the equation, only challenger celebrity status, the
incumbent's health, and the interaction term between unemployment and the
incumbent's membership in the governing party are significant Low-quality
challengers are unable to capitalize on incumbent controversies or scandals that arise
during the course of a campaign. Oddly, the partisan demographics o f a state are
insignificant in these elections. Why would state party identification be significant in
elections with high-quality challengers, but insignificant in elections with low-quality
challengers?
As mentioned earlier, logic would lead one to believe that if anyone could
dampen the effects o f partisanship, it would be high-quality challengers. Perhaps an
explanation lies in emphasizing the role of incumbents as opposed to challengers. In
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contests where incumbents are met with virtually no competition, they dominate the
political landscape. Through a phenomenal advantage in spending and highly skewed
coverage by the press, powerful incumbents are able to promulgate an electoral black
out against challengers. In such a scenario, incumbents will attract votes from all
segments of the electorate, including both parties. These landslide elections make party
identification a mute point; voters of both persuasions are casting ballots for the
incumbent in large percentages.
In more competitive elections, incumbents are unable to cast aside challengers
with such ease. Competitive elections, usually involving high-quality challengers, are
contests where both camps have the resources to shore up their political bases. As a
consequence, incumbents are unable to draw as much support from voters who identify
with the opposite party. Thus, party lines remain intact and party identification emerges
as a more important source of the vote. Again, this is merely an initial attempt to
explain an interesting question that has been raised by my findings.
CONCLUSION

The main focus o f this dissertation is challenger spending, and a comparison of
the equations for high-quality and low-quality challengers fully supports my theory of
challenger spending as it relates to the vote. High-quality challengers, because of their
level o f recognition among voters vis-a-vis incumbents, should receive less benefits
from spending than low-quality challengers. Looking at high-quality challengers
(Table 6.5), the standardized coefficient for challenger spending is virtually equal to
that of incumbent spending, and challenger spending reaches significance at the .05
level. Looking at low-quality challengers (Table 6.6), the standardized coefficient for
challenger spending is far stronger than that of incumbent spending, and challenger
spending easily reaches significance at the .001 level.
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It is clear that for Senate elections, expenditures by low-quality challengers have
far more vigor than expenditures by high-quality challengers. Because of their lack of
visibility among voters, low-quality challengers should especially benefit from
expenditures, and my results show that they do. The question now becomes whether
this holds true for House elections as well. It is to this question that I now turn.
ENDNOTES
1) Obviously, party is included in the model as a control variable, but it is not relevant
to my analysis.
2) Divided government can make retribution more difficult. If one party controls
Congress and the other controls the White House, voters may be ambivalent in
assessing blame.
3) Some incumbents fall victim to strong partisan tides. A competent senator can lose
if the national mood is against his or her party. So, as a challenger, that person might
have a good chance at regaining office, especially if the tide has shifted. These
partisan tides are accounted for in my model by the party variable.
4) Many U.S. Representatives have also spent time in state legislators. This adds to
their pedigree as qualified legislators.
5) For instance, senators have access to federal largesse that can alleviate economic
woes. Also, they have considerable individual power to add measures to
economic legislation that will benefit their states.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF HOUSE RESULTS
The previous chapter detailed evidence to support the main theory guiding this
research project The evidence suggests that low-quality challengers receive greater
benefits from campaign spending than high-quality challengers. Since a candidate's
quality is a reliable proxy for a candidate's level o f recognition among voters, then the
conclusion reached is that candidate visibility does, in fact, impact the benefits that
challengers receive from spending. These findings are within the context of campaigns
for the Senate. I now turn my attention to campaigns for the House.
It is well documented that the institutional rules and norms for both chambers
are, in some important aspects, different from one another (Asher, 1973; Fenno, 1982;
Rieselbach, 1979). Likewise, the electoral environment within which campaigns occur
are different for the two chambers. House races occur more frequently; they tend to be
centered around more parochial issues; television advertising is not as necessary for
reaching large segments of the constituency; they attract a higher percentage of
challengers with no previous experience in elective office; incumbents win reelection
at higher rates. One wonders whether the impact of candidate expenditures is another
difference between campaigns for the two chambers.
One o f the paramount contentions o f this dissertation is that my theory of
campaign spending is equally applicable to both the House and the Senate. The vast
majority of the literature in this area has looked at one chamber-usually the House-to
the exclusion of the other. Rarely have both chambers been examined at the same time.
This creates uncertainty as to whether results for one chamber are generalizable to the
other. Establishing a theory that encapsulates both chambers would advance the
literature, with the primary benefit being a more unified understanding of congressional
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elections. Thus, it is important that my results for the House mirror my results for the
Senate in terms of challenger spending benefits.
OLS RESULTS
In Tables 7.1 and 7 .2 ,1 present two OLS equations for the House. Table 7.1
contains the most basic, with incumbent and challenger spending as the only
independent variables. The coefficient for challenger spending is extremely significant
(check out that t-value), while the coefficient for incumbent spending is insignificant.
My data set is much larger than that of the early studies using OLS to estimate House
elections, but the basic finding remains the same. This finding is what sparked the
academic debate because of its counter-intuitive logic. It does not seem logical that
incumbents would receive no benefits from expenditures.
Table 7.1

OLS Regression of the Effects of Campaign Spending-House

Dependent Variable. Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

.164

.013

.92

Challenger Spending

-5.170

-.692

-46.94***

Party

1.132

.056

4.39***

R-Squared=.48
N=3181
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01

In Table 7.2,1 present the results for the full model. With the additional
variables thrown into the mix, the finding of insignificance for incumbent expenditures
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Table 7.2

OLS Regression of the Effects o f Campaign Spending-House

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

.312

.025

1.80**

Challenger Spending

-4.739

-.634

-41.98***

Governor

10.739

.027

2.19**

Senator

5.436

.009

.78

U.S. Rep

-2.518

-.029

-2.36***

Major

-1.126

-.025

- 2 .0 0 **

Minor

-1.800

-.063

_4 9 4 ***

Celebrity

-1.733

-.0 2 2

-1.79**

Controversy

-4.839

-.078

-6.28***

Scandal

-8.513

-.081

-6.56***

Health

-3.365

-.017

-1.37*

Party I.D.

.117

.145

10.92***

Ideological Distance

.062

.015

1.44*

Party

.177

.008

.67

R-Squared=. 51
N=3181

Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<.01
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disappears. Incumbent spending is significant at the .05 level, but it does not bring the
same weight to the model as challenger spending, which is significant at the .001 level.
A look at the standardized coefficients for the two variables offers dramatic proof that
challengers receive greater benefits from spending. The beta for challenger spending
(-.634) is ten times that o f incumbent spending (.025).
It is interesting to compare these results with those from the full OLS equation
for Senate elections. In that equation, the difference between the spending coefficients
was not nearly as big as it is here. The challenger spending coefficient was double that
o f incumbent spending. This finding is in line with what my theory would lead one to
expect. Because challengers in House campaigns are not as well-known as challengers
in Senate campaigns vis-a-vis incumbents, the difference in spending effects between
incumbents and challengers should be far greater in House elections.
Overall, the model performs fairly well, with all but the senator coefficient
achieving significance. It is a bit odd that the beta for challengers with minor electoral
experience (-.063) is larger than those for the other CPQ variables. It is also worth
noting that the beta for incumbent controversy (-.078) is similar to the beta for
incumbent scandal (-.081). Apart from challenger spending, the largest coefficient is
for partisan identification (.145). This makes sense when one considers all of the
electorally safe districts that exist throughout America. An incumbent who serves a
district that is heavily populated with fellow partisans is likely to win landslide victories
election after election. As the incumbent becomes increasingly entrenched, the
advantages derived from incumbency and party become virtually insurmountable.
2SLS RESULTS
As mentioned in the previous chapter, OLS estimates of campaign spending
equations may be skewed, and so it is necessary to turn to other statistical techniques.
Table 7.3 contains the results for the basic 2SLS equation. Both of the coefficients are
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Table 7J

2SLS Regression o f the Effects of Campaign Spending-House

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

2.018

.16

3.30***

Challenger Spending

-4.507

-.603

-21.48***

Party

.953

.047

3.55***

R-Squared=47
N=318 1
Note: *<10 **<.05 ***<.01

significant at the .01 level. O f the two variables, challenger spending performs best.
Though incumbent spending does not perform as well as challenger spending, it is
highly significant. This is in contrast to the OLS model discussed above, which found
incumbent spending to be insignificant. Since the data set used for each equation is
exactly the same, this reversal can only be the result of the different statistical
techniques employed.
Because it is not equipped to handle endogenous variables, OLS produces biased
estimates. Green and Krasno (1988:886) note,
If incumbents raise money as they become threatened by the prospect of defeat,
the apparent effect o f incumbent expenditures will be biased [negatively], and
the role of incumbent spending will be understated. Conversely, if challengers
attract campaign contributions as their prospects for victory improve, the
estimates for challenger expenditures will be biased positively, and the effect of
challenger spending will be overstated.
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Through the creation o f instrumental variables, 2SLS eliminates, or at least dramatically
reduces, this problem. As a result, the bias which caused the coefficient for incumbent
expenditures to be underestimated to the point of insignificance in the OLS model is
jettisoned, and the true relationship of incumbent spending to challenger spending is
realized. Likewise, 2SLS lends itself to a more accurate assessment of the other
variables in the model.
In Table 7 .4 ,1 present the regression results for the full model. Again, both o f
the spending coefficients are significant, with challenger spending (-.546) having a
higher value than incumbent spending (. 164). Upon examining all o f the equations in
this chapter, a definite pattern can be detected in elections for the House. Challengers
get a far bigger bang for their buck than do incumbents. In Senate elections,
challengers also derive higher marginal returns on expenditures, but not to the extent
that they do in House elections.
The simple fact is that the average challenger for the House is not as qualified or
as recognizable as the average challenger for the Senate. This creates a huge disparity
between incumbents and challengers in terms o f public awareness. Many challengers
enter House races as virtual unknowns, and this situation is only reinforced by a lack of
media attention. Unless challengers can generate a certain degree o f momentum on
their own, local media outlets are unlikely to devote much time to covering their
campaigns. This is in stark contrast to the inundation of information that districts
receive from incumbents via such channels as television and radio advertising,
telephone solicitations, and direct mailings.
Therefore, the coefficients o f the spending variables in this equation should
come as no surprise. If campaign expenditures are mainly employed to communicate a
candidate's message to the electorate and many voters are already aware o f the
incumbents message, then the incumbent will not benefit as much from these
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Table 7.4 2SLS Regression of the Effects o f Campaign Spending-House

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

1.981

.164

3.32***

Challenger Spending

-4.077

-.546

-20.28***

Governor

10.804

.027

2.14**

Senator

6.187

.011

.87

U.S. Rep

-2.047

-.024

-1.86**

Major

-.947

-.021

-1.63*

Minor

-1.667

-.059

-4.43***

Celebrity

-1.604

-.020

-1.61*

Controversy

-4.320

-.070

-5.38***

Scandal

-9.012

-.086

-6.73***

Health

-3.816

-.019

-1.51*

Party I.D.

.110

.136

9.90***

Ideological Distance

.006

.009

.85

Party

.053

.002

.19

R-Squared=.55
N=318l
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

expenditures. Conversely, the challenger is often in dire need of connecting with voters
and will reap huge returns on any investment made in this area. So while challengers of
all stripes benefit from spending, the context within which challengers operate in House
elections increases these benefits.
O f the five variables measuring a challenger's previous office, only the one for
the office of senator has a coefficient that fails to rise to a level of significance. This
finding is not surprising. The office of senator is more prestigious than that of
representative, so that a former senator running for the House is perceived as taking a
step down on the political ladder. Candidates in this situation are likely to be on the
downslope of their careers or trying to restore a tarnished image. In any event, this is a
situation where the office of senator does not yield the usual benefits.
In this equation, the coefficient for holding a minor elective office is once again
stronger than the other political quality coefficients. This result is not a product of
skewed OLS estimates. Why would these challengers meet with more success than
those with experience in more prestigious offices? The explanation for the offices o f
governor and U.S. Representative is much the same as that for senator.
Because a run for the House is seen as a step down for someone who has been
governor of a state, these candidates may receive as much skepticism as support from
the electorate. Those challengers in the U.S. Representative category are politicians
who were defeated for reelection and are trying to reclaim a seat on Capitol Hill. ^ It
stands to reason that if the voters in a district reject a candidate one time, they are going
to be more apt to do it again should that candidate return. There are instances where an
incumbent loses a very close election and emerges victorious two years later, but
generally a defeat carries the stamp o f finality.
An explanation for the relationship between major and minor challengers is not
as obvious. It would seem that challengers in the major category should fare better than
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those in the minor category. A possible reason for this result could lie with how I code
state legislators. For House races, I place state senators in the major category and state
representatives in the minor category. I felt this was warranted because of the
congruousness of state Senate districts and U.S. House districts. But in fact, state
senators may not have any particular edge over state representatives when it comes to
running for this higher office.
A challenger’s celebrity status plays just as well at the district level as at the
state level. The rate of reelection to the House is extremely high, but one factor that
can threaten reelection is damage wrought by a controversy or scandal; both of these
coefficients are significant. The more accurate estimates produced by 2SLS confirm
the predicted relationship between these two variables. The beta for incumbent scandal
(-.086) is bigger than the beta for incumbent controversy (-.070). The repercussions
horn scandals, which involve accusations of violations of law, should be more severe
than those from controversies. The equation also points to negative repercussions for
incumbents who suffer from poor health.
After the two spending variables, district partisanship performs strongest in the
model. Districts tend to be more homogenous than states in terms o f partisanship, so
that a candidate with strong party ties should remain electorally safe. Districts tend to
be more homogenous in other respects as well, which explains why members of the
House who are especially talented at taking the pulse of their constituents can call that
chamber home for decades on end.

High-Quality Challengers
As in the previous chapter, elections are divided into two categories: those with
high-quality challengers and those with low-quality challengers. This allows me to
accurately gauge the effect that challenger quality has on the effects of spending. As
discussed earlier, House campaigns rarely attract the level o f challengers that Senate
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Table 7.5

2SLS Regression o f the Effects o f Campaign Spending—House Campaigns
with High-Quality Challengers

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

2.983

.251

.84

Challenger Spending

-6.030

-.689

-3.73***

Celebrity

.058

.001

.01

Controversy

-2.979

-.097

-1.44*

Scandal

-1.501

-3.374

-.44

Party I.D.

.116

.112

1.86**

Ideological Distance

.157

.085

1.40*

Party

2.030

.127

2.18**

R-Squared=53
N=218
Note: The variable for health is excluded due to a lack o f variance.*<.10 **<.05
***<.01

campaigns do. So even high-quality challengers in House races are unlikely to enjoy
the kind o f recognition exhibited by elite challengers for the Senate. Therefore, highquality challengers should receive greater benefits from spending than incumbents, just
not as great as their low-qualhy counterparts. In Table 7.5,1 present the results.
A look at the coefficients for the two spending variables reveals the one truly
unexpected result from this entire dissertation. Incumbent spending is insignificant in
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this equation. While this finding does not negate my overall theory, it does represent the
one major assumption that fails to fall into place as anticipated. I expected for there to
be a difference in the coefficients between these two variables, and that expectation is
confirmed. But I also expected that difference to be relatively small; instead, one o f the
coefficients foils to play much o f a role in the equation at all
If incumbent spending was going to be found insignificant, one would assume
that it would occur in the House model for low-quality challengers, but the next section
demonstrates that this is not the case. Even that result would have been mildly
surprising, since it is counter-intuitive to think that any candidate would not derive some
benefit from spending, no matter how paltry. Jacobson's (1978) finding o f insignificance
was deemed to be a product o f the use o f OLS, and subsequent studies (Kenny and
McBumett, 1994; Goidel and Gross, 1994) have corrected that problem through the use
o f other statistical techniques.
However, no previous study has sought to explicitly examine the role that a
challenger's political quality has on spending by partitioning elections involving highquality and low-quality challengers. This is the first study to treat elections with highquality challengers as an entirely distinct sample. What is it about these races that causes
incumbent spending to be ineffective? Clearly, this is an area that is ripe for further
research.
The iron-clad finding that challengers greatly benefit from expenditures holds
true. The electoral fortresses that House incumbents construct are, perhaps, only
capable o f being penetrated by large sums o f money. Even if challengers enter a
campaign with previous experience winning elections, the daunting task o f defeating a
congressional incumbent requires a certain reliance on effective spending. The good
news for high-quality challengers is that incumbent spending in these campaigns
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appears to be impotent. Incumbents cannot rely solely on spending to overwhelm their
opponents. However, incumbents do have a variety o f other advantages that they can
draw on, so that spending inefficiency can be overcome and reelection achieved.
O f the five remaining variables, three o f the coefficients are significant. The feet
that the coefficient for incumbent scandal is not significant is unexpected. One would
expect skilled challengers to be positioned to take advantage o f indiscretions committed
by incumbents, but this is not the case. Perhaps House incumbents are so entrenched
that even personal errors can be overcome; a situation that does not exist for their less
secure counterparts in the upper chamber.
Incumbents also appear to be impervious to the threat posed by celebrity. Being
a celebrity does not significantly increase the vote total for challengers. As with the
other regressions in this dissertation, the variable measuring an incumbent's ideological
distance from his or her constituency exerts little influence on the final outcome of an
election. Though ideology does not come into play, party identification does. The
strength o f party affiliation as a determinant o f the vote continues to be a thread that runs
throughout all o f the models in this dissertation. Clearly, reports o f the party system's
demise are greatly exaggerated.^
Tnw-Oiialitv Challengers

In Table 7 .6 ,1 offer findings for House elections with low-quality challengers.
Both challenger and incumbent spending are significant at the .001 level. Challenger
spending (-.571) provides greater benefits than incumbent spending (.155), and is by far
the strongest standardized coefficient in the model. The feet that low-quality challengers
have very little going for them, in terms o f electoral firepower, means that every dollar
spent yields large gains. The downside is that they usually raise a pittance o f what
incumbents raise, which counteracts the marginal advantage that they have. All
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Table 7.6

2SLS Regression o f the Effects o f Campaign Spending-House Campaigns
with Low-Quality Challengers

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share o f the Two-Party Vote
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Incumbent Spending

1.841

.155

3.36***

Challenger Spending

-4.154

-.571

-22.24***

Celebrity

-1.704

-.022

-1.75**

Controversy

-5.019

-.080

-6.05***

Scandal

-10.509

-.099

-7.62***

Health

-4.287

-.023

-1.80**

Party I.D.

.109

.143

10.09***

Ideological Distance

.013

.016

1.62*

Party

-.216

-.011

-.80

R-Squared=. 51
N=2939
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01

other things being equal, challengers who match incumbents in spending should prevail
in the election. But all other things are not equal, and the obstacles faced by challengers
are often to vast to overcome.
The two spending variables perform as the assumptions expressed in this
dissertation would lead one to expect. The lack o f awareness on the part o f the
electorate for low-quality challengers, coupled with the scarcity o f comprehensive
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media coverage, creates an electoral environment in which challengers have virtually
nothing else to rely on other than the amount of funds that they manage to scrape
together. Expenditures aimed at communicating with potential voters are the only
reliable option that low-quality challengers have in their quest to capture the public's
imagination. They cannot rest on past laurels, current journalistic curiosity, or future
favorable events. Their best bet is to spend whatever funds they have, and hope that
this helps them gain a foothold in the campaign. This set of circumstances inevitably
leads to a large discrepancy in the benefits that low-quality challengers and incumbents
receive from expenditures.
All of the other coefficients in the equation are also significant. Once again, the
weakest performer is the coefficient for an incumbent's ideological distance from the
electorate. This variable performs poorly in each of the equations in this study. The
variable is constructed by calculating the ideological disposition of incumbents through
their roll-call votes in Congress and comparing these to a measure o f their constituents'
ideology. The fact that this variable performs poorly may point out the electorate's
disinterest in how votes are cast in Washington D.C. An incumbent's party label and
personal attributes may simply outweigh any perceived ideological drift in the minds of
voters. Certainly a radical shift in an incumbent's ideological tenor could spell trouble,
but most incumbents work hard to avoid this perception.
The significance of the celebrity coefficient is yet another indicator of the
public's fascination with celebrities. In the realm of politics, logic would dictate that
past political experience and a proven track-record are the most important
qualifications for office. Whether or not someone appeared on a television show or met
with success on an athletic field of play should be irrelevant Throughout this study, the
strong performance of the celebrity variable shows just the opposite.
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Even a challenger with virtually no experience can generate a certain degree o f
heat by virtue o f accomplishments outside the realm of politics. And o f course, we all
know this to be true. The exciting thing about politics is that it exists free from the
strict dictates o f logic. Sometimes things happen that do not seem to make any sense,
especially in the raucous environment of campaigns. Campaigns are about people, and
people always have been and always will be drawn to the famous, albeit in varying
degrees.
The coefficients for controversy and scandal are also highly significant
Incumbents facing low-quality challengers understand that they have a virtual lock on
victory. The staggeringly high reelection rates to the House over the past few decades
are proof of this. With this in mind, the one thing that incumbents should avoid at all
costs is becoming embroiled in a messy controversy or ugly scandal. These things
certainly tarnish an incumbent's image, and can possibly cause defeat Alas, how many
times have we watched in disbelief as an incumbent pulls out a metaphorical gun and
shoots himself or herself in the foot? And while such events produce a collective
shudder from the other 534 members of Congress, they are seen as a sign o f hope to all
those struggling challengers. Victory, sweet victory, can be delivered in the strangest of
packages.
The variable for an incumbent's health has performed relatively well throughout
this study. Politics can often be a harsh business and this is an example o f that It has
long been known that a suspect medical history is a barrier to candidates seeking to
capture the White House. Apparently, poor health is also an impediment to reelection
to Congress. Whether voters are wary of sending someone to Washington D.C. who
may be unable to perform the requisite duties or whether these incumbents cede ground
to their opponents because of an inability to campaign vigorously, incumbents with
health concerns travel a tougher road than they otherwise would.
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Finally, a few more words about party identification. The coefficients for this
variable have performed strongly in equations for both chambers. As politicians
become increasingly comfortable using the communication tools offered by the
information age, it is easy to assume that the trend toward personalized campaigns will
accelerate. However, this assumption underestimates the important function that
parties continue to have in our political system. An individual candidate's operation,
even in a small House district, pales next to the political infrastructure that is
maintained by the two major parties. No one disputes that charismatic politicians are
often able to build loyal coalitions, but the results in these pages demonstrate that the
banner under which they run remains influential.
CONCLUSION

With one exception, the results in this chapter basically conform to my overall
theory. In House races, virtually every challenger is going to enter the race operating
under a deficit in terms o f recognition from the public. For high-quality challengers,
that deficit should be smaller than for low-quality challengers. For this reason, the
difference in the coefficients between incumbent and challenger spending should be
smaller in contests with high-quality challengers than with low-quality challengers.
The equation for elections with high-quality challengers (Table 7.5) produces
the only deviation from my overall expectations. In this equation, incumbent spending
is insignificant. Rather than having fairly similar coefficients, challenger spending is
considerably stronger. In fact, the difference between the betas from this equation and
the equation for low-quality challengers (Table 7.6) is approximately the same. This
indicates that both types o f challengers benefit equally well from expenditures.
This finding serves as an interesting sidenote. As we know from Jacobson's
(1978) article, such counter-intuitive results often spark as much attention as the main
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conclusion. It is an issue that bears further analysis, but as I explain in the next chapter,
it does not particularly call into question my theory. It is to this final chapter that I now
turn.
ENDNOTES
1) There are instances where two incumbent U.S. Representatives square-off in an
election due to redistricting. However, these elections are excluded from my
analysis.
2) My regards to Mark Twain.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
A LOOK BACK AND A LOOK FORWARD
In this chapter, I summarize the key findings from this dissertation, as well as
discuss some areas for future research. As with any lengthy study, there is a
voluminous amount o f information contained in the preceding chapters. All of that
information is here because I deem it relevant to the topic under consideration. But to
paraphrase George Orwell, some pieces of information are more relevant than others.
There are numerous instances where my research produced interesting and even
surprising results. These instances are discussed in the text in the hope that they might
spark additional avenues of inquiry. However, they do not directly relate to the central
issue around which this entire enterprise revolves.
Ultimately, this dissertation is concerned with the campaign expenditures of
congressional candidates, and how the benefits derived from those expenditures are
affected by the electorate's recognition o f the candidates. This is a topic that, though
relatively new on the political science scene, has garnered quite a bit of attention. It
attracts scholars because o f its complex methodological issues and its possible impact
on campaign finance reform. In undertaking this project, I hope to add to the existing
literature by exploring areas that have been ignored and providing new evidence to
support a traditional theory.
One o f the main contributions o f this work is the sheer amount of data that has
been collected and analyzed. Previous studies have focused on elections for either the
House or the Senate, and those focusing on the House have covered a small number of
years. For the first time, this study provides a comprehensive examination of both
chambers over a twenty year period. This comparative approach to the topic bolsters
the generalizability of my findings, as well as provides a viable framework that can
offer a degree o f consistency to future research.
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THE THEORY
In his original 1978 article examining House elections, Gary Jacobson discovers
that challengers receive greater benefits than incumbents from campaign expenditures.
He reasons that this result centers around the communication aspects of congressional
campaigns. Most of the spending that occurs in a campaign is intended, in one way or
another, to acquaint the public with the candidate. For the most part, challengers are
not as well-known as incumbents by the public. Therefore, any dollar that a challenger
spends on communicating with the public is going to yield more than a dollar spent by
an incumbent, simply because the challenger has more to gain in terms of public
visibility.
Subsequent studies have yielded varying results, but all of these results confirm
Jacobson's key conclusion: challengers get a bigger bang for the buck. The one
exception is an article by Alan Gerber (1998) that examines the role o f spending in
Senate elections. He finds that incumbents and challengers equally benefit from
spending, and if anything, incumbents actually receive higher marginal returns on
spending. Based on this finding, he questions the viability o f Jacobson's theory.
The main objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate how these varying
results are consistent with Jacobson's theory. The problem is that these two
accomplished scholars are not approaching the subject from a broad enough viewpoint.
Jacobson fails to make any nuanced distinction between different types of challengers
(high-quality and low-quality), while Gerber fails to make any distinction between
different types o f elections (House elections and Senate elections). This study
encompasses all of these critical elements in an attempt to bridge the gap that currently
exists in the literature on campaign spending.
The voter recognition theory that serves to guide this dissertation is a logical
extension o f Jacobson's theory. By elaborating on some critical elements from his
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theory, I provide a way o f looking at campaign spending that is applicable to all
congressional elections at all times. Basically, the theory focuses on the different
electoral environments within which House and Senate candidates operate.
The Senate is the more prestigious of the two chambers. Consequently,
elections for the Senate tend to be more competitive than elections for the House. A
primary determinant of electoral competitiveness is the quality of the challenger.
Incumbents have the experience and resources to run effective campaigns, but
challengers vary in this regard. High-quality challengers are those that have previous
experience in an important elective office, while low-quality challengers lack this
experience. Because of this experience, high-quality challengers enjoy a higher level of
recognition ffom the public than low-quality challengers. Thus, Senate elections differ
from House elections because they attract high-quality challengers who are well-known
by the public.
If the benefits that challengers receive from expenditures are inversely related to
the level o f recognition that voters have of these challengers, then low-quality
challengers should receive greater benefits from spending than high-quality challengers.
Since incumbents from both chambers maintain high levels of recognition among the
electorate, the difference in spending benefits between incumbents and challengers is
determined by the quality of challengers. Low-quality challengers should receive much
greater benefits than incumbents, while high-quality challengers should receive benefits
that are roughly equal to incumbents. Thus, the difference in spending benefits between
incumbents and challengers is smaller in Senate elections than in House elections.
THE EVIDENCE
In order for the voter recognition theory to be valid, three key assumptions must
be true. First, the difference between the coefficients for incumbent spending and
challenger spending should be larger in elections with low-quality challengers than in
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elections with high-quality challengers. In Tables 6.5 and 6 .6 ,1 present results for
Senate elections. In elections with low-quality challengers, the standardized (beta)
coefficient for challenger spending is -.845 and for incumbent spending is .581. Setting
aside the negative sign, which merely proves that the coefficient is in the proper
direction, the difference between these coefficients is .264. In elections with highquality challengers, the beta for challenger spending is -.408 and for incumbent
spending is .407; a difference o f .001. As predicted, the difference in spending benefits
is larger in elections with low-quality challengers.
In Tables 7.5 and 7.6,1 present results for House elections. In elections with
low-quality challengers, the beta for challenger spending is -.571 and for incumbent
spending is .155; a difference o f .416. In elections with high-quality challengers, the
beta for challenger spending is -.689 and for incumbent spending is .251; a difference
of .438. It is also worth noting that incumbent spending is not significant in the
equation for high-quality challengers. In House elections, the predicted differences do
not come to fruition. However, this is not a major blow to the veracity o f the theory due
to the second key assumption.
The second assumption is that Senate elections will attract more high-quality
challengers than House elections. As shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, of the 279
challengers in Senate elections, 98 of them were designated as high-quality. O f the
3550 challengers in House elections, 220 o f them were designated as high-quality It
now becomes clear why the single exception to my correctly predicted results—House
elections with high-quality challengers-is not as crucial as one might think. Only a
mere 6% of total House elections fall into this category. In contrast, a respectable 35%
of total Senate elections involve high-quality challengers. With the set o f deviating
elections representing such a minuscule percentage o f the overall data set, it does not
disrupt the overall legitimacy o f the theory.
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We now know that Senate elections have more high-quality challengers than
House elections, and that high-quality challengers receive smaller marginal returns on
expenditures than low-quality challengers. This brings us to the third and final
assumption. The difference in spending coefficients for incumbents and challengers in
all Senate elections should be smaller than the difference in spending coefficients for
incumbents and challengers in all House elections.
In Tables 6.4 and 7.4,1 present the relevant results. In Senate elections, the beta
for challenger spending is -.778 and for incumbent spending is .546; a difference of
.232. In House elections, the beta for challenger spending is -.546 and for incumbent
spending is . 164; a difference of .382. As predicted, the difference in spending benefits
is larger in House elections. And focusing entirely on challengers, we see that the
standardized coefficient for challenger spending in House elections is .232 points higher
than that for challenger spending in Senate elections. For all intents and purposes, all
three key assumptions are supported by the evidence.
As the above summary o f the evidence demonstrates, challengers do receive
greater benefits from spending than incumbents i f those challengers are not as
recognizable to the electorate as incumbents. That important "if' is what my voter
recognition theory highlights. Jacobson concludes that all challengers get higher
returns on spending, while Gerber concludes that no challengers get higher returns on
spending, but the truth lies somewhere in between. The determination o f challenger
spending benefits is conditional, rather than absolute.
Challengers receive these benefits on the condition that they are relatively
obscure. Low-quality challengers are relatively obscure and tend to populate House
elections, so challengers receive greater benefits in those elections. High-quality
challengers are relatively well-known and tend to gravitate toward Senate elections, so
challengers receive lesser benefits in those elections. This is how one can arrive at
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different results that serve to support the same theory. The theory predicts different
results depending on the environment within which congressional elections take place.
FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several areas that are prime candidates for future research. One area
centers around the finding o f insignificance for the incumbent spending coefficient in
that set of House elections involving high-quality challengers. This is the one truly
unexpected result in the whole dissertation. Why does incumbent spending play such a
minor role in these elections? The initial thing that I would like to test is whether my
classification o f high-quality and low-quality challengers needs to be refined for House
races. Specifically, should state representatives and state senators be placed in the same
category?
For Senate races, I place all state legislators into the "minor office" category.
These offices do not give candidates the type of statewide exposure that is necessary to
wage competitive Senate campaigns. The results in this study appear to support my
decision. For House races, 1divide state representatives into the "minor office"
category and state senators into the "major office" category. The latter decision seemed
warranted due to the fact that many state Senate districts are as large, and in a few cases
even larger, than U.S. House districts. * However, the small geographic size and
compact media market of many House districts may allow even state representatives to
gain a foothold in these races. An industrious state representative campaigning
diligently would have the opportunity to make himself or herself known to voters.
By placing all state legislators into the "major office" category for House
elections, I would increase the number of cases in this particular data set, and perhaps
generate results that are more in line with expectations. Even if the results remain the
same, it is still beneficial to pursue this line of inquiry because of the need to arrive at a
universal classification for challengers. As 1mention in the literature review, scholars
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employ various means for determining challenger political quality. The use of a single
classification system would facilitate the comparison of results and enable this research
agenda to move forward in a more orderly fashion. A better understanding o f where
state legislators fit into the mix would help in this endeavor.
Another possible line o f future research concerns the methods used for
measuring voter recognition of challengers. Like other researchers, I use the challenger
political quality variable as a proxy for a challenger’s level of visibility. Challengers
who have served in prestigious offices are going to be more well-known by the public
than challengers who do not have such experience. This is sound logic and the variable
works fine as a proxy. But it is a proxy.
If given a choice, every researcher prefers to measure a phenomenon directly,
rather than rely on an indirect measurement O f course, this is not always possible.
Researchers operate under temporal and financial constraints that force them to adopt
more pragmatic methods. The optimum situation is to conduct research without any
constraints. In fact, if you stroll through university hallways, you are prone to hear
professors speaking with childlike wonder about the possibilities that arise out of
unlimited funding. What would unlimited funding mean for the measurement of voter
recognition?
The best measurements that exist for the public's awareness o f candidates are
derived from political surveys. All across the country, people are asked various
questions aimed at determining the extent o f their political knowledge. One such
question measures the percentage o f the public who are able to recall or recognize a
challenger's name. This is the most direct way to measure that variable.
The problem is that every two years there are approximately 468 congressional
elections, which means that there are approximately 468 different polls that one would
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have to collect in each election cycle. This would require the resources to acquire
access to the various newspapers and television news broadcasts where these poll
results are reported. Even if this is possible, there may be some districts or some years
where this survey question was not asked. There may be instances where the timing of
the surveys are suspect; occurring too late in the campaign season to accurately gauge
voter recognition of challengers at the beginning o f the campaign. Such informational
gaps would frustrate attempts to conduct both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.
In order to prevent such gaps, one would need to conduct separate surveys in
each state and in each House district. By conducting your own survey, you would
ensure that you are getting the information that you want at the time in the campaign
when you want it. You would also ensure the type of continuity that makes the Gallup
surveys of presidential approval so valuable. A single national survey would not
provide the necessary number of respondents needed in each district for a reliable
measure of that district's awareness o f its House challenger, so the separate surveys
would be appropriate.
Obviously, the expense required to mount this kind of operation is prohibitive.
However, a research grant could provide someone with the opportunity to collect
information from various existing polls. Though not perfect, this approach would yield
enough data to perform new analyses, and serve as a first step toward a universal
measure for this variable. The information gleaned from these polls also could be used
in research focusing on other topics. In any event, it is an area worth pursuing.
Finally, the campaign spending research agenda would benefit by moving
beyond elections between incumbents and challengers. The basic assumptions behind
the voter recognition theory are transferable to open seat elections. Different variables
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would need to be substituted for the incumbent variables in the spending equation, but
this is fairly easily done. One would just need to determine what factors are critical to
the success of one candidate over another in open seat races.
As for challenger political quality, it would affect spending in much the same
way as it does for incumbents and challengers. The candidate who has a higher degree
of recognition from the electorate should receive smaller benefits from campaign
expenditures. Whereas incumbents are almost always considered to be the better
known o f the two candidates, in open seat elections this does not apply. In some ways,
the absence of powerful incumbency advantages should allow spending to play an even
more important role. However, other factors like party identification could fill the void.
Studying open seat elections would provide answers to these questions, and provide
researchers with a more complete picture of campaign spending.
CONCLUSION
The issue of campaign spending is as timely as it is important. Many citizens
feel disconnected from the political process and distrustful o f political leaders. One of
the ways to remedy this problem is to make the political process more responsive to the
needs o f ordinary Americans. And one o f the ways to make the system more responsive
is to eliminate the disparity that exists in terms of the influence that wealthy Americans
wield in comparison to ordinary Americans.
The fact that candidates benefit from spending means that they will try to
acquire as much money as they can for their campaigns. This is a rational response.
The fact that wealthy citizens gain access to candidates through donations means that
they will be willing to give money to those campaigns. This is a rational response. The
fact that both o f these actions are rational means that they will continue unless a third
party steps in and puts a halt to it
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The purpose o f this dissertation is not to recommend policy prescriptions for
campaign finance reform. I simply want to point out that some type o f reform to the
present system is needed, unless you happen to support the wealthy being able to drown
out the voices of others through large donations. I do not To paraphrase one of the
Supreme Court justices during a recent case concerning the constitutionality of limiting
campaign contributions, the First Amendment guarantees you the right to free speech,
but not the right to have that speech amplified by a megaphone.
This issue has been debated for decades and will probably be debated for
decades to come. The literature on campaign spending can serve to provide that debate
with objective, relevant facts. It is my hope that this dissertation adds to the literature
and informs the debate. If so, then I have fulfilled my duty as a scholar and an
American.
ENDNOTES
1) For example, California has some state legislative districts that are bigger than U.S.
House districts.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Table A.1

Definition o f Variables

Name

Description

Incumbent Vote

The percentage of the two-party vote received by the
incumbent.

Incumbent Spending

The amount o f total campaign expenditures by the
incumbent in real 1982-84 dollars.

Challenger Spending

The amount o f total campaign expenditures by the
challenger in real 1982-84 dollars.

Governor

A dichotomous variable coded I if the challenger was a
governor.

Senator

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a
senator.

U.S. Rep.

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a
representative.

Major

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a
statewide official or mayor o f an important city.

Minor

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was a
state legislator or local official.

Celebrity

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger
achieved prominence through activities other than holding
elective office.

Controversy

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if incidents called the
incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence into
question.

Scandal

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the incumbent was
alleged to have been involved in illegal activities.
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Table A.1

cont

Name

Description

Health

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the incumbent's
physical condition was an apparent political problem.

Unemployment

The unemployment rate for the state.

Unemployment*Party

The unemployment rate interacted with a variable that is
coded 1 if the incumbent belonged to the governing party.

Party I.D.

An estimate o f a state's/district's partisan make-up based
on pooled survey data compiled by Erikson, Wright, and
Mclver (1993) and an estimation procedure developed by
Ardoin and Garand (2000). The figure is the
percentage point difference between the number of
respondents identifying with the incumbent's party and
those identifying with the opposite party.

Ideological Distance

A measure of the distance between the voting record of
incumbents and the ideological make-up of their
state/district. The voting record is culled from ADA and
ACU ratings, while state/district ideology is measured
using the same procedure as that for party identification.

Census

The population of the state/district as determined by the
United States census.

Wealth

A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the challenger was
considered wealthy.

Party

A dichotomous variable coded 1 for the Democratic party
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APPENDIX B: PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION
Table B .l

Partisan Identification in the United States

State

Rep.

Ind.

Dem.

Mean

N

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Conn.
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mass.
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N.H.
N J.
N.M.
N.Y.
N.C.
N.D.
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Penn.
R.I.
S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
W.V
Wisconsin
Wyoming

23.4%
—
34.7
20 2
33.3
32.6
24.5
28.7
32.7
21.0

322%
—
29.9
32.8
272
388
432
40.6
27.9
31.0

44.4%
—
35.4
46.8
39.4
28.6
322
30.7
39.3
48.0

21.1

2.419

0.6
26.5
62
-4.0
7.8
2.0
6.6
27.0
7.0
-13.5
6.1
-1.7
-2.8
-9.3
24.3
352
2.4
222
18.3
2.1
9.5
16.7
7.8
4.7
-92
5.1
• 10.0
5.1
15.7
8.0
19.0
-8.9
4.4
20.9
7.4
3.7
12.7
11.7
2.0
12.9
13.4
-17.4
-5.1
3.3
7.8
20.1
7.1
-42

1.767
1.727
14.773
1.863
2269
443
7.466
3.814

—

37 3
28.7
32.9
32.4
38.3
25.5
20.0
27.0
2 47
15.8
29.8
27.3
270
26.8
27.4
40 2
31.8
31.8
27.5
26.3
29.7
27.6
36.2
31.0
29.9
312
34.8
15.5
27.5
38.4
26.5
26.1
41.9
28.6
29.4
24.0
28.6
27.1
34.5

—

390
36.5
36.0
38.1
32.7
24.8
24.7
43.5
29.4
50.0
38.3
35.8
292
38.6
40.4
28.9
312
462
39.9
31.7
32.6
25.8
36.6
33.6
192
302
26.8
56.4
332
21.3
342
34.5
33.5
48.0
37.9
44.1
22.7
38.7
35.1

—

23.8
34.8
31.2
29.6
29.0
49.8
S5.3
29.5
46.4
342
31.9
36.8
43 8
34.6
322
30.9
37.0
21.8
32.6
42.0
37.7
46.6
27.3
35.4
50.8
38.6
38.4
282
39.2
40.3
392
39.4
24.5
23.4
32.7
31.9
48.7
342
302

-11.0

—

—

724
7.0%
3.964
2230
2,037
2.458
2,405
777
2.9%
4.158
6.806
3.181
1.416
3283
594
1252
487
760
5252
843
11299
3.885
495
7.778
2.115
2,063
8.710
614
2204
717
3.149
9.6%
966
448
4245
3.179
1259
3.413
333

Note: These percentages are derived from CBS/NYT national surveys conducted from
1976 to 1988.
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Table B.2

Ideological Identification in the United States

State

Con.

Mod.

Lib.

Mean*

N

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Conn.
Delaware
Honda
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mass.
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
NIL
N.J.
NM .
N.Y
NC
N.D
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Penn.
R.I.
S.C.
S.D.
Tenn.
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
W.V.
Wisconsin
Wyoming

40.5%

42.0%
—
43.4
44.6
43.1
46.1
45.6
48.2
42.9
446

17.5%

23.1
25.0
18.2
18.3
6.2
8.6
4.4
12.2
17.1
17.7
6.0
279
10.1
16.7
13.5
159
13.2
23.0
14.7
5.7
0.8
8.8
12.8
25.4
15.5
III
18.7
0.2
12.8
3.4
16.0
3.1
20.7
26.6
10.1
27.3
7.9
10.6
2.1
214
24.1
16.6
23.2
28.0
11.4
17.9
5.9
92
10.5
17.8

2,142

—

37 4
368
31.6
31.3
29.4
32.0
37.1
36.6
—

42.5
32.5
36.0
33.0
36.5
33.7
40.0
36.1
304
28.2
31.6
33.2
41 2
34.4
34.3
37.5
29.6
34.2
30.1
36.2
304
37.8
40 5
32.4
42.0
32.8
33.0
29.0
39.8
38.4
366
406
44.1
34 8
370
29.2
32.2
32.6
39.7

—

42.9
45 I
44.7
47 5
42.9
45.8
43.0
42.6
44.8
44.5
45.6
46.5
43.0
46.7
42.5
43.7
41.0
44.5
43.2
43.6
42.4
45.1
456
452
43.4
42.3
445
44.1
41.8
47.2
43 3
42.0
39.7
41.7
43.9
47.5
44.8
45.4
38.4

—

19 2
18.6
25.4
2X6
25.0
198
20.0
18.8
—

14.6
22.4
19.3
19.5
20.6
20.5
17.0
21.3
24.8
27.3
22.8
20.4
158
18.9
23.2
188
294
21 3
26.7
20.2
273
17.1
13.9
22.3
14.7
24.9
22.4
26.9
18.4
14.4
20.1
17.4
16 1
23 5
19.1
23.3
230
22.1
21.9

—

1,578
1,528
13,369
1,724
2,095
409
6,735
3,443
—

666
6,456
3,510
1,980
1.810
2.103
2,119
685
2,723
3,704
6,135
2.942
1X23
3,167
551
1.128
446
685
4.833
746
10,619
3.326
447
7,013
1.866
1.890
7,783
562
2.128
627
2,764
8,745
868
405
3,948
2.915
1.348
3,113
292

* Since none o f the states have a positive number, interpretation is made easier by
simply dropping the negative sign. Thus, states with a higher number are
ideologically more conservative.
Note: These percentages are derived from CBS/NYT surveys from 1976 to 1988.
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APPENDIX C: INCUMBENT CONTROVERSY OR SCANDAL
Table C .l

House Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy or Scandal, 1974-94
DistrktCategorization

Year

State

1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978

2
Arkansas
1
Idaho
2
Indiana
11
Indiana
4
Kentucky
Massachusetts 4
Minnesota
3
9
New Jersey
New Jersey
13
New York
3
9
Ohio
1
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania 9
4
California
11
California
1
Florida
2
Idaho
2
Kansas
New Jersey
9
1
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania 11
South Carolina 6
14
Texas
Utah
2
14
California
25
California
31
California
12
Florida
2
Idaho
Indiana
3
13
Michigan
New Jersey
15
New York
29
Ohio
19
Pennsylvania 4
Pennsylvania 11
Rhode Island 1

controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
scandal
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
scandal
controversy

Name/Party
Wilbur Mills (D)
Steven Symms (R)
Earl Landgrebe (R)
William Hudnut (R)
M. G. Synder (R)
Robert Drinan (D)
Bill Frenzel (R)
Henry Helstoski (D)
Joseph Maraziti (R)
Angelo Roncallo (R)
Thomas Ashley (D)
James Jones (D)
E. G. Shuster (R)
Robert Leggett (D)
Leo Ryan (D)
Robert Sikes (D)
George Hansen (R)
Martha Keys (D)
Henry Helstoski (D)
James Jones (D)
Daniel Flood (D)
John Jenrette (D)
John Young (D)
Allan Howe (D)
John McFall (D)
Edward Roybal (D)
Charles Wiison (D)
J. Herbert Burke (R)
George Hansen (R)
John Brademas (D)
Charles Diggs Jr.(D)
Edward Patten (D)
Edward Pattison (D)
Charles Carney (D)
Joshua Eilberg (D)
Daniel Flood (D)
Fernand Germain (D)
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Table C .l

cont

Year

State

1978
1978
1978
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1984
1984
1984
1984
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988

Texas
5
Washington
7
Wisconsin
1
Iowa
6
Maryland
1
Massachusetts 6
Michigan
10
Mississippi
4
Missouri
10
New Jersey
4
New York
17
Pennsylvania 3
Pennsylvania 12
South Carolina 6
California
15
Delaware
1
Idaho
1
Idaho
2
North Carolina 7
Idaho
2
Illinois
19
Massachusetts 10
Ohio
1
California
41
New Mexico 3
New York
27
North Carolina 7
Pennsylvania 15
Rhode Island 1
Tennessee
5
Texas
14
California
44
Florida
4
Georgia
4
Maryland
1
Missouri
8
Oklahoma
I

District

Categorization
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
controversy
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy

Name/Party
Jim Mattox (D)
John Cunningham (R)
Les Aspin (D)
Berkley Bedell (D)
Robert Bauman (R)
Nicholas Mavroules (D)
Don Albosta (D)
Jon Hinson (R)
Bill Burlison (D)
Frank Thompson (D)
John Murphy (D)
Raymond Lederer (D)
John Murtha (D)
John Jenrette Jr. (D)
Tony Coelho (D)
Thomas Evans Jr.(R)
Larry Craig (R)
George Hansen (R)
Charlie Rose (D)
George Hansen (R)
Daniel Crane (R)
Gerry Studds (D)
Thomas Luken (D)
Bill Lowery (R)
Bill Richardson (D)
George Wortley (R)
Charlie Rose (D)
Don Ritter (R)
Fernand Germain (D)
Bill Boner (D)
Mac Sweeney (R)
Jim Bates (D)
Bill Chappell Jr. (D)
Pat Swindall (R)
Roy Dyson (D)
Bill Emerson (R)
James Inhofe (R)
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Table C.1

cont.

Year

State

District

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992

Alabama
2
California
17
California
44
Georgia
10
Illinois
11
Maryland
1
Minnesota
7
Rhode Island 1
Colorado
2
Connecticut
5
Illinois
20
Indiana
7
Indiana
8
Iowa
3
Kansas
4
Massachusetts 3
Massachusetts 6
Michigan
9
Michigan
10
Minnesota
6
Missouri
5
New Hampshire 2
New Jersey
9
New York
I
New York
2
New York
5
New York
7
North Carolina 3
Ohio
6
Ohio
10
Pennsylvania
3
Pennsylvania 8
Pennsylvania 19
Pennsylvania 20
Rhode Island 1
Texas
2
Texas
12

Categorization
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy

Name/Party
Bill Dickinson (R)
Charles Pashayan (R)
Jim Bates (D)
Doug Barnard Jr.(D)
Frank Annunzio (D)
Roy Dyson (D)
Arlan Strangeland (R)
Ronald Machtley (R)
David Skaggs (D)
Gary Franks (R)
Richard Durbin (D)
John Myers (R)
Frank McCloskey (D)
Jim Ross Lightfoot (R)
Dan Glickman (D)
Joseph Early (D)
Nicholas Mavroules (D)
Dale Kildee (D)
David Bonior (D)
Gerry Sikorski (D)
Alan Wheat (D)
Dick Swett (D)
Robert Torricelli (D)
George Hochbrueckner (D)
Thomas Downey (D)
Gary Ackerman (D)
Thomas Manton (D)
Martin Lancaster (D)
Bob McEwen (R)
Mary Rose Oakar (D)
Robert Borski (D)
Peter Kostmayer (D)
Bill Goodling (R)
Austin Murphy (D)
Ronald Machtley (R)
Charles Wilson (D)
Pete Geren (D)
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Table C.1

cont

Year

State

District

Categorization

1992
1992
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994

Texas
Texas
Texas
Wisconsin
California
Nevada
Texas

16
23
25
6
43
1
14

controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy

Name/Party
Ronald Coleman (D)
Albert Bustamante (D)
Michael Andrews (D)
Thomas Petri (R)
Ken Calvert (R)
James Bilbray (D)
Greg Laughlin (D)
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Table C.2

Senate Campaigns Involving Incumbent Controversy or Scandal, 1974-94

Year

State

Categorization

1974
1974
1974
1976
1976
1976
1976
1978
1978
1978
1978
1980
1980
1980
1984
1984
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1988
1990
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994
1994

Alaska
Colorado
Washington
Indiana
Maryland
Nevada
New Mexico
Massachusetts
Michigan
Texas
West Virginia
Georgia
Kentucky
Missouri
Iowa
Oregon
Idaho
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Delaware
Illinois
Arizona
New York
Ohio
Massachusetts
Montana
Texas
Virginia

controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy
scandal
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
controversy
scandal
controversy

Name/Party
Mike Gravel (D)
Peter Dominick (R)
Warren Magnuson (D)
Vance Hartke (D)
Glenn Beall Jr. (R)
Howard Cannon (D)
Joseph Montoya (D)
Edward Brooke (R)
Robert Griffin (R)
John Tower (R)
Jennings Randolph (D)
Herman Talmadge (D)
Wendell Ford (D)
Thomas Eagleton (D)
Roger Jepsen (R)
Mark Hatfield (R)
Steven Symms (R)
Alfonse D'Amato (R)
Mark Andrews (R)
John Glenn (D)
James Abdnor (R)
Bob Kasten (R)
Dave Durenberger (R)
Joseph Biden (D)
Paul Simon (D)
John McCain (R)
Alfonse D'Amato (R)
John Glenn (D)
Edward Kennedy (D)
Conrad Bums (R)
Kay Bailey Hutchison (R)
Chuck Robb (D)
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APPENDIX D: CELEBRITY CHALLENGERS
Table D.l

Celebrity Challengers in House Campaigns, 1974-94

Year

State & District

Reason for Celebrity

Name/Party

1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1976
1976
1976
1976
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1982
1982
1982
1982
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

Indiana 4
Nevada 1
New York 29
North Carolina 6
North Carolina 8
Colorado 2
Missouri 5
South Carolina 5
Vermont 1
Alabama 1
California 27
Colorado 2
Missouri 2
Virginia 1
California 27
California 43
Connecticut 4
Indiana 3
New York 23
New York 39
Ohio 2
Ohio 12
California 32
Florida 19
Massachusetts 10
North Carolina 3
California 27
Delaware 1
Missouri 2
Nebraska 2
Ohio 9
Colorado 3
Georgia 4
Maryland 2
Missouri 8
West Virginia 3

member o f prominent family Walter Hehnke (R)
member o f prominent family James Santini (D)
member o f prominent family Edward Pattison (D)
war hero & college athlete
R.S. Ritchie (R)
W.G. Hefner (D)
television performer
television personality
Ed Scott (R)
addressed Rep. Convention Joanne Collins (R)
professional athlete
Robert Richardson (R)
John Burgess (D)
nationally known attorney
L.W. Noonan (D)
college athlete
Gregory Peck's son
Carey Peck (D)
television personality
Ed Scott (R)
television journalist
Robert Chase (R)
son of decorated soldier
Lew Puller (D)
Gregory Peck's son
Carey Peck (D)
leader o f state KKK
Tom Metzger (D)
noted scientist
John Phillips (D)
member o f prominent family John Hiler (R)
noted businessman
Andrew Albanese (R)
noted civic leader
James Abdella (R)
television journalist
Tom Atkins (R)
television personality
Robert Shamansky (D)
brother o f U.S. Rep
Brian Lungren (R)
television journalist
Glenn Rinker (R)
noted businessman
John Conway (R)
decorated soldier
Eugene McDaniel (R)
Robert Scribner (R)
professional athlete
wife o f governor
Elise du Pont (R)
John Buechner (R)
radio personality
member o f prominent family Tom Cavanaugh (D)
television journalist
Frank Venner (R)
Olympic gold medalist
Ben N. Campbell (D)
actor
Ben Jones (D)
R.F.K.'s daughter
Kathleen K. Townsend (D)
Wayne Cryts (D)
led demonstration
television journalist
Tim Sharp (R)
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Table D.l

cont.

Year

State & District

Reason for Celebrity

Name/Party

1988
1988
1988
1990
1990
1990
1990
1992
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

Pennsylvania 15
Georgia 4
Tennessee 3
Alaska 1
California 37
Missouri 8
West Virginia 2
California 42
Minnesota 6
New Jersey 4
Arizona 6
Florida 5
Nevada 2
North Carolina 3
North Carolina 11

member of prominent family Ed Reibman (D)
Ben Jones (D)
actor
Harold Coker (R)
television personality
part o f Exxon Valdez event John Devens(D)
actor
Ralph Waite (D)
member of prominent family Russ Carnahan (D)
Oliver Luck (R)
college athlete
Dick Rutan (R)
flew plane around world
television journalist
Rod Grams (R)
member of prominent family Brian Hughes (D)
sportscaster
J. D. Hayworth (R)
drag-racing icon
Don Garlits (R)
best-selling author
Janet Greeson (D)
son o f former U.S. Rep
Walter Jones Jr. (R)
television journalist
Maggie P. Lauterer (D)
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Table D.2

Celebrity Challengers in Senate Campaigns, 1974-94

Year

State

Reason for Celebrity

Name/Parly

1974
1976
1976
1976
1984
1986
1988
1988
1988
1994

South Dakota
California
New Mexico
New York
Michigan
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Jersey
Virginia

former Vietnam P.O.W.
Leo Thorsness (R)
prominent academic
S. I. Hayakawa (R)
astronaut
Harrison Schmitt (R)
former ambassador to U.N. D.P. Moynihan (D)
astronaut
Jack Lousma (R)
executive director of NFLPA Ed Garvey (D)
son o f Hubert Humphrey Hubert Humphrey III (D)
"dashing" war hero
Robert Kerrey (D)
football star
Pete Dawkins (R)
involvment in Iran-Contra
Oliver North (R)
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APPENDIX E: REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS
Table E .l

Reduced Form Regression for Incumbent Spending in Senate Elections

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Spending
Independent Variables

B

b

T

Governor

.284

.063

1.20

Senator

-.414

-.037

-.73

U.S.Rep

.322

.130

2.33***

Major

.293

.101

1.84**

Minor

-.096

-.044

-.79

Celebrity

.424

.083

1.60*

Controversy

.228

.069

1.38*

Scandal

-.474

-.078

-1.52*

Unemployment

-.052

-.116

-2.18**

Unemploy* Party

.015

.058

.97

Party I.D.

.127

.077

1.19

Ideological Distance

-.036

-.028

-1.28*

Census

-.090

-.009

-9.25***

Wealth

.102

.121

.84

Party

-.275

-.145

-2.47***

R-Squared=.49
Note: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01

N==279
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Table E.2

Reduced Form Regression for Challenger Spending in Senate Elections

Dependent Variable: Challenger Spending
b

B

T

Governor

1.688

.257

4.72***

Senator

1.243

.075

1.46*

U.S. Rep

1.241

.341

5.94***

Major

1.407

.333

5.86***

Minor

.269

.084

1.46*

Celebrity

1.308

.175

3.26***

Controversy

.543

.112

2.16**

fN

-.59

OO

Independent Variables

-.031

Unemployment

-.044

-.067

-1.23

Unemploy*Party

.005

.015

.24

Party I.D.

.056

.089

1.60*

Ideological Distance

.010

.012

1.11

Census

-.064

-.229

-4.33***

Wealth

.706

.200

3.84***

Party

.023

.008

.14

Scandal

R-Squared=42
N=279
Note: *<.10 **<05 ***<01
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Table E J

Reduced Form Regression for Incumbent Spending in House Elections

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Spending
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Governor

.371

.010

.69

Senator

.892

.018

1.17

U.S. Rep

.731

.098

6.34***

Major

.517

.135

8.63***

Minor

.374

.154

9.83***

Celebrity

.421

.062

4.00***

Controversy

.428

.079

5.10***

Scandal

.174

.019

1.27

Health

.043

.002

.16

Party I.D.

.006

.109

6.59***

Ideological Distance

.050

.047

1.08

Population

-4.660

-.260

-16.72***

Wealth

.241

.087

5.58***

Party

-.054

-.032

-1.96**

R-Squared=48
N=3567
Note: *<.10 **<05 ***<01
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Table E.4

Reduced Form Regression for Challenger Spending in House Elections

Dependent Variable: Challenger Spending
Independent Variables

b

B

T

Governor

.334

.006

.39

Senator

1.259

.016

1.05

U.S. Rep

1.582

.139

8.67***

Major

1.249

.213

13.12***

Minor

.933

.247

15.22***

Celebrity

1.171

.113

7.05***

Controversy

.829

.101

6.25***

Scandal

.860

.061

3.84***

Health

.727

.027

1.71**

Party I.D.

.015

.139

8.23***

Ideological Distance

.086

.018

1.30*

Population

-2.342

-.008

-.51

Wealth

.660

.152

9.43***

Party

.087

.032

1.91**

R-Squared=45
N=3186
Note: *<10 **<05 ***<01
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE STATISTICS
Table F.l

Sample Statistics for Variables in the Model—House

Variable

Mean

Incumbent Vote %

65.18

Incumbent $

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

10.25

26.0

96.4

279,890

220,402

0

2,384,676

Challengers

123,576

169,361

0

2,422,318

Incumbent $ PV

.55

.41

.00

5.10

Challenger $ PV

.25

.33

.00

4.62

Party I.D.

10.31

13.18

-16.70

35.40

Census

508,156

45,813

302,173

799,065

Variable

Percentage

Number

Governor

.1

2

Senator

.0

1

U.S. Rep.

1.2

44

Major

4.8

173

Minor

13.1

470

Celebrity

1.5

53

Controversy

2.4

86

Scandal

.9

31

Health

.2

8

Wealth

9.8

349

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table F.2

Sample Statistics for Variables in the Model-Senate
Minimum

Maximum

9.36

37.50

83.20

2,453,085

2,256,911

0

16,282,540

Challenger $

1,316,491

2,025,352

0

20,222,466

Incumbent $ PV

.94

.90

.00

5.97

Challenger $ PV

.47

.65

.00

6.11

Party I.D.

6.51

10.48

-17.4

27.0

Unemployment

6.57

2.10

2.20

15.50

Census

4,560,000

4,930,000

470,000

29,730,000

Variable

Percentage

Number

Governor

4.6

13

Senator

.7

2

U.S. Rep.

17.5

49

Major

12.1

34

Minor

25.0

70

Celebrity

3.6

10

Controversy

8.9

25

Scandal

2.5

7

Health

1.8

5

Wealth

18.9

53

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Incumbent Vote %

59.13

Incumbent $
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